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  The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) is an informal 
association of university and government economists.  The Consortium has taken a keen interest 
in the Uruguay Round and the negotiations on agriculture from the inception of talks in 1986.  
During the Uruguay Round, the Consortium published, under the overall title of “Bringing 
Agriculture into the GATT”, a series of eight Commissioned Papers that have attempted to 
monitor and interpret the progress of the negotiations and in a modest way to provide a platform 
for ideas.  After the negotiations were concluded, Commissioned Papers w ere published, 
evaluating the new Agreement on Agriculture and the commitments that major countries had 
accepted under it.  The present paper continues the series by assessing the issues of reforming 
tariff-rate import quotas in the Agreement and drawing i mplications for the current round of 
negotiations.  Even though the Uruguay Round has firmly embedded agriculture into GATT 
disciplines, the series title “Bringing Agriculture into the GATT” has been maintained to indicate 
the unity of the overall series. 
Like previous Commissioned papers of the IATRC, the present work is that of a team of 
economists.  This paper was organized under the Chairmanship of Harry de Gorter with 17 other 
contributing authors.  Each co-author contributed a draft of one or more chapters and participated 
in reading and improving the other chapters. The drafting responsibilities for the specific issues 
were as follows: chapter 3 (GATT Rules) de Gorter, Boughner and Skully; chapter 4 (Overview) 
Liapis; chapter 5 (EU) Bureau and Tangermann; chapter 6 (U.S.) Skully; chapter 7 (U.S. dairy) 
Coleman and Boughner; chapter 8 (developing countries) Abbott and Morse; chapter 9 (Japan 
and Korea) Choi and Sumner; chapter 10 (Canada) Barichello; chapter 11 (Australia and New 
Zealand) MacLaren; chapter 12 (Bananas) Herrmann, Kramb and Moennich; and chapters 1 -2 
and 13 were drafted by de Gorter and Sheldon, but with significant input from several other 
authors.  The authors are aware of the fact that different views on a number of policy issues are 
occasionally presented in the individual country chapters.  To a large extent, these divergences of 
views reflect different attitudes adopted in the respective countries, and it is for that reason that 
not all of them have been ironed out in the process of e diting the country drafts.  Though not 
necessarily agreeing with everything in the paper, each of the authors has nevertheless agreed to 
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1.  Introduction 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) put in place a set of rules that 
may, in the future, have significant effects on the conditions for market access for agricultural 
products.  In most cases, bound tariffs replaced non-tariff barriers such as quotas, embargoes and 
licenses.  Rules facing exporters were to be now more transparent.  In addition, minimum access 
commitments were made through the use of tariff rate import quotas, with a lower tariff (in-quota 
tariff) for imports within the quota, and a higher tariff rate (out-of-quota tariff) for imports 
exceeding the quota. A total of 35 countries including all OECD Member countries (except 
Turkey) have scheduled 1,370+ tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for agricultural commodities in the 
members’ schedules that are annexed to the URAA.  Although agriculture i s now integrated into 
the multilateral trading system, most commentators agree that the URAA did little actually to 
liberalize agricultural trade ( USDA, 1997; ABARE, 1999;  OECD, 1999).  Bound out-of-quota 
tariffs remain very high while quotas have resulted in the institutionalization of pre-existing rents 
for specific countries and firms or state trading enterprises (STEs), thereby potentially 
maintaining resistance by these stakeholders to any trade liberalization initiatives.   
However, the potential for  trade liberalization through reduction in tariffs or increases in 
quotas could be realized at the agricultural trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Developing countries in particular have much at stake here, as they are potentially large 
exporters who lose significantly from agricultural trade restrictions (Hertel and Martin, 1999).  
The purpose of this Commissioned Paper is to assess the problems and issues related to 
liberalizing market access and to administering the large number of TRQs.  No specific 
provisions were approved in the URAA regarding administration of the quotas, although relevant 
GATT rules were to apply.  Trade liberalization with TRQs is very complex, with two tariffs, a 
quota and several specific situations like over-quota imports, quota under-fill and preferential 
quotas and tariffs.  In terms of administering TRQs, WTO member countries use a host of 
different methods, ranging from applied tariffs, and auctioning, to licenses on demand and first-
come, first served.    Each of these methods can lead to differing inefficiencies and inequities.  In 
addition, other conditions placed on TRQ administration like domestic purchase requirements 
(prohibited by existing GATT rules) or quota limits per firm also have the potential to generate 
inefficiencies.   2 
 
Quota administration can have a direct influence on both trade flows and the distribution 
of rents originating under the quotas, and is, therefore, a highly political issue.  In the debate 
about implementation of the URAA, much dissatisfaction has been voiced regarding TRQ 
administration in many specific cases, and, in some cases, formal disputes have been brought 
before the WTO.  There is an urgent need to provide more information on how TRQs are 
currently administered, what t he economic implications are for TRQ reform and trade 
liberalization, how trade flows have developed under TRQs, what better rules for TRQ 
administration might look like, and how the next round of WTO negotiations should deal with 
TRQs in agriculture. The following chapters provide this essential information. 
TRQs at low or minimal tariffs provide market access opportunities in agriculture, 
beyond the hoped-for effects of the scheduled reduction in tariffs.  TRQs were put in place to 
deal with the fact that tariffication of existing quantitative restrictions would have shut off all 
trade in many cases.  All countries were expected to allow access to their domestic markets for 
imports equivalent to at least 3 percent of domestic consumption in the 1986-1988 base period.  
This proportion was to rise to 5 percent by the year 2000 (2004 for developing countries).  These 
provisions refer to “minimum access”.  When traditional imports did not represent a sufficient 
percentage of domestic consumption, TRQs were applied so as to meet URAA minimum access 
commitments. 
In addition, the  URAA agreed that preexisting market access had to be preserved.  That 
is, access conditions for historically established import quantities would be maintained by a 
provision referred to as "current access".  Hence, for a number of products, countries opened up 
TRQs in order to meet the obligations of current access.  In most countries, TRQs have mainly 
been used to maintain traditional import flows but have not led to a large increase in trade. This 
can be explained by several factors: 
•  URAA commitments were based on the Modalities established by the WTO, which were not 
incorporated as part of the URAA (see  IATRC, 1994).  What countries actually agreed to 
was what they respectively submitted  in their schedules, whether or not it reflected the 
application of the Modalities. As a result, the Modalities discipline was not always followed 
in practice, and the operation of TRQs was left to individual country discretion. For example,   3 
 
some countries calculated their TRQs in a way that does not always correspond to 3 percent 
of consumption. This also  made it possible to minimize market access increases for more 
politically sensitive commodities. 
•  TRQs were often set for products characterized by tariff  peaks, so the out-of-quota tariffs 
remain prohibitive.  
•  Commitments as well as management of  TRQs lack transparency in many countries. This 
creates gray areas that allow some countries to get around some of the  URAA disciplines. 
One example is the latitude given to (or taken by) countries either to use different  - and 
sometimes inconsistent  - statistical classifications or to define products at a level of very fine 
detail, restricting access to quotas for particular products from specific origins. 
•  TRQs under minimum access are not always allocated on a non-discriminatory basis, as was 
specified in the Modalities.  Countries have used existing freedom to fill not only current 
access but also, sometimes, minimum access  TRQs with imports under preferential 
agreements.  In such cases, one or a few countries are allowed access to the TRQ concerned 
and can take advantage of the new trade opportunities.  Where this is the case, it considerably 
limits the scope of the current functioning of the  URAA in terms of trade liberalization.  In 
some cases, quotas are allocated to countries that are unlikely to be able to export the 
relevant commodity.  In other cases, tariffs under preferential agreements are lower than the 
in-quota  MFN tariffs so those minimum access quotas  are,  de facto, filled with preferential 
imports from particular countries. 
•  Even though countries are obligated to open their markets to imports at particular tariffs 
within the  TRQs specified in their schedules, they are not required to import quantities 
corresponding to the TRQs.  Market conditions may preclude a 100 percent quota fill rate.  In 
some cases, only a small share of the  TRQ quantities is actually imported because of the 
manner in which TRQs are administered.  This translates into a low fill rate for such quotas. 
TRQs have various institutional designs with respect to the distribution of quota shares 
among countries and licenses among importing and exporting firms.  A  global quota has imports 
determined by market forces (provided there are no biases in the licensing schemes) while   4 
 
country-specific allocations involves the importing country assigning shares to specific exporting 
countries.  In the latter case, WTO rules require that such allocations aim at a distribution of 
trade approximating to  the shares which would occur in the absence of restrictions (see Article 
XXIII).  Licenses are often used as a means of administering TRQs, and can be assigned to 
importing or exporting firms (or to both such that an importing firm needs to present both an 
import and an export license to import authorities).  The share of rent going to importing or 
exporting countries will depend on the bargaining power resulting from any licensing 
requirements.   
An efficient TRQ administration method will be one that allows for full utilization of the 
import quota (in terms of quotas allocated to importing firms and of the latter fully using their 
allocation).  Rules such as tradability of quotas and/or licenses (e.g., sold or rented) will affect 
the incentives for utilizing TRQs.  An understanding of the implications of allocating non-
tradable, country-specific export quotas and licenses to importing or exporting firms is 
important.  The method of allocating quotas can have important implications for the impact of 
trade liberalization.  For example, if export licenses are allocated to high cost producers, 
reduction of in-quota tariffs may result in increased quota fill, whereas an increase in the quota 
may result in quota under-fill.   Other factors affecting the efficient  administration of TRQs 
include simplicity, transparency, and certainty.  
In the following chapters, such issues surrounding TRQs will be discussed in general and 
for specific country cases and commodity sectors.  After the analysis of alternative TRQ 
liberalization scenarios, the implementation of the  URAA  is assessed in terms of five major 
issues: 
•  Identification of the many different TRQ  allocation methods and the problems associated 
with those methods, including the additional conditions 
•  The incidence and problems associated with  discrimination, as in country-specific export 
quotas and import and export licensing to trading firms 
•  The economics of fill rates and the reasons for and implications of quota under- or over-fill   5 
 
•  Problems associated with TRQ  transparency and notification procedures  (including the 
means by which countries may circumvent market access commitments such as through 
calculation procedures) 
•  The tariffs for the commodities under TRQs and the administration of TRQS. 
The basic economics of T RQs and trade liberalization are discussed first in Chapter 2, 
along with a summary of inefficiencies that can be generated from alternative quota 
administration methods. 
In Chapter 3, the GATT rules regarding quantitative restrictions are examined, and an 
interpretation of GATT Article XIII is presented that shows it is inherently contradictory  – it 
advocates non-discrimination and use of tariffs, yet also permits TRQs to be allocated on an 
historical basis, a procedure which is typically discriminatory.  This can cause tension between 
trading partners.  An examination of import and export licensing rules is also conducted, using 
the Banana Dispute as an example. 
Using a selected sample of data on commodities and countries worldwide, a global view 
of relative tariff rates, quota fill rates and trade flows is then described in Chapter 4.  This 
provides an overview for the individual country case studies that are presented in subsequent 
chapters.  
In Chapter 5, the use of TRQs in the European Union (EU) is examined, 87 TRQs having 
been implemented in order to meet the EU’s market access obligations.  About 60 percent of the 
TRQs relate to minimum access, while the remainder relates to current access.  The latter 
category has been documented with much more transparency compared to those of other 
countries such as the United States.  The chapter concludes that the EU has chosen to administer 
its TRQs in a way that neither discourages imports nor improves economic efficiency.  The most 
common methods of TRQ administration are licenses on demand, historical allocation, and first-
come first-served.  Fill rates have been quite high for most TRQs, and there is no evidence that 
the EU has managed TRQs in such a way as to discourage market access.  The TRQ system 
accounted for most of the increased access to the EU market after the URAA.  In terms of further   6 
 
trade liberalization, the chapter concludes that increasing quota volumes in the EU is likely to 
result in more gains than reductions in tariffs. 
In the case of the United States described in Chapters 6 and 7, a total of 54 TRQs 
covering 7 product categories have been notified to the WTO.  Of these, the TRQs covering 
sugar, peanuts, cotton, and dairy products originated in quotas designed to maintain a U.S. 
domestic price support program.  Most of the TRQs in the United States are allocated on an 
historical market share basis, and once allocated, they are likely to become difficult to 
redistribute in accordance with changing comparative advantage. 
In Chapter 8, the implementation and administration of TRQs in developing countries is 
analyzed.  Fourteen developing countries have notified the WTO that they utilize TRQs for over 
180 agricultural commodities, the countries being Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and 
Venezuela. Only Korea and the Philippines are actually implementing TRQs typically found in 
rich countries.  The remaining countries made notifications to the WTO of the use of TRQs to 
verify that they are meeting their access commitments.  In at least half of the total cases, an 
applied tariff is the relevant regime, while for a third of cases, licenses are either being employed 
or there is STE involvement.  In many cases, applied tariffs are well below a country’s bound 
GATT rates, the exceptions being Korea and the Philippines where applied tariffs are close to 
GATT bindings.  This suggests that there has already been substantial trade liberalization in 
some of these markets, and over-fill of quotas is as common as under-fill.  The chapter concludes 
by arguing that maximal benefits from future trade liberalization in developing countries are 
most likely to come from tariff reduction rather than expansion of import quotas. 
The analysis in Chapter 9, which is concerned with Korea and Japan, indicates that TRQs 
for all agricultural imports were established following the URAA, specifically, 67 in the case of 
Korea, and 19 in the case of Japan.  Korea administers its TRQs through licenses on demand, 
first-come first-served, auctioning, and STEs, while Japan uses both licenses and STEs.  
Interestingly, although the US and other exporting countries have targeted STEs for investigation 
in the next round of trade negotiations, TRQs involving STEs have the highest fill rates in Korea 
and Japan.  Access for some commodities, such as rice, is less open than would be the case if   7 
 
quota amounts were made available on a commercial basis.  As a result, consumer benefits are 
reduced, and allocation across import suppliers has been affected. 
The focus in Chapter 10 is on Canada, where a total of 21 TRQs are administered for 
agricultural commodities, the fill rates being typically high.  Most Canadian TRQs are allocated 
to private firms, and administration imposes minimal burden on importers.  Canada allocates 
import quotas mostly on the basis of licenses granted to importing firms which imported the 
product historically.  Provisions are made for new entrants.  While allocating quotas to firms 
with historical market share may not be the most efficient method, Canada has started to make 
progress toward transferability of quotas on a permanent basis, with quotas now being tradable in 
many categories.  Overall, the chapter notes that Canada’s TRQ regime has been successful in 
maintaining transparency, and minimizing costs to importers, although additional gains could be 
made through further simplification of quota administration, notably for poultry, and if quotas 
could either be bought and sold or r ented within a particular year in all product categories.  
Quota rents could also be spread more widely if quota auctions were adopted. 
The effects of TRQs from the perspective of 2 major exporters: Australia and New 
Zealand are analyzed in Chapter 11 while the recent banana dispute in the WTO is analyzed in 
Chapter 12.  The lessons to be learned from this latter dispute and the implications for the 
administration of TRQs in the URAA are discussed.  Finally, in Chapter 13 we look ahead to the 
URAA negotiations and provide an assessment of the ways in which trade liberalization can be 
maximized and potential reforms of TRQ administration methods to provide for more efficient 
and equitable TRQ regimes.   8 
 
2.  The Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas and the Effects of Trade Liberalization  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the economics of trade liberalization with tariff 
quotas, describe the potential inefficiencies resulting from various administration methods 
(including the inefficiencies of non-tradability  of import licenses and country-specific export 
quotas), and to outline features of a more desirable TRQ administration model.  Tariff rate 
quotas allowed countries to make market access commitments through both import tariffs and 
quotas.  ‘Tariffication’ i nvolved the conversion of non-tariff barriers into MFN out-of-quota 
tariffs, which were bound and reduced by an unweighted average of 36% (minimum of 15% per 
tariff line) by 2000/01 (and four years later for developing countries).  ‘Quotification’ provisions 
provided import opportunities despite the high out-of-quota tariffs, with minimum access assured 
and current access not restricted.  All countries agreed to maintain a minimum access of 3% of 
domestic consumption (in the base period 1986-88) and increase to 5% by the year 2000.  
   In order to meet access commitments, many countries scheduled an ‘in-quota’ and an out-
of-quota’ tariff.  The import quota was to provide a means for countries to allow imports up to at 
least current and minimum access levels w ith a lower tariff for in-quota (including ‘over-quota’
1) 
imports and a higher tariff for out-of-quota imports.  There was no uniformity across countries or 
commodities in absolute or relative levels of the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs, resulting in 
differing (potential and realized) trade liberalization effects.
2  Quota rents are therefore also 
unequal across countries and commodities.  Many out-of-quota tariffs were prohibitively high 
(aided by the process of purposeful miscalculation or ‘dirty tariffication’), making the quota the 
maximum import level.  Some countries also used creative methods to minimize access through 
‘dirty quotification’
3. 
As will be shown below, the effects of trade liberalization depend critically on  which of 
the three basic r egimes is operational to begin with (the quota, the in-quota tariff or the out-of-
quota tariff), the trade liberalization option under consideration (lowering either tariff or 
increasing the quota level), and how close one is to a regime switch with trade  liberalization.  
                                                 
1 The level of ‘over-quota’ imports at the in-quota tariff is determined at the discretion of the importing country. 
2 Countries were more easily able to meet their trade liberalization obligations (a 36% in the unweighted average of 
all tariffs) by reducing low tariff sectors relatively more (in percentage terms).   9 
 
Furthermore, tariff quotas involve other complexities that are also important for policy makers to 
understand before the true effects of trade liberalization can be determined.  We will show in 
section 3 of this chapter that over-quota imports, quota under-fill (other than that due to the in-
quota tariff being the effective instrument), quota and non-quota imports at preferential tariff 
rates, preferential or ‘country specific export’ quotas, and “non-notified” import quotas (e.g., 
preferential quotas for Eastern Europe) can all complicate the analysis.  The analysis to follow 
shows how TRQs involve many complexities for policy makers to understand before meaningful 
trade liberalization can occur.  The discussion is not meant to be exhaustive but illustrative and 
highlights the key factors to be taken into consideration for the negotiations.    
The final two sections of this chapter discuss the possible inefficiencies of alternative 
tariff quota administration methods and outlines desirable f eatures of a more efficient and 
equitable TRQ regime. 
 
2.1  The Basic Economics of Tariff Quotas 
 It is important to be able to identify the condition under which the quota or either tier 
tariff becomes effective, i.e., which policy instrument is the constraint and so determines the 
level of imports and domestic/world prices.  One can then describe the interaction between the 
tariffs and quota in their effects on trade and welfare, and the distribution of quota rents and tariff 
revenues.  Liberalizing trade  via a reduction in tariffs has a different effect on these variables 
than increasing quota levels. 
Let us formally define the three basic policy instruments in a tariff-quota scheme: the 
import quota Q
quota; the tariff t 1  on in-quota imports (including possibly over-quota imports), and 
the higher tariff t 2  on out-of-quota imports.
4  Only one of the import tariffs or the quota can be 
effective  in determining imports and domestic/world prices, rendering the other two policy 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Examples of how countries manipulated quantities was choosing different base periods, using net versus gross 
imports or calculate consumption at a product aggregation level that suited their purposes. 
4 We ignore for the moment in this formal analysis the possibility of quota under-fill (other than that due to the in-
quota tariff being the effective instrument), over-quota imports with government discretion at in-quota tariffs (where 
imports can be above the quota), quota and non-quota imports at preferential tariff rates, and “non-notified” import 
quotas.     10 
 
instruments redundant.
5  For a tariff to be effective, therefore, it must change the volume of trade 
from the bound quota level.  Otherwise, each tariff is redundant and the quota becomes effective, 
in which case the world price plus the out-of-quota tariff must be greater than (and the world 
price plus the in-quota tariff must be less than) the domestic price resulting from the import 
quota alone. 
The in-quota tariff can be effective when the world price plus the in-quota tariff is greater 
than the unobserved or ‘what if’ domestic price that would have occurred if the import quota was 
the only policy instrument (likewise for the out-of-quota tariff if the world price including the 
out-of-quota tariff is below the hypothetical import determining domestic price).  
Figure 2.1 shows that if the quota level is very high and close to the free trade level (i.e. 
such as Q 1
quota which is close to the intersection of the excess demand curve ED and the excess 
supply curve ES), then the in-quota tariff t1 is effective and the domestic price = PW + t1.  A tariff 
causes a wedge between the domestic price and the world price P W. The equilibrium is 
determined when the wedge between the excess supply (determining P W) and the excess demand 
(determining the domestic price) curves is equal to the tariff.  This equilibrium determines total 
imports that are lower than free trade levels.  Indeed, when the in-quota tariff t 1 is effective, 
imports would be at the maximum level M
*
MAX in Figure 2.1 and will remain so as long as the 
quota level is to the right of M
*
MAX.  The resulting domestic price would be at the minimum PMIN 
and quota under-fill occurs.  
If, on the other hand, the quota is very low and close to the origin like Q 2
quota in Figure 
2.1, then the out-of-quota tariff t 2 is effective.  The out-of-quota tariff  determines the minimum 
level of total imports M
*
MIN and the maximum possible domestic price P MAX occur under this 
scenario.  Because the quota level is to the left of the minimum level of total imports (the 
requirement for the t 2 tariff to be effective in  the first place), out-of-quota imports occur.  If the 
                                                 
5 The world price is defined to be the c.i.f price net of marketing costs to the appropriate market in the domestic 
market for the importer.   11 
 
quota falls between the minimum and maximum level of imports, then the quota is effective in 
determining the domestic price like that depicted by Qe
quota in Figure 2.1.
6   
Hence, there are three possible regimes over all levels of the import tariff rate quota Q
quota:  
•  the “in-quota tariff regime” where the lower in-quota tariff t 1 is operative (for example, 
Q1
quota in Figure 2.1), where quota rents and out-of-quota revenues are zero, but in-quota 
tariff revenues are areas c+f+h+i.  
•  the “out-of-quota tariff regime” where the higher out-of-quota tariff t 2 is operative (for 
example,  Q2
quota in Figure 2.1), where quota rents equal areas  a+b, out-of-quota tariff 
revenues are areas d+e+f, and in-quota tariff revenues of area c. 
•  the “quota regime” where the import quota (for example,  Qe
quota  in Figure 2.1) determines 
price, where quota rents are areas b+e+g, in-quota tariff revenues are areas c+f+h, and out-
of-quota tariff revenues are zero. 
2.2  The Implications for Future Trade Negotiations 
The analysis in Figure 2.1 demonstrates that, depending on the regime in effect, only one 
instrument can be effective at a time, so reducing either tariff (namely, the effective one) or 
increasing the quota will result in trade liberalization.  Therefore, negotiators need to identify and 
change the one policy instrument of the three that is effective to begin with in order to maximize 
the effects of trade liberalization.  
Under some circumstances, regime switches could occur (perhaps with only small 
changes in the one effective policy instrument).  A further reduction in the tariff (or an increase 
in the quota) would then become ineffective in liberalizing trade.  To counter this, it is important 
to not only identify the effective instrument in the current situation but also how soon the 
instrument becomes redundant upon liberalization.  To do this, one can compare the relative 
level of out-of-quota imports to the quota and the quota fill rate.  This provides information 
about how close one is to a regime switch. 
                                                 
6 A regime switch can also occur with a shift in the free trade equilibrium, independent of policy changes.  For 
example, large increases in import costs (due to an increase in world prices) or insufficient domestic demand 
(resulting in a leftward shift in excess demand) could trigger the in-quota tariff regime to be effective.   12 
 
Consider, for example, the case where t
*
e is close to but less than t
*
2  (i.e., imagine Q e
quota in 




e is the tariff equivalent of the 
binding quota.  A small reduction in the out-of-quota tariff rate t 2 will have no impact on 
imports.  A simultaneous increase in the quota will be required in order for trade liberalization to 
occur.  However, once t
*
2  reaches t
*
e (the tariff equivalent when the quota is binding), f urther 
decreases in the rate t 2 will have maximal effect in liberalizing trade.  Hence, for such cases 
where t
*
e is close to t
*
2, it may be sufficient to focus on negotiating significant reductions in the 
tariff rate t2 only. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the effects of alternative trade liberalization scenarios.  Notice that 
when the out-of-quota tariff rate t 2 is effective (like with Q2
quota in Figure 2.1), then an increase in 
the quota has no volume effect initially until imports under the quota are greater than  M
*
MIN.  
Conversely, when the quota is initially effective (like Q e
quota in Figure 2.1), then a decrease in the 
tariff rate t 2 has no effect unless t 2 goes so low as to generate imports beyond the quota level 
Qe
quota.  Hence, because the domestic price with a quota (world price plus some tariff equivalent 
te) described earlier is unobserved when the quota is not effective, it is sufficient to observe how 
large out-of-quota imports are relative to the quota, or the quota fill rate.   This gives information 
on how close the unobserved te plus the world price is to the domestic price.  Indeed, to avoid an 
instrument becoming redundant upon liberalization, it may be necessary to have at least two 
liberalizing instruments at the same time.   
To summarize, in order to liberalize trade, negotiators should especially focus on 
reducing out-of-quota tariffs, in those cases with out-of-quota imports or if the out-of-quota tariff 
t2 is close to the tariff equivalent of the quota t e.  If t e is far below t 2, increasing the quota will 
have a greater chance of liberalizing trade in the short run.  A reduction in t 1 will liberalize trade 
only if t 2 is close to and below t 1, in which case both tariffs need to be reduced, or if under-fill is 
significant because t 1 is effective  ￿  otherwise, quotas will also have to be increased in order to 
obtain trade liberalizing effects.  This is highlighted in Table 2.1 where one notices that many 
cells have ‘0’ in them.  This analysis shows the importance of understanding the relationship 
between three tariffs: the in-quota tariff t 1, the out-of-quota tariff t 2 and the tariff equivalent of 
the quota when the quota is effective (where the latter can be derived from observed domestic 
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Figure 2.1: The Economics of the 3 Tariff-Quota Regimes 
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The share of rents versus tariff revenue depends on the relative difference between the 
two tariffs and on the size of the import quota.  There is, however, no one uniform tariff-quota 
policy administered by every country, which makes it difficult to determine whether an increase 
in import quotas or a decrease in tariffs will result in a greater trade liberalizing effect.  
Therefore, there is no general rule on how quota rents and tariff revenues will change with trade 
liberalization. 
  Out-of-quota tariff revenues exist only if Q
quota is to the left of M
*
MIN, while there are 
always t 1 tariff revenues.  Quota rents exist only if Q
quota is less than M
*
MAX.  Quota rents can 
increase with a lower t 1 and a higher t 2, while t 2 revenues  decline with an increase in quota 
levels.  The last 3 columns of Table 2.1 summarize all of the possibilities for changes in rents 
and tariff revenues.  In some cases, the direction of the change in tariff revenues depends on the 
elasticities of excess supply and excess demand.  In other cases, regime switches occur, and so 
tariff revenues could increase, stay the same or decrease. 
2.3  The Economics of Quota Under-fill, Over-quota Imports and Preferential Tariffs  
The discussion so far ignores the possibility of quota under-fill (independent of the in-
quota regime being effective), over-quota imports, and imports under preferential tariffs.  Over-
quota imports occur when it is still profitable to import even though the over-quota duty is paid.  
Imports also  occur at preferential rates which can be below either the in-quota or above-quota 
tariffs, and can be equal to zero. 
The introduction of tariff-rate quotas in no way meant that they would necessarily be 
filled.  So far, we have identified the in-quota tariff may be so high or the quota so large that the 
in-quota tariff is effective and under-fill occurs.  Therefore, a low quota fill rate does not 
necessarily imply inefficiency (there may be unavailable supply or insufficient demand, such that 
the in-quota t ariff is effective).  A fill rate of 100% or more does also not necessarily imply 
efficiency.  However, i nefficiencies and transactions costs imposed by the allocation schemes 
(i.e., country specific export quotas to high cost exporters, export (import) licenses issued to high 
cost firms with non-tradability of quotas/licenses, information costs, implicit non-tariff barriers 
and the like) can result in quota under-fill or partial rent dissipation with a 100 percent quota fill 
rate.  On the other hand, out-of-quota imports could occur on the excess supply curve ES if other   15 
 
exporters do not incur the same costs and constraints as those importing under the quota regime 
(but out-of-quota imports do pay the higher tariff t2). 
The possibility of quota under-fill,  over-quota imports and imports under preferential 
tariffs complicates the analysis of determining the initial regime from observed data, and hence 
of the effects of trade liberalization.  We can identify seven possible outcomes in Table 2.2, 
using hypothetical data.  Column (2) gives the bound quota while column (3) summarizes 
imports under the quota at t 1, which includes the possibility of over-quota imports.  Column (4) 
gives total imports of all products that are specific to the bound tariff-rate quota n otified to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO 2000a)  (it excludes ’non-quota’ imports of a product category, 
for example, particular types of cheeses).  The difference between column (4) and (3) is the out-
of-quota imports (column 5).  The “quota share“ of total imports given in column (6) provides 
critical information on the regime, summarized in column (7).  A quota share equal to 100 
percent means the quota is effective (scenario (f)) or there is under-fill due to either the in-quota 
tariff regime being  effective or inefficiencies of the quota allocation scheme are such that the 
quota is unfilled yet effective (scenarios (d) and (a), respectively, in Table 2.2.  If the quota share 
is less than 100 percent, then there are out-of-quota imports with either the out-of-quota tariff or 
the preferential tariff being effective.   
In scenario (a), imports are greater than the minimum in Figure 2.1 but less than the 
quota: M
*
MIN < M ￿ M
*
MAX and < Q
quota.  In scenarios where either t2 or the preferential rate tp 
are operational (scenarios (b), (c) ,(e), (g) and (h)), it is possible that part of the out-of-quota 
imports occur at the preferential rate and the rest at t 2 (for which case the out-of-quota regime is 
effective).
7  However, if the preferential tariff is effective (not shown in Figure 2.1), then there 
are no out-of-quota imports at t 2.  In these scenarios where either t 2 or t p are effective, the total 
level of imports equal M
*
MIN in Figure 2.1 only for the t 2 regime.  If the t p regime is effective, 
imports are greater than M
*
MIN in Figure 2.1.  Note that imports are less than the quota in 
scenario (b), but greater than the quota in scenario (c), (e) and (g).   
Scenario (d) and (e) have over-quota imports at t1 and so the government has exercised its 
discretionary powers.  Note that the government uses discretion in scenario (e) in allowing over-
                                                 
7 The preferential import tariff regime is not shown in Figure 2.1 but would be some tariff below t2.   16 
 
quota imports, but the out-of-quota regime still applies.  The final two columns o f Table 2.2 
present alternative “fill rates”.  Column (8) presents the “in-quota” fill rate that is published by 
the WTO (2000a) and cited widely.
8  The final column gives the ratio of total imports to the 
quota (the  “total import fill rate”).  Column (9) always exceeds the in-quota fill rate when either 
the t 2 or t p regimes are effective.  In scenario (b) and (c), quota under-fill as defined by the WTO 
(2000a) in column (8) is not as critical as it seems because quota imports were displaced by out-
of-quota imports.  Quota rents were foregone (and are now t 2 tariff revenues) but inefficiency in 
trade has been minimized, given that the quota under-fill is due to high cost exporters receiving 
the quota licenses or inefficiencies in trade generated by the import quota allocation system 
itself. 
Scenarios (b) and (c) are cases where out-of-quota imports occur and the “in-quota import 
fill rate” in column (8) is less than 100 percent.  This is a sufficient (but not a necessary) 
condition for inefficiencies in the  quota allocation methods to exist.  Note that the in-quota fill 
rate reported by the WTO can be greater than 100 percent but an increase in the quota may have 
no effect on trade volume because of over-quota imports.  Likewise, an increase in the quota 
with an in-quota fill rate of less than 100 percent may also have no effect on trade because the 
inefficiencies caused by the quota allocation method to cause under-fill in the first place may 
prevent further increases in imports as well (and in some cases, there are out-of-quota imports 
which would simply be displaced by any increased in-quota imports due to the increase in the 
quota).  The analysis in Table 2.2 highlights the importance of analyzing “quota share” in 
column (6) and the two fill rates in the last two columns to gain a full understanding of which 
regime is operative, and what the implications are for economic efficiency and the distribution of 
quota rents and tariff revenues.  Nevertheless, including quota under-fill, over-quota imports and 
preferential tariffs can change the stylized analysis of tariff-rate quotas in Figure 2.1 and Table 
2.1 substantially.   
The outcomes of identifying initial tariff-quota regimes are even more complicated if one allows 
for the possibility of imports with autonomous (un-notified) and preferential quotas.  If the fill 
rate is less than 100 percent, then imports under quotas not notified to the WTO displaces in-
                                                 
8 The WTO (2000a) does not give any figures above 100 percent because their concern is to compare commitments 
while our numbers in column (9) compare actual in-quota imports.   17 
 
quota imports and so the in-quota import fill rate is underestimated.  In cases where the total 
import fill rate is greater than or equal to 100 percent, it may seem like there are out-of-quota 
imports at t 2 but really the un-notified quota is effective.   Another possibility is that imports 
from high cost exporters under quotas with preferential in-quota tariff rates may result in a 
higher in-quota fill rate than otherwise would be the case because of the preference afforded 
these high cost exporters who would not otherwise export.  These potential complexities also 
need to be taken into account when analyzing tariff-quota liberalization options, but are omitted 
in the discussion here.  
2.4   Alternative Quota Administration Methods 
Almost 50 percent of the total 1371 agricultural tariff quotas scheduled in the WTO are 
administered by “applied tariffs” (Table 2.3).  An applied tariff regime means no quota shares 
are allocated and imports are allowed in unlimited quantities at the in-quota tariff rate or lower.  
“Licenses on demand” are used for another 25 percent of the TRQs whereby import licenses are 
allocated  in relation to quantities demanded (and requests are typically reduced pro rata if they 
exceed the quota volume).
9  “First come, first served” is the third most commonly used 
administration method where imports are allowed in at the in-quota tariff rate until the quota is 
filled.  “Historical allocation” is a method whereby licenses are issued in relation to past imports 
while “auctions” result in licenses allocated on the basis of a competitive bid system.  Imports 
directly controlled by “state trading enterprises” and “producer groups” are the remaining major 
type of administration methods of tariff quotas.  “Other” administration methods are those that 
do not fall into the aforementioned categories, “mixed allocation” refers to methods that are a 
combination of methods listed in Table 2.3, and “not specified” refers to tariff quota 
administration regimes which have not been notified. 
 
                                                 
9 Some licenses on demand regimes allocate licenses on a first come, first served basis.   18 
 
Table 2.1: Effects of Trade Liberalization with TRQ’s 
 




Imports  Farm Welfare  Efficiency  t1 revenue  t2 revenue  Quota rents 
decrease t1  +  -  +  + or -
1  0  0
2 
decrease t2  0




increase quota  0  0  0  0  0  0 
decrease t1  0  0  0  -  0  + 
decrease t2  +  -  +  0  + or -




increase quota  0 then + if 
M >
*
MIN M  
0 then - if 
M >
*
MIN M  
0 then + if 
M >
*
MIN M  
0 then + if 
M >
*
MIN M  
- then 0 if 
M >
*
MIN M  




MIN M  
decrease t1  0  0  0  -  0  + 
decrease t2  0 then + if 
M > 
quota
e Q  
0 then - if 
M > 
quota
e Q  
0 then + if 
M > 
quota
e Q  
0   0 then +  
if M >
quota
e Q  
0 then - if 
M > 
quota




increase quota  +  -  +  +  0  + or -
1 
 
1Outcome depends on the elasticity of excess demand and excess supply. 
2If t1 goes so low that the quota becomes effective, then quota rents are generated. 
3If t2 falls below t1 (as has happened in some cases), then imports increase. 
   19 
 
Table 2.2: Scenarios under the Tariff Rate Quota System with the Possibility of  





1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Imports under the quota (t1)
1  Scenario  Bound 
quota  (a)        
In-
quota  
(b)    
Over-
quota  




















a  100  60  0  60  60  0  100%  t1/Q
3  60%  60% 
b  100  60  0  60  80  20  75%  t2/tp  60%  80% 
c  100  60  0  60  120  60  50%  t2/tp  60%  120% 
d  100  100  20  120  120  0  100%  t1/Q  120%  120% 
e  100  100  20  120  180  60  66%  t2/tp  120%  180% 
f 
4  100  100  0  100  100  0  100%  Q  100%  100% 
g  100  100  0  100  120  20  83%  t2/tp  100%  120% 
h
5  100  60  0  60  100  40  60%  t2/tp  60%  100% 
 
1  all imports that came in at t1 (bound in-quota rate) or lower applied rate 
2  all imports that came in at t2 (applied out-of-quota rate) or preferential rates tp ￿ 0 
3  Q represents the committed or bound quota plus discretionary over-quota imports (if relevant)  
4  It is possible but only by chance that the in-quota tariff regime is operative 
5  Row h is italicized because it is identical to row c.  The t2 regime occurs with in-quota imports less than the quota AND 
when total imports are greater than the quota. 
 
*  The data in this table is hypothetical for illustrative purposes only.  The analysis also ignores the possibility of non-
notified quotas and non-quota imports. 
 
 
Source: de Gorter and Kask (forthcoming).  20 
 
The second column of Table 2.3 reports the “fill rate” as reported by the WTO (2000a,b).  
Recall that the WTO reports the “in-quota import fill rate” as described in column (8) of Table 
2.2.  This ignores the possibility of out-of-quota imports and so is a narrow interpretation of a 
“fill rate”.  Furthermore, the WTO data in Table 2.3 has a maximum fill rate of 100 percent and 
ignores the imports where the in-quota fill rate exceeds 100 percent (which it often does in the 
real world).  This results in a downward bias in the figures reported in column (2) of Table 2.3. 
 











Distribution of fill rates 
(percent of tariff quotas) 
 
       0-20%        80-100% 
Method of Administration       
   Applied Tariffs  643  69          24                 60 
   Licenses on Demand  337  53          36                 39 
   First-come, first-served  147  51          40                 37 
   Historical Allocation  75  65          27                 58 
   Auction  56  51          41                 47 
   State Trading  22  86          10                 85 
   Producer Groups  9  80          13                 75 
   Mixed Allocation   59  84            5                 80 
   Other  15  91            -                  80 
   Not Specified  9  44           20                20 
   Overall 
 
1,371  62           29                51 
Additional Constraints       
   Domestic Purchase Requirement 
1  48  69 
   Limits on tariff quota shares 
2  119  51 
   Export Certificates 
3  24  53 
   Past Trading Performance 
4  78  51 
N/A 
 
1.  A condition requiring the purchase of domestic production of the product in order to be eligible.     
2.  Limits the maximum share or quantity of the quota allowed. 
3.  Requires an export certificate administered by the exporting country. 
4.    Limits eligibility to established importers of the product concerned. 
 
Source: Calculated from the World Trade Organization, 1997, 2000a,b.  “Tariff Quota Administration Methods 
and Tariff Quota Fill.”  Background Paper by the Secretariat, 6 November (AIE/S4) and “Tariff and Other 
Quotas” 23 May 2000 G/AG/NG/S7 and /S8. 
   21 
 
The average fill rates can be misleading because some are equal to zero and others are 
equal to 100 percent.  The fill rates reported are also biased because trade volume or value is not 
used to weight them. Hence, very little can be read into the fill rates reported other than to note 
that the average fill rate for 1998 is 62 percent with state trading enterprises having the highest 
fill rate and auctions the lowest.  The l ast column of Table 2.3 gives the distribution of fill rates 
falling between 0 -20 percent and 80-100 percent.  The data indicates a bi-modal distribution of 
fill rates for the lowest and highest fill rate categories.  This may indicate that particular attention 
should be placed on the low fill rate category to determine the reasons for such performance.   
Data provided by the WTO (2000a,b) indicate that the fill rates are constant for the period 1995-
1999, but the fill rate for quotas that have expanded is  less than that for quota volumes that 
remained constant.  There is no difference in the fill rate between global and country specific 
export allocations, and only a small difference across commodity groups, with fibers and 
beverages having the lowest fill  rates (approximately 40 percent) with oilseeds, sugar and 
tobacco having the highest fill rate of 67 percent.  The fill rates do vary across countries 
significantly, with Australia, Brazil and Indonesia with 100 percent fill rates and Costa Rica, 
Malaysia  and Slovak Republic below 40 percent.  Again, one cannot make substantive 
conclusions from this data because of the many caveats of how the data is constructed cited 
earlier. In addition, almost 50 percent of the TRQs are administered by applied tariffs in which 
cases one would not necessarily expect a 100 percent fill rate. 
We now briefly outline the incentives for inefficiencies with each tariff quota 
administration type.   
Licenses on Demand 
Import licenses are allocated to individual firms pro rated on  the difference between the 
quota level and the total amount of licenses requested.  Over subscription can result in 
uneconomic quantities allocated to each applicant.  This method also enables higher cost 
importers to obtain the rights to the rents.  Therefore, an inefficient distribution of licenses across 
firms generates economic waste with quota rents at least partially dissipated with the extra costs 
associated with importation.  There are ways to mitigate these inefficient rent seeking practices.  
A good example of such a scheme is the EU regime for eggs.  Any importer can apply for the   22 
 
license but is required to pay 20 percent of the value of the product in advance once a license is 
awarded.  There is now an incentive for the importer not to overbid for the license and hence 
reduces rent-seeking activity by high cost suppliers.  It also provides an incentive for the 
successful firm to import the product, thereby reducing the chance of quota under-fill.  However, 
the costs of the down payment may deter s ome firms from participating and so lead to quota 
under-fill because of uncertainty.  Once a firm receives an import license, the firm loses the 
down payment.   
First- Come, First -Served 
With no import rights allocated to either the importer or the exporter, an exporter may not 
risk the costs of shipping the product and find that the quota has been filled.  The costs of storage 
until the following quota season, of paying the higher out-of-quota tariff or of shipping the 
product elsewhere may be high.  The costs for traders of establishing a business relationship over 
time with importers are also a factor contributing to under-fill.  Exporters do not have 
information on who holds the import license.  The first come, first served method is prone to 
wasting resources by concentrating imports at the beginning of the season, increasing costs for 
importers who have to store the product, and discriminating against exporters farther from the 
import market and with different seasons, generating higher exporting costs at the beginning of 
the quota year.  First-come, first served can also encourage low value bulk shipments as 
exporters cannot guarantee customers regular shipments of finished products throughout the 
year. 
Historical Importers 
Allocating import licenses t o importing firms or granting ‘country specific’ export quotas 
on the basis of historical shares can lead to a waste of global resources if the lowest cost 
exporting country or importing firm do not receive the rights to imports.  Historical import 
allocation therefore enables high cost importing firms and/or high cost exporting countries to 
operate, leading to the partial dissipation of quota rents (provided licenses and quotas are non-
tradable).  If licenses are known to be allocated as a share of historical imports, firms may act 
strategically to increase market share.  Chiquita is purported to have expanded imports in the 
European Union in 1992 in anticipation of the new Common Market Organization for bananas   23 
 
(CMOB) where import licenses (and export quotas) were to be allocated as a proportion of 
historical imports.  Resources are therefore wasted in rent seeking activities to obtain more 
licenses. 
Auctioning 
The auctioning of import quota licenses is generally deemed to be an efficient way to 
allocate the right to import (Bergsten,  et al. 1987; Skully, 1997).
10  An auction would generate 
the same level of revenue to the government as a tariff at the rate te would have done.  However, 
data in Table 2.3 indicate that the auction method has the lowest fill rate.  It is possible for one 
group to purchase the entire portion of the right to import (domestic or foreign), and then 
withhold part of the licensed import quantity to maximize revenues.  Bergsten,  et al.  (1987) 
argue that procedures can be designed to guard against the monopolization of licenses.   
State Trading Enterprises (STEs) 
The quota fill rate is very high for those STEs that control imports directly or indirectly.  
This may be due to exporters having to deal with only one entity, and hence do not face the 
transactions and information costs when dealing with many importing firms owning import 
licenses under other schemes.  An STE is also more visible and so perhaps even scrutinized more 
with political pressures by foreign governments.  The ability  to seek rents is still possible, 
however.  However, some STEs deliberately allocate export quotas to higher cost exporters for 
political reasons (ABARE 1999), resulting in inefficiencies and inequities. STEs have the ability 
to restrict imports to help farmers, but they do not seem to do this by under-filling quotas.   
Producer groups 
The control over imports by producer groups leads them to trade off the benefits from 
owning the quota rents and the loss in producer surplus through competition from imports.  
Failing to fill the quota is advantageous only if the quota rents are smaller than the loss in 
producer surplus due to increased imports (ABARE 1999).  The outcome depends on the relative 
domestic supply/demand elasticities for the product, the level of  the domestic price with imports   24 
 
(which depends on the world price and excess supply conditions in the world market) and the 
level of the import quota.  There remains a problem of distributing the rents to farmers, which if 
blended with revenues from sales  from domestic production, would cause an increase in 
domestic production and so reduce welfare.  Another option is to destroy the imported product, 
representing a cost to farmers (unless the domestic government finances it on behalf of the 
producer group).  Producer groups could instead import a product that is of inferior quality, 
thereby fulfilling their quota and at the same time maintaining income from domestic production 
provided the cross elasticity of demand is low.   
Lottery 
An option not separately identified in the WTO’s documents is issuing import licenses by 
lottery.  This does occur (e.g. some U.S. butter and milk powder import licenses) and is efficient 
in that a firm cannot affect the likelihood of obtaining the license  a priori.  Nevertheless, each 
firm would have to comply with application procedures and assuming each firm is allowed only 
one draw, there are incentives to break the firm down into many small firms to increase the 
probability of receiving a license.  Such rent seeking activities involve economic inefficiencies.  
Furthermore, high cost firms may win the lottery and, if the licenses are non-tradable, this 
method may result in excessive uncertainty and economic waste. 
Additional Conditions 
Table 2.3 also lists the additional conditions associated with the administration methods 
discussed above.  Each of these can lead to wasteful rent seeking activities as well.  A domestic 
purchase requirement increase the cost for some importing firms that otherwise would not be 
involved in domestic production.
11  Thus, part of the quota rents is dissipated and fill rates would 
be lower as domestic consumption declines and production increases.  Limits on quota shares do 
not allow for economies of size and coordination, again resulting in the dissipation of quota 
rents.  Limits on quota shares discriminate against more distant suppliers for whom shipload 
amounts are the economic size of shipment, rather than truckload lots, for example.  Export 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Some argue that auctions can be inconsistent with GATT rules because the auction fee can cause the tariff binding 
to be breached. 
11 Domestic purchase requirements could have in the past been considered a GATT-Article XI quantitative 
restriction, which is now prohibited by the URAA.   25 
 
certificate requirements that are non-tradable and allocate the rights to rents to higher cost 
exporters as could the condition of past trading performance, can both lead to partial dissipation 
of quota rents. 
2.5   Characteristics of More Efficient TRQ Administration Methods 
 
Three broad objectives of TRQ administration are important.  First, from an international 
perspective, allow market access opportunities up to the full amount of the TRQ level.  This is 
how the URAA was intended to deal with the remaining high tariffs that inhibit trade.  Second, 
from a home country perspective of making the most efficient use of domestic resources, ensure 
that the lowest cost or highest revenue firms do the importing.  In other words, allocate TRQs to 
those firms that can make the best use of them by generating the highest  profits from the 
importing activity.  Third, the system of TRQ administration of TRQs should be designed to 
operate efficiently in that it does not unnecessarily waste the country’s resources.  
Given these objectives, we now describe what would constitute  an efficient regime for 
administering TRQs, by discussing the means for achieving each objective. 
Full Utilization of the TRQ 
To ensure full use of the TRQ, many models and procedures could be followed.   The full 
use of TRQs has two aspects: the aggregate TRQ for a country should be fully allocated to 
importing entities (firms), and the entities receiving TRQs should fully use their allocation.  For 
the first aspect, the main means of assuring full utilization is for the administering agency to 
fully distribute import quotas to importers, and to do so relatively early in the quota period.  
Other rules for operating the TRQ administrative system must be designed t o facilitate a full, 
rapid and transparent distribution of the quota. 
  For the second aspect, there are many means of ensuring that importers holding the quota 
make full use of it.  In a market economy, one would wish to preserve the profit motive for 
importers so that they would import the item in question as long as domestic prices are higher 
than world prices by more than the cost of importation.  This can be accomplished by having 
private firms receive the import quotas.  It can also be accomplished by allowing firms to   26 
 
compete to obtain these import rights.  The general point here is that the TRQ system should 
involve many importers and not create a situation where there is a monopoly importer.    
  Similarly, allowing quotas to be rented out or rented in, or bought and sold openly, will 
create strong incentives for the firms that obtain the quotas to use them fully.  The application of 
carefully constructed additional regulations can also strengthen the incentives for firms to make 
full use of their quotas.  One example is the widely observed rule for all types of quota systems, 
for the quota holder to “use it or lose it.”  Such a regulation removes quota from quota holders if 
they do not use some high percentage of their quota.  Whether such added regulations are 
necessary is a separate question, but most countries seem to believe so because this  type of 
regulation is almost universal across and within countries.
12 
TRQs allocated to firms that make best use of them 
The second objective is to ensure that those importers receiving the quota are the most 
efficient importers in terms of net profit (lowest costs, highest revenues).  One widely suggested 
method of achieving this is to use quota auctions to allocate the TRQ.  Although this allocation 
mechanism is economically efficient, there may be legal WTO issues that inhibit its use.  The fee 
that is paid in such an auction, although it is bid by the would-be buyer, could be seen as a 
breach of the tariff binding, the in-quota tariff in this case, and that fee is not related to the cost 
of import service. Allocation by auction will result in those firms  that make the highest net 
importing profit acquiring the quota.  However, other methods can achieve this same end.  One 
effective but overlooked mechanism is to allow quota resale and transfer.  However, the quota is 
initially allocated, if there is a well-developed (and legal!) market in quota for resale and 
transfer, a firm that is unlikely to utilize its quota fully can sell it and realize the quota profits.  In 
the process, the quota passes along to a firm that will necessarily use it to recoup the costs of 
buying it.  The point is often lost, that resale provisions will result in the quota ending up in the 
same hands (i.e., that it is as economically efficient) as with an auction.  This point has practical 
importance because many jurisdictions find some reason for not allowing quota transfer and sale. 
                                                 
12 A “use it or lose it” stipulation could have firms importing when it is not economical to do so, because the import 
license has capitalized value for future use.  This can cause economic waste. A better principle is “turn it back in or 
lose it”.   27 
 
An Efficient TRQ operating system 
The third objective is to have efficient quota administration and regulations.  This can be 
accomplished most effectively by following a basic rule in regulating quota use, and that is to 
keep the regulatory system as simple as possible.  All firms (existing ones or newcomers) should 
be allowed to acquire the quota; there is no reason for limiting the quota validity period (i.e., they 
should be able to use the quota whenever they wish within the quota period); and buying and 
renting should be fine for all firms of whatever size or with whatever facilities.  Put differently, 
the rules need only to say which commodity item can be imported (certain HS numbers) and that 
imports m ust be made by the end of the quota period.  The temptation to use the quota regulatory 
system to meet other objectives should be resisted.   
  Another way to keep the quota administration system as simple as possible is to minimize 
the uncertainty and rule changes associated with the regime.  Even if there are a number of rules, 
if these rules are transparent, well publicized and not changed too often, the uncertainty factor 
facing quota users is substantially reduced.  This is particularly an issue in developing countries 
where quota regimes are often characterized by little information and a possible lack of 
transparency and openness, perhaps to facilitate corruption of various types. 
  One added rule type may be useful, and that concerns the general question of the 
distribution of quota rents and whether the recipient should pay for the quota.  (Note the possible 
legal issues surrounding any payment for the quota, beyond the in-quota tariff and a cost of 
service, as mentioned above.)  It may be judged desirable to tax away some of the profits (quota 
rents) accruing to quota holders.  This can be done effectively and completely by an auction, but 
it can also be done less thoroughly by imposing a charge to acquire the quota.  This has the 
advantage of generating some public revenue as well as leaving some profits in the hands of the 
quota recipient (although reducing those profits by the amount taxed by this charge).  And the 
charge can be infinitely varied to achieve any desired split in revenues (quota rents) between the 
quota recipients and the treasury.  One disadvantage of such a charge system is the difficulty in 
knowing, at least at the outset, what to charge.  Observations on the transfer price prevailing in 
private transactions can be a guide to the total rents and to an appropriate charge to levy on initial 
allocations.   28 
 
  One advantage of both these payment schemes is that they have the effect of reducing 
rent seeking or corruption by those wishing to obtain the quotas.  Rent seeking induced by a 
quota a llocation scheme can make the system very inefficient in terms of the waste of time and 
money spent in lobbying, especially when quota values are high.  This can be reduced or 
prevented by making the receipt of quotas less lucrative by auctioning them or charging a fee for 
them that is close to the auction price.  In general, rent seeking can be reduced by keeping the 
quota allocation system rules-based, with clear reallocation criteria and a mechanical reallocation 
process with no scope for case-by-case adjustments or individual judgments.  (Keeping the 
system rules-based is still consistent with imposing penalties that may result in quota 
reallocations for behavior by quota holders considered undesirable by quota administrators.  The 
key issue is that these penalties be specified in advance and not discretionary.)  
  Another way to make the quota system work more efficiently is to define  two types of 
quota  — permanent and annual.  TRQs are usually valid for only one year.  In some cases, it 
may be more efficient for a firm to own the quota outright, so that the amount of quota the firm 
will have in future years is known with certainty.  This can be accomplished by defining a 
permanent quota, according to which the firm would receive the annual import rights every year 
in perpetuity (subject to the possible future demise of the regime, of course, and subject to “use it 
or lose it” provisions).  Yet to have  only such a “permanent” quota is less efficient than giving 
the permanent quota owner the flexibility of being able to rent out (or in) some permanent quota 
from year to year.  In other words, an efficient quota system will involve both permanent quota 
(for acquisition for long-term reasons) and one-year quota or the rental of permanent quota (for 
short-term r easons of fluctuating markets and general flexibility).  Managers of such schemes 
can draw on the experience of TRQ administration for short-term, one-year rental arrangements 
and for long-term, permanent quota arrangements. 
A number of other issues regarding TRQ systems concern the efficiency of the quota 
administrative system, the profitability (size of quota rents) of the export opportunities opened up 
or restricted by the TRQ, and the equity of quota allocations.  This allocation issue is as much 
about  which entities within a country receive import rights, but which countries gain the right to 
export into the importing region through the TRQs.   Five issues can be addressed: How 
aggregated are TRQ commitments, and at what level of commodity aggregation are TRQs   29 
 
administered?  Second, should TRQs be targeted partly or completely to specific countries’ 
exports (“country reserves”)?  Third, should state trading enterprises (STEs) be handling or be 
the recipient of TRQs?  Fourth, should import allocations be r estricted to industry segments, 
establishments, and product end-uses?  And fifth, are there administrative matters concerning 
handling the TRQs, such as validity periods and unfilled quota provisions, that lead to fewer 
imports or lower-valued imports that lower the value of the TRQ to the exporting country?  
Finally, there is some confusion about whether a problem in the eyes of an exporter is due to a 
country’s TRQ implementation system or to the negotiated access and commitments agreed upon 
in the URAA.   One such example would be the debate about tariff peaks, which is not a TRQ 
issue per se, and will not be discussed here.  Another is the actual level of the TRQ, which was 
also negotiated and is not an issue of TRQ administration. 
  On the subject of aggregation, to maximize the value of the TRQs one would like to see 
commitments defined as broad aggregates and administered similarly.  However, if the TRQ is 
defined broadly (e.g., “eggs”), yet in terms of administration it can be used only to import 
processed eggs, not table eggs, the TRQ will be valid only for low-valued egg products.  This 
mix of commitment and administration detail effectively reduces the market access of the TRQ.  
To maximize the value of market access for a given TRQ, the commitment should be made 
across a broad commodity category, without further administrative constraint, and the private 
trade should determine which products to import within that broad commodity category. 
  The country reserve or preferential trade issue is really one  of equity in distribution of 
TRQs among different countries’ exports.  But limiting a TRQ to a specific country’s exports 
lowers the benefit in terms of trade liberalization of the TRQ compared with allowing any 
country’s exports under that quota, as in the previous case discussed.  Certain country allocations 
existed prior to the URAA, and these were continued to ensure that those countries would not 
lose as a result of an importer’s URAA commitments under the guidelines for establishing 
current access commitments. 
  The matter of STEs handling TRQs remains contentious.  One argument is that the STE, 
often less influenced by market considerations, may have no incentive to fill the TRQ.  A simple 
statistical correlation, as done by the WTO Secretariat in June 1998, shows that state trading   30 
 
enterprises fill their TRQs as completely as other recipients of TRQ allocations.  Although it may 
be expected that STEs would not have the incentive to fill their TRQs, in an actual situation this 
depends on the specific incentives faced by the firm, agency, or STE.  That kind of detail is not 
revealed by simple correlations, and so this approach offers only an incomplete test of STE 
behavior in filling TRQs. 
Another complaint is that the STE, especially if it represents producer interests, will 
choose to limit the TRQ to lower valued imports within that category or to pay the exporter 
lower prices for the good in question than would be paid under a private market transaction.  
Therefore, the argument goes, allocating TRQs to STEs is likely to reduce the market access 
represented by that quota, either quantitatively or in value terms.  There is a general potential of 
an STE to lower the value of its TRQ, and the specific use of a policy directive to import 
products for processing, not retail, use. 
  Restricting import allocations to industry segments, establishments, and product end-
uses, this will also reduce the value of the market access represented by the TRQ.  In effect, such 
restrictions reduce the demand for those imports, compared with unrestricted, open market 
allocation of those imports.  Although this restriction puts allocations into the hands of those who 
will use it, the recipients are willing to pay less to get the allocation than others would be.  If not, 
the restriction would be unnecessary. 
Consequently, this type of restriction has the same effects as do country reserves and, 
arguably, allocating TRQs to state traders.  Any restrictions on who can use or receive TRQs will 
reduce the demand for and lower the implicit value of that TRQ, to the disadvantage of would-be 
exporters.  There are several examples of this kind of TRQ allocation and it has usually arisen for 
historical reasons, where pre-URAA end-use allocations have been preserved in the current TRQ 
allocations. 
  With regard to administrative restrictions in handling of TRQs, such as limited validity 
periods for the quota and unfilled quota provisions, the tighter those restrictions, the more costly 
it is to comply and the lower the demand for TRQ imports.  This could lead to fewer or lower-
valued imports, or simply to a reduction in import quota rents (or in the implicit value to the   31 
 
importing country of the TRQ).  This situation can harm the importing country as much as the 
exporting country, as discussed earlier.   32 
 
3.  TRQs and GATT Rules 
 
Article 4 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture [URAA] specifies disciplines 
for Market Access, one of the three pillars of the agreement.  Paragraph 2 of Article 4 states that 
"members shall not maintain, resort t o, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been 
required to be converted into ordinary customs duties." A footnote to the Agreement expands on 
this statement: 
 
These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum 
import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through 
state-trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other 
than ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-
specific derogations from the provisions of GATT 1947, but not measures maintained 
under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific 
provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to 
the WTO Agreement. 
 
While Article 4 established an obligation to convert non-tariff barriers into ordinary 
customs duties, the URAA left WTO members considerable discretion over how to effect this 
conversion.  Guidelines or 'modalities' for establishing tariffs and tariff-rate quotas were drafted; 
and while they were generally used by countries to prepare their schedules of commitments, 
there were important exceptions, and the guidelines were not binding obligations.  Several WTO 
members are alleged  to have engaged in 'dirty tariffication,' that is, they established higher tariffs 
than the suggested method would have allowed.  There were also guidelines for calculating 
minimum access volumes, that is, how to determine 3 percent of base period domestic 
consumption.  These constructed tariffs and in-quota volumes were included in members' 
Uruguay Round tariff schedules.  A window for challenging them existed between the time the 
country schedules were submitted and the time when the URAA was accepted by  the WTO 
membership.  If a member was able to submit a tariff that was 'too high' or an in-quota volume 
that was 'too low' and it was not successfully challenged, then once it was accepted as part of the 
URAA, it became 'too late' to be challenged.  The tariffs and in-quota volumes in the accepted 
schedules became the new WTO obligations.  These obligations are the starting point for 
disputes over how the obligations are implemented and administered.   33 
 
Article XIII of the GATT “Non-Discriminatory Administration of Quantitative 
Restrictions” governs the administration of quantitative restrictions, including TRQs.  Article 
XIII can be interpreted as being inherently contradictory.  It advocates non-discrimination and 
the use of tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions, yet it also allows supplier tariff quotas to be 
allocated on an historical basis, a method that is inherently discriminatory.  The WTO is a 
judicial body to enforce the law constructed by its members.  In the enforcement of Article XIII, 
fair m arket access is all that matters; access to quota rents plays no role.  Of course, the 
distribution of rents drives many trade conflicts and is the source of disputes over TRQs.   
  Tariff quota administration concerns how the rights to import at the in-quota tariff are 
distributed.  This determines both the volume and distribution of trade as well as the distribution 
of quota rents.  It is important to keep the distinction clear between the volume and distribution 
of trade and the volume and distribution of rents.  The WTO is only concerned with how quota 
administration influences the volume and distribution of trade; it has no direct interest in the 
distribution of rents.  However, it is the distribution of rents that motivates the politics of TRQ 
administration.  The choice of how to administer a tariff quota becomes a political decision; 
many competing interests claim entitlements to quota rents.   
Historically, four positions were put forward by various countries: 
1.  Quantitative restrictions are per se inconsistent with MFN. 
2.  MFN requires that each country be assigned an equal share of the global quota. 
3.  MFN can be approximated by allotting the global quota in  proportion to the trade shares of 
current suppliers. 
4.  Quantitative restrictions should be filled on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Because of conflicting interpretations of the principle of non-discrimination, there was no 
consensus, but that “there was fairly unanimous agreement that the use of global, race-to-the-
border quotas (now permitted by GATT A rticle XIII) was inconsistent with MFN because it 
unduly favored countries with geographical proximity and/or better transport facilities” (Hudec 
1997, 178. n. 14).  The first position claims there is no just way to solve the quota allocation   34 
 
problem.  The second position argues for strict parity. The third position advocates 
proportionality, defined as the observed volume of trade in some recent representative period.  
The fourth position asserts (literal) priority in the form of first-come, first-served.  This issue has 
not been resolved to this date.   
Instead of advocating one principle of distributive justice and proscribing all others, 
Article XIII allows a conflicting set of distributive principles.  Predictably, this leads to trade 
conflicts over TRQ administration.  The interpretation advanced here is as follows: quantitative 
restrictions are inconsistent with MFN principles; however, if they are administered as if they 
were tariffs, they can be MFN consistent.  Two means of administering TRQs as tariffs are 
auctioning TRQ rights and allowing current TRQ holders to lease TRQ rights to other suppliers.  
The two methods have radically different distributions of rent, but identical expected 
distributions of trade.  The expected distributions of trade are also identical to that generated by a 
tariff, and thus consistent with MFN.   
  The economic interpretation of Article XIII advanced here, and in Skully (1999a), 
concludes that the GATT advocates two criteria for judging whether the quotas under TRQs are 
being properly administered: (1) quota fill and (2) distribution of trade.  Quota fill requires that 
imports of the in-quota volume be allowed if market conditions permit.  That is, TRQ 
administrators should not impose any impediments to imports beyond payment of the in-quota 
tariff.  If apparent profitable arbitrage opportunities are not realized, it may be because of the 
TRQ administration method.  Of course, there may be other legitimate costs that have not been 
observed, thus zero-fill or under-fill does not necessarily mean TRQ administration is the cause. 
As for the distribution of trade, GATT Article XIII, paragraph 2 states: 
In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a 
distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares 
which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence 
of such restrictions …  
That is, one determines what the distribution of trade (supplier market shares) would be if 
there were no trade  restrictions. The allocation of the TRQ is then evaluated by how closely the 
observed distribution of the restricted volume of trade (under tariff quota) approaches the 
counterfactual distribution.  The economic principle underlying the distribution of trade criterion   35 
 
is the minimization of trade distortions given the TRQ constraint.  The GATT principle of non-
discrimination asserts that trade shares should be determined by the relative efficiency of 
suppliers and not by alternative, discriminatory criteria.   
  Subparagraphs in XIII 2c and 2d, on supplier quotas, are clearly contradictory in 
advocating both non-discrimination and tolerance (if not advocacy) of discrimination.  The 
subparagraphs allow for “supplier tariff quotas,” TRQs that are allocated to s upplying countries 
and require that “the imported product originate from a particular country or source”.  Thus, they 
allow importing countries a GATT-consistent means of discrimination.  As for how the supplier 
tariff quota shares are apportioned, GATT Article XIII, 2d states that agreement should be 
sought among all interested WTO members but that if this is “not reasonably practicable,” then: 
the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a 
substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, 
supplied by such contracting parties during a previous  representative period, of 
the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of 
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the 
product. 
  The two italicized phrases (here, not in the original) have been the subject of further 
definition by the GATT in a series of interpretative notes to Article XIII.  The convention has 
been to use an average of the  three years prior to the imposition of a restriction as the 
representative period.  Several disputes have arisen over base periods during which there were 
other restrictions on trade. The GATT recommends that shares be allotted according to the trade 
shares “which would correspond to what could reasonably have been expected in the absence of 
restrictions.”  Once again, this is the free trade counterfactual distribution of trade, the 
operational equivalent of non-discrimination. 
  With regard to the meaning of  special factors, the GATT interpretation includes “changes 
in relative productive efficiency” which may have occurred since the representative period “as 
between the various foreign producers.”  Clearly, changes in competitive advantage are viewed 
as an appropriate cause for reapportioning supplier shares. 
  Thus, XIII: 2c and 2d instruct member governments that they are allowed to transfer 
TRQ rights to incumbent exporters, but that they should do so in such a way as to approximate   36 
 
the free trade counterfactual distribution of trade.  This is not a simple task.  The passage above 
elucidating the term “special factors” gives the impression that exporter shares can be (and, 
indeed, should be) reallocated in line with changing economic conditions.  Logically  this 
reapportionment should be without compensation.  If quota rights are granted partially to 
compensate for lost market access due to the imposition of a quota, then quota rights should go 
to those suppliers actually harmed by the quota.  If a supplier g ranted quota suffers a loss of 
competitive advantage and is incapable of exporting without the quota rent, then the quota 
clearly no longer denies market access and there is no basis for compensation.  It is the lower-
cost entrants who are impaired.  However, once vested with quota rights, suppliers aggressively 
defend what they view to be their property rights to quota rents.   
  We are unaware of a case where this kind of reallocation has occurred in accordance with 
Article XIII.  The lack of such reallocations is hardly surprising.  First, Article XIII 2d instructs 
the country imposing the quota to “seek agreement with … all other contracting parties having a 
substantial interest in supplying the product concerned.”  As share reapportionment is a zero-sum 
game from the point of view of quota holders, agreement among them is unlikely.  Second, the 
primary reason the government imposing the quota chooses to allocate “supplier quota” is to 
appease suppliers harmed by the quota.  In this regard it is similar to a voluntary export restraint 
whereby the quota-constrained exporter is partially compensated by the transfer of rents from the 
importing country.  For example, the U.S. tobacco, peanut, and sugar TRQs (and some in dairy) 
transfer quota rents from the United States to the holders of TRQ rights.  The quota rights are 
non-transferable, and the product delivered in-quota must be the domestic product of the 
exporter.  Such compensation might have been reasonably and non-discriminatorily apportioned 
when the quota was imposed, but with the passage of time and changes in the relative 
comparative advantage of potential suppliers of the control product, the distribution of shares can 
become increasingly malapportioned.  The allocation of the right to export via "country specific" 
TRQs is also contentious because an exporting firm has the potential to obtain the rents available 
through bargaining power, imperfectly competitive practices, and/or the issuance of an export 
license.   
An example of a dispute over the method by which country-specific export quotas are 
allocated is the "Banana Dispute" (WTO, 1997a).  Exporters argued that the methods used by the   37 
 
EU in allocating export quotas were discriminatory and did not reflect recent trade patterns.  
Export quotas were allegedly allocated to some countries but not others with comparable or even 
greater historical trade levels.  As upheld by the Appellate Body in the Banana Dispute, this is 
inconsistent with Article XIII, although the latter rules that importers allocating export quotas 
may: 
…seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares of the quota with all 
other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product 
concerned.   
If an agreement is not possible, then export quotas are to be allocated to those countries having a 
"substantial interest" based on shipments during a "previous representative period."  The EU was 
accused of not allocating quotas consistent with exports in the "representative period", with some 
countries receiving higher quotas than historical exports and other countries less.  The EU also 
allocated export quotas to non-WTO members, provided additional amounts to Lomé countries 
above and beyond that "required" by the preferential agreement, and assigned shares to some, but 
not all countries that did not have a "substantial interest."  
  The Banana Panel also ruled on the issue of the EU requiring only some countries to 
issue export licenses to exporting firms for the country-specific export quota.  The EU was found 
to b e in violation of Article I of GATT which requires that "…all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation…be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
the like product…".  Hence, not requiring export licenses for all countries with export quotas was 
not in accordance with the MFN clause. Countries with export licenses were given preferential 
bargaining power because it allowed them to extract a share of the quota rents. 
The Banana Dispute also highlighted the problems of allocating import licenses.  There 
are inconsistencies across countries in regard to the period of validity for the import license, the 
size of the licenses, eligibility requirements for an import license, reallocation of unused licenses, 
and requirements for the u se of the license.  Overall, firms importing from Latin America faced 
very complicated licensing procedures in comparison to firms importing African, Caribbean and 
Pacific State (ACP) countries. The first had unnecessary burdens imposed on them, which were 
deemed to be treated in a discriminatory, trade restrictive and trade distorting manner.  These 
importing firms faced non-automatic licensing, and had to apply many times, which often   38 
 
delayed imports (sometimes for the 1
st three weeks of every quarter, according to claims filed by 
Ecuador).  The Panel ruled that licensing rules are generally covered by Article 1 GATT as “... 
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation…” and therefore, the EU 
was found again in violation of this GATT article. 
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures in the WTO requires that the application 
process for obtaining and renewing a license be as simple as possible, and that all rules and 
information concerning the procedures should be published.  The L icensing Agreement provides 
for two types of import licensing: automatic and non-automatic.  Rules applied by importing 
countries for licensing procedures should "…be neutral in application and administered in a fair 
and equitable manner."  No licensing procedures should be trade distorting or restrictive and 
"…no more administratively burdensome than absolutely necessary to administer the measure."   
However, the importing country gets to decide what is 'fair and equitable' and which 
methods are least 'administratively burdensome'.   The Licensing Agreement sets only vague 
guidelines, many of which are open to the interpretations of the importing countries.  In the 
Banana Dispute, the EU's import licensing scheme was deemed to be "highly complex" for 
imports from Latin America (WTO, 1997b).  
The licensing procedures were found to be inconsistent not only to Article I but also to 
Article III (national treatment clause) and Article X (applying different sets of rules) as well as to 
GATS rules. Even though it   is true that Article XIII of the GATT is not concerned with the 
distribution of rents, rents cannot be arbitrarily be distributed such that it alters competitive 
conditions for firms in a discriminating way.  That is what the dispute around GATS was all 
about.  Even though the European Union had claimed that the distribution of quota rent was to its 
discretion and not within the scope of WTO rules, the Panel blamed precisely the fact that firms 
of complainants’ origin, which were mostly category A operators, had to purchase licenses from 
EU/ACP firms, which were mostly category B operators, in order to maintain their previous 
market share within the sector of Latin American Bananas (see Chapter 12 for details).  The 
price of these licenses sometimes usurped  the entire quota rent. The European Commission that 
had reported that the licensing regime was designed to “cross-subsidize” bananas of EU and 
ACP origin, and so intended this distribution effect.   To sum up, this previous Panel decision   39 
 
makes clear that  quota rent cannot be used at will to manipulate competitive conditions in a 
discriminating way in service sectors which are tied to the supply of the import restricted good.  
These issues surrounding country-specific export quotas, exporting firm licenses, and 
import-licensing procedures highlight the problems of discrimination and exemplify the 
inefficiencies that can arise. 
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4.  An Overview of Tariffs, Quotas and Imports Worldwide 
   
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of tariffs, import quotas and trade 
for individual commodities and countries under the TRQ system.  We use preliminary data from 
the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD) project and data from the WTO.  AMAD is a 
cooperative effort among the OECD, FAO, UNCTAD, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
European Union Commission  - Agriculture Directorate-General, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture - Economic Research Service, and The World Bank
13.  
  In this chapter, an overview is presented on the fill rates --the level of notified imports as 
a percentage of the scheduled quota
14  -- as well as on the relative levels of tariffs.  We also 
illustrate the gap between in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs by providing examples for selected 
countries and commodities.  An examination of worldwide data gives us a general indication as 
to how the TRQ system is operating in terms of liberalizing trade, and provides a context for the 
individual case studies to follow. 
   
4.1  Fill Rates 
 
  Countries with TRQ commitments are required to notify the WTO each year on the 
scheduled TRQ for that year and actual in-quota imports.  The effects of market access 
commitments on trade are difficult to isolate from the effects of changes in market conditions.  
Many agricultural commodity prices reached near-record highs and near-record lows in the 
URAA implementation period.  One summary statistic that can be used to assess improvements 
in market access is the fill rate of the import quota. A fill rate greater than 100 percent indicates 
that notified imports exceed the  scheduled quota. This is not to say that where quotas are not 
filled countries are not meeting their commitments.  There are many reasons that fill rates can be 
less than 100 percent and they are discussed extensively elsewhere in this document. 
 
                                                 
13 Data are available at www.amad.org. 
14 Defined as the “in-quota import fill rate” in Chapter 2.   41 
 
Table 4.1 provides data on the fill rates.
15  The countries included in Table 4.1 account 
for 912 of the over 1,370 scheduled TRQs.  It can be ascertained from Table 4.1 that some 
countries have not notified all of their TRQs on which they made commitments.  Notifications by 
both OECD and ‘other’ countries increased in three years 1995-97.  In 1997, OECD and ‘other’ 
countries tabled 84 and 80 percent of their scheduled TRQs, respectively. 
  Reporting average fill rates as a summary statistic of market access has limitations (see 
also Chapter 2).  First, notification procedures are not uniform across countries.  Some countries 
only report imports up to the quota level, while others report all imports subject to the in-quota 
tariff rate.  While this discrepancy is not a  problem when there is quota under-fill, it does 
otherwise under-estimate market access.  On the other hand, some countries like the EU notify 
imports based on licenses granted rather than on actual imports.  This reporting method could 
over-estimate market access if importers do not fully utilize their licenses.  Attempts to reconcile 
notifications with trade data are inundated with difficulties.  For example, the EU trade data are 
difficult to decipher because the same trade codes appear in several TRQs. 
  Second, the fill rates reported in Table 4.1 give equal weight to all TRQs, irrespective of 
trade volume or value.  A fill rate calculated on a scheduled TRQ of 16 tonnes has the same 
weight as a fill rate based on 1,600 tonnes.  However, weighting schemes are problematic 
because the units differ within and among countries, even within the same TRQ and the diversity 
of products that comprise any TRQ makes it difficult to weight them by value.  The average fill 
rates are also misleading because some are equal to zero and others are equal to 100 percent. 
  Third, the URAA did not mandate that each quota be filled.  In fact, a low quota fill rate 
does not necessarily imply inefficiency.  As explained in Chapter 2, there may be unavailable 
supply or insufficient  demand such that the in-quota tariff is effective.  A fill rate of 100 percent 
or more does not necessarily imply efficiency.  Filled quotas may occur even if suppliers are 
high cost importing firms or export countries/firms, or state trading enterprises m ay have 
fulfilled WTO commitments but have imported low quality product or destroyed imports (see the 
discussion on Korea and Japan to follow).   Either way, inefficiencies in the administration of 
                                                 
15 Notification data in AMAD for 1998 are less complete due to lags between country notifications to the WTO and 
their incorporation into AMAD. 
   42 
 
quotas can be associated with fill rates greater than 100  percent. Fourth, independent of export 
quotas or non-tradability of licenses, the method of allocation of the import license itself can 
have a direct impact on the quota fill rate and hence on economic efficiency.  An important 
indicator of administrative  inefficiency is when there is a fill rate of less than 100 percent and 
there are out-of-quota imports.  Situations like this beg the question of whether imports will 
increase with an increase in the level of the quota.  In other words, the issue is whether the fill 
rate is proportionate to the quota, or in-quota imports are limited, independent of the quota level.  
This becomes an important issue when determining the effectiveness of alternative trade 
liberalization scenarios. 
  Average fill rates reported i n Table 4.1 are different from those reported by the WTO 
(G/AG/NG/S/7 and G/AG/NG/S/8).  Average fill rates in those reports are based on calculations 
that truncate the fill rate distribution at 100 percent.  But, truncating the fill rate at 100 percent 
losses important information on the degree by which market access may have improved.  
Furthermore, this may provide erroneous information on which is the relevant regime for these 
TRQs.  As shown in Chapter 2, a quota with 100 percent fill rate may be in the quota or in the 
out-of-quota t 2 regime, depending on the level of total imports.  But, if a country voluntarily 
expands imports leading to more than 100 percent quota fill, the binding constraint may in fact 
be the in-quota t 1 regime, a very different regime with different implications about quota rents 
and domestic prices.  The WTO methodology therefore over-estimates the number of TRQs that 
may be in the quota or the out-of-quota t 2 regime. This has repercussions regarding the effects of 
further trade liberalization.  Based on the information from the WTO, one may be tempted to 
give unduly weight to quota expansion when in fact quotas may not be the binding instrument.   
These problems using average fill rates not withstanding, Table 4.1 provides a mixed 
picture of how market access has changed.  Some TRQs have fill rates of over 100 percent while 
fill rates for others are close to zero.  Among the Quad countries-- Canada, U.S., EU, and Japan-- 
Canada has the highest fill rate over the four year average, at 100 percent, while the other three 
each have simple average fill rates less than 100 percent.  Among the Quad countries, the United 
States has the lowest four-year average fill rate of 59 percent.  Furthermore, between 1996 and 
1997, when world prices for many agricultural commodities fell, the fill rates for the Quad 
countries either declined or remained the same.  On the other hand, the average fill rate for  43 
 
Table 4.1  Number of TRQs and average fill rates OECD and selected countries 
 
Number of notified TRQs Number of 100% and over fill rate Average fill rate (percent) Total average
Country Total TRQs 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 fill rate
Autralia 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 117 112 103 99 108
Canada 21 21 21 20 20 10 9 12 15 82 98 95 124 100
Switzerland 28 28 27 27 27 18 17 15 15 338 401 374 432 386
Czech Republic 24 24 24 24 24 5 7 4 5 50 55 60 69 58
European Union 87 54 83 84 43 18 34 34 18 75 72 69 73 72
Hungary 75 66 68 67 67 18 2 5 8 55 52 45 43 49
Japan 20 18 18 18 18 5 4 3 2 78 77 74 68 74
Korea 67 67 67 63 64 36 31 34 31 117 128 134 121 125
Poland 109 19 23 29 26 8 10 11 1 43 43 39 32 39
Iceland 90 87 86 86 na 41 43 49 na 798 994 1658 .. 1150
Mexico 11 1 0 0 0 1 .. .. .. 112 .. .. .. 112
Norway 232 217 203 215 213 111 93 93 98 215 460 269 251 299
New Zealand 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 0 0 69 50 34 25 45
United States 41 26 38 39 39 0 3 4 4 51 62 60 62 59
TOTAL OECD 810 633 663 677 546 273 255 265 198 157 200 232 117 176
Indonesia 2 1 1 1 na 1 1 1 na 4306 1558 748 1399 2204
Malaysia 19 19 18 .. na 3 9 .. na 57 162 .. na 110
Philippines 14 14 14 14 na 6 6 3 na 265 58 44 na 122
Slovak Republic 24 24 24 24 24 3 5 2 3 77 47 46 43 53
Slovenia 20 20 20 20 na 1 0 0 na 51 18 8 na 26
Thailand 23 14 23 23 na 8 8 8 na 349 318 513 na 393 
Source:  Author’s calculations from AMAD and WTO notifications 
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all OECD countries exceed 100 percent.  By this criterion, and given the  caveats  discussed 
above, it would seem that on average, market access to the OECD countries increased during the 
first four implementation years.  However, it is difficult to distinguish what is due to policy 
versus that due to changes in market conditions. 
  Additional information such as the relationship between domestic and world prices would 
help illuminate the discussion on the TRQ system and market access.  However, in the majority 
of cases, the specification of TRQs (usually many different products spanning several HS 
headings in a single TRQ) and their notifications (a single figure reporting all imports of the 
different products within a single TRQ) renders such comparisons infeasible.  Even in the few 
cases where TRQs are defined relatively narrowly, the availability of domestic and world prices 
are generally not available for consistent comparisons.   Hence, the focus on imperfect indicators 
such as fill rates. 
Along with information on the average fill rates, another indicator of changes in market 
access is the number and share of notified quotas with fill rates that fall within a given range.  
Most of the quotas, (about 40 percent over the 4 year period), have fill rates that are equal to or 
greater than 100 percent.  But, as shown in Table 4.1, the number of fill rates (as well as their 
share of notified quotas) at or above 100 percent, declined over the four-year period.  By this 
criterion, it would seem that little progress has been made in increasing market access (other than 
the growth in the TRQs), as about 60 percent of the TRQs were not filled.  The number of quotas 
with fill rates in excess of 80 percent during this period (but less than 100 percent) represent an 
additional 14 percent of the notified quotas.  Thus, a little more than half of the notified quotas 
have fill rates that are greater than 80 percent, suggesting that significant improvements in 
market access remain.  This point is punctuated by the fact that many quotas have fill rates that 
are less than 20 percent.  About 23 percent of the notified quotas during the four-year period fall 
in this category and their proportion increased over the four-year period from 21 percent of the 
notified quotas in 1995 to 26 percent in 1998.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter, but clearly 
further investigation as to why such a large number of TRQs have such low fill rates is 
warranted.  The detailed case studies that follow investigate various factors that may be 
responsible.   45 
 
  The data in Table 4.1 suggest that focusing on increasing the quota as currently defined 
and administered may not have significant payoffs in liberalizing trade.  The majority of the 
TRQs in OECD countries are currently not being filled.  Hence, further increases in quotas 
without changes in tariffs or changes in how quotas are administered, allocated, or scheduled, 
may not increase market access.  On the other hand, the data suggest that for many TRQs, the 
quota component may not be restricting trade.  For many TRQs (at least 265 in 1997) the quotas 
did not restrict trade in that a country simply expanded the quota as necessary to increase 
imports.  Table 4.1 indicates that for many products the quota i s not binding as notified imports 
exceeding the quota enter the country at the lower in-quota tariff rate.  Further expansion of these 
quotas may not necessarily expand trade either.  Therefore, expanding quotas may not 
necessarily liberalize trade significantly in the majority of situations where there is either quota 
over-fill or under-fill.  A single summary statistic from the notification and schedule data to 
assess the impacts of the TRQ regime is problematic, and so the case studies that follow analyze 
the TRQ systems for individual commodities and countries.  
 
4.2  In-quota and Out-of-quota Tariff Rates 
 
  The tariff data do not include mark-ups or other fees. They are based on the MFN 
bindings and TRQ schedules, and so exclude preferential tariffs.  In principle, the in-quota rates 
are lower than the out-of-quota tariff rates.  In the URAA, industrial countries agreed to bind 
their tariffs and reduce them by an unweighted average of 36 percent during the implementation 
period.  Some countries chose to reduce both their in-quota and out-of  -quota tariffs, while most 
opted to omit in-quota tariffs from their reduction commitments.  In some cases, no change in the 
in-quota tariff rates leads to out-of-quota rates becoming less than the in-quota rate.  Therefore, a 
pure tariff regime results because quotas become redundant.  
  The number and complexity of the TRQ tariff schedule varies by commodity and 
country.  For example, the US schedule of 41 TRQs  consists of 360 tariff lines that have both ad 
valorem  and specific tariffs.  Iceland’s 90 TRQs consist of 407 lines with  ad valorem and 
compound tariffs ( ad valorem  plus a specific component) while Canada’s 21 TRQ schedule 
contains 256 lines, many of which contain complex tariffs ( ad valorem  and specific along with 
expressions such as “not less than” or “not more than”), while Korea and Hungary’s TRQ in-
quota tariff schedules are ad valorem only.   46 
 
  The calculated level of protection generated by tariffs depends on the choices that are 
made while aggregating and converting specific tariffs to their  ad valorem equivalents.  To 
compare relative rates of protection across sectors and countries, specific rates need to be 
converted to their  ad valorem equivalent.  Furthermore, meaningful comparisons cannot be made 
at the TRQ level (not all countries scheduled the same TRQs, for example).  Rather, tariffs need 
to be aggregated to specific products such as butter, cheese, beef, wheat, and the like.   
  Converting specific tariffs into their  ad  valorem equivalents is arbitrary because a 
theoretical basis for choosing a specific conversion factor is not available.  Furthermore, 
aggregating tariff lines to compute tariffs that represent the “true” protection level at the TRQ 
level is even more arbitrary.  
  The problem of converting  tariffs to an  ad valorem equivalent and of aggregation is 
illustrated with an example for skim milk powder (SMP).  Japan’s schedule includes two TRQs 
for SMP.   One SMP TRQ consists of 2 tariff lines, and both lines have an in-quota tariff rate of 
0 percent (with no specific component) while the out-of  -quota rate is 0 percent plus 438 yen/kg. 
for one line, and 0 percent plus 470 yen/kg for the second line.  The second SMP TRQ consists 
of 6 tariff lines.  The in-quota tariff rate ranges from 0 percent to 35 percent, while the out-of-
quota rate ranges from 0 -33 percent plus a specific component, depending on the line of either 
438 or 470 yen/kg.  The average in- and out-of-quota tariff rate for each of these two TRQs 
varies, depending on the aggregation method and on the price used to convert specific rates into 
ad valorem rates.  By taking a simple average of the tariff lines, we obtain an in-quota tariff rate 
for the second SMP TRQ of 20 percent, and an out-of-quota rate of 19 percent plus 454 yen/kg.  
However, the implied level of protection changes dramatically when trade volume is used as a 
weight to aggregate the tariff.  Both in- and out-of-quota tariff rates become 1 percent, while the 
specific component falls to 438 yen/kg.   
  Further aggregation of the two SMP TRQs to obtain a single in- and out-of-quota tariff 
rate at the product level yields equally different results.  The in-quota tariff rate for SMP can be 
as low as 1 percent if the tariffs are weighted by trade volume, or it can be 15 percent if a simple 
average is used, or 18 percent if the TRQ volume is used as the weight.  The out-of-quota tariff 
(including the  ad valorem equivalent using Japanese unit values) ranges from 81 percent when   47 
 
trade is the weight to 203 percent based on a simple average.  The out-of-quota tariff rate would 
be considerably higher if a world unit value or a world reference price is used to convert the 
specific tariff to its ad valorem equivalent. 
  In this paper, specific and complex tariffs were converted to their ad valorem equivalent 
based on each country’s import unit values.  Simple average ad valorem rates were computed for 
each of the products in the data sample.  These are reported in Table 4.2.  Given our discussion 
above on SMP TRQs in Japan, the calculations reported here need to be interpreted with caution.  
Table 4.2 also includes information on the number of TRQs and on the number of tariff lines that 
were involved in computing the average tariff for that product, and the number of specific and/or 
complex lines included in the calculations.  The sensitivity of the computed average tariff to 
alternative weighting schemes increases with the number of tariff lines and with the number of 
specific and/or complex tariffs. 
  The results in Table 4.2 illustrate that both the in-quota and out-of-quota rates differ 
widely among commodities within a country, and between countries.  For the sampled 
commodities and countries, the in-quota and out-of-quota rates are surprisingly high, considering 
that the average tariff for all agricultural products in 1996 was 16 percent in the EU, 8 percent in 
the U.S. and 5 percent in Japan (OECD, calculated using production weights).  In-quota rates 
range from 0 percent for beef and veal in Canada and wheat in the EU to 60 percent for butter in 
Hungary.  In general, Table 4.2 indicates that in-quota rates are relatively smaller in Canada and 
the U.S. compared to the other countries. The gap between the in-quota and out-of-quota rates 
differs widely across commodities and countries.  This indicates the potential protection 
provided by the tariffs for these TRQ commodities.  Imports above the effective quota (i.e. one 
that has not been voluntary expanded by the government) face the out-of-quota rate.  The largest 
difference between the in and out-of  -quota rates is in Japanese butter with an out-of-quota tariff 
that is 459 percentage points higher than the in-quota rate.  The second highest gap is for butter 
in Poland with an out-of-quota rate 315 percentage points above the in-quota rate. 
  On a verage, the lowest gap between in- and out-of-quota rates is in the U.S. where the 
out-of-quota rate is 36 percentage points higher for the products in the data sample.  The largest 
gap is in Japan, where the average difference between in and out-of -quota tariff rates are 252    48 
 
 
Table 4.2  In- and Out-of-quota MFN Tariff Rates for Selected Commodities and 
Countries, 1997 
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percentage points.  A lower gap does not necessarily imply lower cost access opportunities 
however, because a low gap can result from cases where both the in- and out-of-quota rates are 
very high.  For example the average difference between in and out-of  -quota rates in Hungary is 
43 percent points, but Hungary has some of the highest in-quota rates. 
From these data, we can see one possible reason for the low fill rates -- relatively high in-
quota tariffs.  For many commodities in most countries, the in-quota rates are at double-digit 
levels.  Many are in the 20 percent to 40 percent range, with some as high as 60 percent.  Out-of-
quota tariff rates for most commodities in many countries are at triple-digit levels.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that quota are not being filled.  
  Interestingly, in Korea, the in and out-of-quota tariff rates are the same for beef and pork.  
This is a result of Korea’s scheduled reductions in the out-of-quota rate and the planned 
elimination of the quota for these two products.  The pork quota is scheduled for elimination in 
1997 while the beef quota is  scheduled for elimination in 2001.  Based on the data, the beef 
quota becomes redundant after 1997, earlier than scheduled.   
 
4.3  Applied tariffs 
 
  The observed applied tariff rate can differ from either the scheduled MFN in-quota or 
scheduled MFN out-of-quota rates.  Using 1997 data for selected OECD countries and 
commodities, the applied rate is not materially different from the scheduled MFN rate for most 
countries and products.  Canada, the EU, Japan, and the U.S. apply tariffs on the same basis as in 
their schedules.  That is, their schedule MFN rates are the applied in-quota and applied out-of-
quota tariff rates.  Speculation after the conclusion of the URAA was that scheduled MFN tariff 
rates were substantially greater than applied rates.  Hence, it  was feared that negotiated 
reductions in scheduled rates would have no effect.  This gap between scheduled and applied 
rates was deemed to be one of the shortfalls of the Agreement.  
  For most countries and products examined here, this does not appear to b e the case.  
Applied rates are the same as scheduled rates (with the exception of developing countries 
discussed later in Chapter 8).  The notable exception is the three products in the data sample   50 
 
from the Japanese schedule.  The in-quota-applied rate is the same as the scheduled MFN rate, 
but the applied rate on the out-of-quota imports is substantially lower than the scheduled MFN 
rate.  For example, the average applied rate on SMP in Japan is 58 percent compared to the 
scheduled MFN rate of 203 percent.  The average applied rate on butter is 83 percent and is 33 
percent on wheat, both significantly lower than their scheduled MFN rates. 
  Although the data coverage on products and countries may not be representative, the data 
here suggest that the gap between scheduled and applied tariffs may not be as big a problem as 
initially feared.  However, scheduled MFN tariffs remain very high.  The relatively large number 
of quotas with low fill rates and the criticism that market access did not improve significantly 
following the Agreement may be a result of the relatively high scheduled tariffs that remain in 
the system.   
 
4.4  Imports 
 
  Most countries do not distinguish between in-quota and out-of-quota imports in reporting 
trade figures.  Depending upon the detail at the HSC level for scheduled and notified TRQs and 
reported trade statistics, it may be possible to infer in-quota and out-of-quota imports from total 
trade.  However, that is only the case for Canada, Japan, and the U.S. whose schedule and import 
data enable one to distinguish between in-, out-of-quota and total imports.      
  Table 4.3 reports in- and out-of  -quota trade for selected commodities by these three 
countries.  Out-of-quota imports for these products are very small which is consistent with the 
large disparity typically found between the in-quota and out-of  -quota tariff rates.  For example, 
there are zero out-of-quota butter imports by Japan.   Similarly, Canada’s 1997 trade data for 
cheese indicates that Canada voluntarily expanded its cheese TRQ and there were  over-quota 
imports (at the in-quota tariff) of around 3,000 tonnes while out-of-quota imports were only 26 
tonnes.  This may be a reflection of Canada’s very low in-quota tariff rate of less than 1 percent 
while the out-of-quota rate is more than 260 percent.  
Out-of-quota trade (both above-quota imports and those that come in quota-free) is 
important for some products.  For example, Canada’s out-of-quota beef imports in 1997 were   51 
 
almost equal to in-quota imports
16.  In Canada’s case, out-of-quota beef imports occurred while 
the TRQ fill rate was greater than 100 percent.  But, it is possible to have out-of quota imports 
even with a fill rate of less than 100 percent because of how quotas are allocated and 
administered.  Data here suggest that this is in fact occurring.  For example, out-of-quota US 
cheese imports (including many cheeses not covered by quotas) were 3 percent of the in-quota 
volume even though the fill rates for the cheese TRQs were less than 100 percent.  Similarly, 
out-of quota butter imports occurred in the United States with a fill rate less than 100 percent.  
Quota rents still exist in these cases as well. 
 
 
Table 4.3  In- and Out-of-Quota Imports:  Selected Commodities and Countries - 
1997 





            Canada 
 

























Beef & Veal 
Cheese 







Source:  Calculations based on AMAD. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Canada’s out-of-quota beef imports reported in AMAD include Canada’s imports from the US under NAFTA at a 
duty of 0 percent.     52 
 
4.5  Summary 
 
  The conclusions that can be drawn from the preliminary data are mixed in terms of 
assessing the impact of TRQs on market access.  Based on official schedules and notifications, 
the calculated fill rate for OECD countries would suggest that market access might be 
expanding.  The simple average fill rate has increased.  But this is a biased indicator -- it does not 
reflect the volume of trade involved, and so a few  large fill rates can dominate the results.  The 
data also suggest that governments are rather innovative in their use of the TRQ system.  In cases 
where countries want more imports, they simply expand the TRQ to increase imports at the 
lower in-quota rate without dismantling their armor for use in subsequent years as desired.  Since 
the TRQs do not represent minimum imports, countries can use them to protect their industries as 
they wish, expanding them when it is politically convenient.  Although countries can also 
manipulate their tariff schedules to obtain similar results by lowering applied tariffs, the data 
suggest that quotas have been voluntarily expanded frequently whereas applied tariffs tend to be 
at the schedule MFN rates.   The data also indicate that the in-quota tariffs are relatively high for 
most commodities.  They tend to be in the mid- to high double-digit range, and in most cases, 
they are the binding instruments.  Out-of-quota tariff rates are very high, often over 100 percent, 
thereby negating the possibilities for out-of quota imports in most cases. Applied tariffs for the 
products and countries examined in this study are almost equal to the scheduled tariffs, 
suggesting that further reductions in scheduled tariffs may eventually lead to  improvements in 
market access.   
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5  TRQs in the European Union 
 
5.1  A Brief Description of TRQs in the European Union 
 
The European Union established 85 tariff rate quotas in its Schedule resulting from the 
Uruguay Round.  An extra quota for grape juice  and grape musts (following negotiations under 
Article XXIV.6 of the GATT in the context of EU Northern enlargement) was added in 
September 1996.  A quota for rum and taffia was added in July 1997 following the 1996 
Singapore ministerial meeting agreement of the WTO. As a result, a total of 87 tariff rate quotas 
was incorporated in the commitments of the 15 members in the EU, after Austria, Finland and 
Sweden had joined the Union.  The precise description of these quotas can be found in the 
Official Journal  of the European Communities (OJEC, 1999)
17.  Table 5.1 shows the different 
categories of products covered by TRQs.  It is, however, important to stress that the economic 
importance of the imports covered varies widely.  For example, in some cases, TRQs volumes 
are as little as 300 tonnes of meat, or 129 tonnes of poultry, while some other TRQs deal with 2 
million tonnes of maize, 34,000 tonnes of tenderloins or 2.2 million tonnes of bananas.  Clearly, 
the number of TRQs per se, or average figures computed across TRQs, has little meaning. 
 
Table 5.1. Number of Tariff Quotas by Product Categories 
  Grains  
Oilseeds  Sugar  Dairy  Meat  Eggs  Others  Total 
        Poultry  Other        
EU  15  4  12  6  22  3  25  87 
                 
Canada  5  -  11  2  1  2  0  21 
USA  3  6  24  -  1  -  20  54 
WTO  339  50  183  249  21  528  1370 
 
Source: from WTO and OJEC figures. 
 
Origin of the  TRQs.  In the EU, most MFN tariffs were determined under the process of 
tariffication.  That is, former measures such as variable levies were converted into tariffs.  The 
tariffication process resulted in high base tariffs.  TRQs were set either to preserve market access 
by ensuring that historical quantities continued to be treated under former access conditions, or 54   
to provide opportunities for additional imports so as to fill minimum market access obligations in 
spite of the high, and sometimes prohibitive MFN tariffs.  
In the EU Schedule, the TRQs have a clear origin.  Forty-four quotas, representing a total 
of 155 tariff lines in the Harmonized system (HS) classification at the 8 -digit level, were 
presented in the schedule under current access.  A total of 37 tariff quotas, representing roughly 
160 tariff lines at the 8 -digit level, were notified under minimum access.  Quotas for non-
tariffied products include 6 quotas corresponding to 7 tariff lines at the 8 -digit level, for fresh 
potatoes, carrots, turnips, sweet peppers, and almonds.  They are also listed separately. 
While current access quotas often correspond to live animals, beef, fruits and vegetables, 
minimum access TRQs were mainly opened for meat, dairy products and grains (see Figure 5.1). 
Note that the number of quotas itself is not very meaningful because of the heterogeneity of 
TRQs, and Figure 5.1 must be interpreted with caution.  In general, the quotas under current 
access correspond to larger import quantities than those under minimum access.  For example, 
while current access quotas correspond to imports of roughly 430,000 tonnes of meat (not 
counting large imports of live animals), minimum access quotas for meat amount to a total of 
130,000 tonnes only.  Some of the 87 TRQs originated from compensating third countries for 
access they used to have to the markets of Austria, Finland and Sweden before they joined the 
EU.  This is the case, for example, for TRQs on rice (70,000 tonnes), oats (10,000 tonnes) and 
poultry meat (700 tonnes). These are notified under minimum access in the EU Schedule (In the 
WTO negotiations on compensation for EU enlargement, some other TRQs were also opened up, 
and tariffs were reduced on a number of products, see IATRC, 1997). 
Some other TRQs resulted from the bilateral settlement of earlier trade disputes.  For 
example, the GATT oilseeds panel dispute was settled by the opening of 20,000 tonnes of beef, 
15,500 tonnes of poultry meat, 500,000 tonnes of maize and 300,000 tonnes of wheat, notified as 
TRQs under minimum access.  Older agreements resulted in import quotas notified as TRQs 
under current access.  This is, for example, the case of the compensations granted to traditional 
exporters such as the United States, for the accession of Spain to the single market (TRQ of 2 
million  
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Figure 1. Distribution of EU Minimum and Current Access TRQs across Commodity  
                Groups 
 
tonnes of maize and 300,000 tonnes of sorghum).  Much older arrangements such as imports of 
high quality beef have led to a TRQ notified under current access.  One of the quotas for "high 
quality beef" allocates 37,800 tonnes to a particular list of countries including the United 
States/Canada, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. 
Other TRQs resulted from bilateral arrangements that the EU had in the past concluded 
with individual exporting countries.  This is the case for most EU TRQs listed under "current 
access".  The reasons for which these bilateral arrangements had been agreed differ. In some 
cases, past voluntary export restraint agreements were the historical source of TRQs that are now 
included in the EU’s Schedule.  The export restraint agreement between the EU and Thailand, 
relating to Thailand's manioc exports to the EU is one such case.  That TRQ commits the EU to 
charge no more than the tariff that existed under the bilateral agreement, on the quantity of 
imports set in that export restraint agreement.  It should be noted that the EU did not open up any 
TRQs for products that had undergone tariffication and where no specific bilateral arrangements 
had existed in the past.  This fact is noteworthy as one could well have argued that the high EU 
tariffs that resulted from tariffication had, at least in some cases, the potential of getting in the 
way of the imports that used to be shipped to the EU under variable levies before the Uruguay 
Round.  Thus, to be on the safe side, some exporters could well have requested the EU to set up 
current access TRQs f or tariffied products even in cases where no specific bilateral arrangements 
had existed in the past.  However, the EU did not open up such TRQs, arguing that the tariffs that 
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resulted from tariffication provided at least as favorable access to the EU market as the 
respective non-tariff measures had done in the past. 
One should also mention the recent tariff quota allocated to the U.S. for malting barley 
(100,000 tonnes for years 1999 and 2000).  This tariff rate quota is not part of the 87 TRQs listed 
above. It is part of an agreement following consultations with the EU under WTO dispute 
settlement procedures (the U.S. challenged the reference price system for grains that deprived 
U.S. exporters of the duty reductions on high-value grains agreed during the Uruguay Round). 
Transparency of the EU TRQs.  Some seemingly technical aspects such as statistical 
classification and the definition of products may strongly affect the practical scope of the market 
access commitments under the URAA.  For example, many countries have used unique or 
inconsistent statistical classification of the products under TRQs, which makes the monitoring of 
the implementation of market access cumbersome.  Some countries have created quotas with 
such a degree of precision in the definition of the commodity covered that they  de facto restrict 
export rights to a particular country.  In some cases, there is suspicion that changes in the 
classification and product definition during the implementation period of the URAA made it 
possible to shift some sensitive commodities to a more protected tariff line.  Transparency is 
therefore an important criterion in the assessment of the URAA implementation. 
The EU has a somewhat better record than most countries as far as transparency of TRQs 
is concerned. Indeed, it is one of the very few countries that have listed separately the minimum 
access quotas.  This is particularly important because current access quotas are mainly a new 
shell for old preferential agreements.  They are seldom open on a MFN basis, and one may 
consider that minimum access quotas are the only ones that hold the promise of leading to a 
genuine increase in market access.  A separate listing of minimum access quotas, such as 
provided by the EU, makes it easier to assess the real impact of the URAA.
18  
The list of tariff rate quotas, the levels of imports and the related tariffs are published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) in a consistent classification, even 
                                                 
18  The separate listing of minimum access and current access TRQs has not affected the overall volume of quota set 
by the EU for the individual products. The EU opened up minimum access TRQs only where, and to the extent that, 
past imports, whether coverered by current access TRQs or not, were below the required percentage of domestic 
consumption. 57   
though it imperfectly matches the classification used in the Schedules
19.  Notifications to the 
WTO (G/AG/N/EEC, MA:1 and MA:2) provide information on the volume of imports under the 
particular quota, the management and the allocation of import licenses, and on the level of quota 
that is pre-allocated to a particular country.  
The Modalities specified that market access commitments should be based on the 4-digit 
level of the Harmonized system ( HS).  Very few countries have followed this guideline.  In 
practice, TRQs were notified at the 8 -digit level (EU, Canada, USA), and even 9 - or 10-digit 
level in some countries.  This narrows the range of products eligible, and, therefore, may restrict 
imports to a particular list of countries.  In the EU, there are a few cases where the degree of 
detail in the definition of products raises questions.
20  However, it is noteworthy that while the 
definitions are sometimes very restrictive for the current access quotas (which, anyway may be 
allocated to a particular country, that has usually agreed to the specification chosen), this is not 
the case for minimum access quotas in the EU.  For that reason, the statistical definition of the 
products can hardly be seen as imposing hidden restrictions on imports, as it is the case in some 
other countries (e.g. Korea, Japan, Brazil, T hailand which have set quotas on the basis of the 9- 
or 10-digit level of the HS). 
The transparency of the notifications to the WTO has been questioned since the volume 
of imports that is notified by the EU correspond to the volume specified in the licenses given to 
importers, not to the actual quantities imported.  (Note that this is not a violation of the URAA - 
other countries like Canada are in the same situation).  The Committee for Agriculture in the 
WTO questioned the possibility that EU imports are  overestimated if licenses are unfilled.  The 
EU claims that it is not the case, since a deposit is required from the importer.  According to the 
EU, this makes it very unlikely that a trading company obtains a license and chooses not to 
import the product. 
                                                 
19  One of the explanations of the discrepancies in description and codes is that the OJEC refers to the new EU-15 
commitments, while the original Schedule referred to EU-12. Second, there have been changes in the codes of the 
European Classification (Nomenclature Combinée, the European version of the Harmonized system) that has been 
adopted in the OJEC. The EU continues to notify its compliance with WTO commitments in the former 
classification, so that actual policy can be compared to the original commitments (Codes in the initial classification 
are followed by "Ex" in the WTO notifications). In addition, both codes imperfectly match the Geneva List of tariff 
lines used in the schedule on bound (out-of-quota) tariffs. 58   
Modalities of TRQ calculation.  The Modalities mentioned that WTO countries had to offer a 
minimum access in 1995 equivalent to 3 percent of the average consumption between 1986 and 
1988.  However, some degree of freedom could be used in the exact calculation of the level of tariff 
quota for a particular commodity.  Since the Modalities lost their legally binding value when the 
Schedules were adopted, the procedures used by some countries made it possible to minimize the 
impact of the minimum access commitments.  
Consumption statistics often do not match the detail of trade statistics.  Using this 
argument – whether justified or not – several countries choose to calculate the level of quota as a 
percentage of consumption for aggregate commodities, and then  to allocate this aggregate level 
between the more detailed commodities, so as to set lower TRQ levels for the most sensitive 
ones.  Typically, the United States and Canada have used this procedure for dairy products.  This 
"dirty quotification" may have resulted in a level of quotas below the actual 3 percent of 
consumption (see Doyle, 1999, for the case of dairy products in the United States and see also 
IATRC, 1994).  The EU used a similar procedure for meat products. It calculated the overall 
quota at a  rather aggregated level for the meat sector, and then allocated the quota across the 
various tariff lines in a somewhat arbitrary way, and not necessarily such that imports were to be 
highest in the most sensitive markets.  As a result, the allocation between the different categories 
of meat was not the same as if the Modalities had been followed precisely (IATRC 1994). In 
particular the TRQ for pigmeat was established at a level lower than a disaggregate calculation 
for individual meat categories would have yielded.  However, because of the rather large imports 
of bovines and beef under current access quotas and the increase in minimum access TRQs for 
pigmeat during the implementation period, the overall EU TRQs for meat are argued to be 
consistent with the 5 percent minimum access objective.  This is also the case for other TRQs 
than meat.  For wheat, for example, it is noteworthy that the EU implemented a TRQ which 
augments base period imports such that 5 percent of domestic consumption was reached in 1995 
already (the requirement was 3 percent for that year, and 5 percent only in 2000).
21 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 For example, a current access quota specifies the live animals eligible with a degree of detail that includes the 
particular breed of the animal (Simmental or Pinzgau). This specification was agreed with the country of origin, i.e. 
Switzerland. This information is normally well beyond the 8-digit level in the EU version of the HS. 
21  The minimum access quota of wheat opened up by the EU, at zero tariffs, amounts to about 0.5 percent of base 
period consumption, while base period actual imports were about 4.5 percent of base period consumption. 59   
Most significant increases in EU market access.  Current access quotas, as well as those 
minimum access TRQs which correspond to compensation for EU enlargement, hardly 
correspond to new trade opportunities for third countries.  Taking this into account, the 
examination of the EU TRQs suggests that they have only led to a limited increase in access to 
the EU market. This is not specific to the EU, and it is also the case in most WTO countries.  The 
main impact of the URAA market access provisions are to be found for those commodities 
where large minimum access quotas have been set.  In the EU,  this is the case for corn, for 
durum and quality wheat (note, however, that it resulted from the oilseed dispute settlement with 
the U.S. rather than from the URAA).  It is also the case for cheese and skim milk powder, where 
most of the increases in EU market access are likely to occur.  A large quota was also created for 
the egg sector. This sector experiences little domestic support and hence domestic production has 
to compete with imports. 
 
5.2  In-quota and Out-of-quota Tariffs 
 
In principle, a TRQ should provide access to imports thanks to a low in-quota tariff.  It 
should, therefore, be less restrictive than a regular quota since third countries do not face a 
quantity constraint, but simply a higher out-of-quota tariff. In practice, however, out-of-quota 
tariffs are often prohibitive and effectively exclude imports in excess of the  quota in many 
countries.  In addition, there are also cases where the in-quota tariff itself was set at a relatively 
high level, making it difficult even for in-quota imports to compete with domestic production 
(ABARE, 1999).  
The setting of the tariff.  Even less than for the level of quotas, the Modalities did not set precise 
constraints on the level of tariffs for in-quota imports under minimum access requirements. 
Tariffs should be "low or minimum", which leaves a lot of room for interpretation.  Most WTO 
member countries have set in-quota tariffs as a percentage of the out-of quota tariff.  However, 
the percentage varies a lot across commodities and is often larger for the most sensitive 
commodities.  
In the EU, tariffs under current access TRQs are much lower than the respective out-of 
quota tariffs.  For example, the in-quota tariffs for live animals are designed so that the specific 
component of the out-of-quota tariff (which is by far the largest duty) is set to zero.  As a result, 60   
imports under current access TRQs for meat products are subject to small tariffs (from zero for 
sheep meat to 20 percent for beef), with the exception of young live animals for fattening.  
Feedstuffs under current access TRQs also have very small tariffs (from zero to 7 percent), and 
refined sugar from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries enters the EU with no duty.  
Butter from New Zealand still faces a significant tariff, although roughly half of the out-of-quota 
tariff.  On average, over the 50 quotas under current access and for non-tariffied products, the 
in-quota tariff shows a reduction of 80 percent compared to the out-of-quota tariff of the 
beginning of the implementation period.
22  Since in-quota tariffs have remained unchanged 
during the implementation period, while out-of quota tariffs are scheduled to decrease, the gap is 
narrowing. In 2001, current access tariff quotas will be roughly one third of out-of-quota tariffs 
for the commodities concerned. There is however some variation between commodities. 
For  TRQs under minimum access, the EU has applied a rather uniform reduction relative 
to the out-of-quota MFN tariff when setting in-quota tariffs.  With the exception of quotas for 
high quality beef where no "in-quota" tariff is set, but where it is specified that the rate have to 
be fixed by the competent authorities so as to ensure that the quota will be filled, most of the 
in-quota tariffs have been set at 32 percent of the out-of quota MFN initial (base) tariff.  The gap 
is much larger for high-quality meat, since meat is highly protected in the EU while it is subject 
to low in-quota tariffs.  Other exceptions include milled rice, durum and wheat that are subject to 
a zero in-quota tariff. In the case of minimum access TRQs, the in-quota tariffs are also not 
scheduled to change during the implementation period of the URAA.  Hence for these products, 
too, the gap is narrowing over time, and in-quota tariffs are close to 40 percent of the out-of-
quota tariff at the end of the implementation period. 
Compared to most other countries, where in-quota tariffs were set in a more arbitrary 
way, the EU procedure used for minimum access TRQs is transparent, and shows that the 
"strategic" setting of tariffs across commodities so as to protect the most sensitive commodities 
has been very limited.
23  However, the procedure maintains the tariff dispersion that can be 
observed for the out-of quota tariffs.  In particular, commodities, where the out-of quota tariff is 
                                                 
22 This figure is a non-weighted average tariff across TRQs after converting specific tariffs into ad-valorem 
equivalents. The conversion was made on the basis of an average world price, constructed as the 4-year average unit 
value of imports between 1995 and 1998 (calculation by the authors).  61   
very high, still experience a significant in-quota tariff.  The case of butter is typical in this regard. 
The out-of-quota tariff is high (Euro 2316/tonne).  The in-quota tariff under minimum access is 
equivalent to 948 Euro per tonne, which is significantly higher than the in-quota tariff in other 
countries.
24 
5.3  Allocation of import licenses 
 
Allocation of quotas to specific countries.  In principle, quotas under minimum access should be 
allocated on a MFN basis.  This was specified in the Modalities.  In practice, there are grey areas 
in many countries.  In some countries there is a lack of transparency concerning which quotas are 
under minimum and current access. The distinction matters, as many current access quotas are 
allocated to given countries only, in particular where they have originated from preferential trade 
agreements. Countries such as the United States and Canada, for example, do not distinguish 
between minimum access and current access.  It is therefore difficult to assess whether or not 
they have granted preferential in-quota tariffs to specific countries.
25  In other cases, the setting 
of the in-quota tariff at a level higher than the regular tariff under preferential agreements results 
in a  de facto allocation of quota to a preferentially treated (often neighbor) country.  This all 
often takes place with little transparency. 
As far as trade liberalization is concerned, it makes a lot of difference whether a 
particular quota is open on a MFN basis, or whether access to this quota is restricted to, say one 
particular country.  In practice, country-specific allocation is used either to prevent access or to 
achieve reciprocal benefits on a bilateral basis.  In addition, the possibility to allocate quotas to a 
particular country may result in low imports under that quota.  Indeed, quotas are sometimes 
allocated to countries that are unlikely to be able to export the commodity (e.g. some of the U.S. 
TRQ for ice cream has been allocated to Jamaica, which, unsurprisingly, is not exporting any ice 
cream into the  U.S., see Doyle 1999).  Administration procedures often make reallocation of such 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 This is similar to the reduction rates chosen for tariffs that resulted from tariffication, where the EU has opted for 
a 36 percent reduction for nearly all products, and not less than 20 percent reduction in any single case. 
24 The in-quota tariff is Cdn$163/t, i.e. roughly US$111/t in Canada and US$123/t in the US, compared roughly to 
1004US$ in the EU. Note however that this does not seem to be a prohibitive tariff, since the minimum access TRQ 
for butter has a fill rate close to 100 percent. 62   
unfilled quotas to other would-be exporters difficult. Preferential allocation of TRQs to particular 
countries is, therefore, an important issue for assessing the implementation of the URAA market 
access provisions. 
In the EU, most quotas under current access result from old preferential agreements, and 
many of them are allocated on a preferential basis.  Out of 44 current access TRQs, 17 are 
allocated to a particular list of countries.  This includes some non-WTO member countries, such 
as the People's Republic of China.  Several quotas are pre-allocated to countries associated with 
the European Union, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Czech and 
Slovak republics, or Macedonia.  Some quotas are also allocated to ACP countries that benefit 
from a preferential agreement under the Lomé convention.  For example, this is the case for 
sheep, goat, and mushrooms quotas, a 1.2 million tonne quota of sugar, and of a granted share of 
the quota for bananas.  Access to some tariff rate quotas is restricted to the  U.S., Australia, 
Uruguay, New Zealand, Chile, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Iceland and Greenland respectively.  
In some cases, the whole quota is pre-allocated to a particular country (e.g., to New Zealand for 
EU imports of butter). 
In the EU, quotas under minimum access are administered on a MFN basis, and are, 
therefore, not allocated to a particular country.  However, quotas on rice can be considered as 
exceptions, since the administrative conditions  of the allocation of licenses discriminate between 
countries.  In the case of rice, the administrative procedures (export licenses) resulted in 
allocating imports to Thailand and Australia.  As part of the concessions made to the United 
States as compensation for the accession of Finland, Austria, and Sweden to the EU, the EU 
agreed to implement tariff rate quotas (TRQ) for imports from the U.S. of 38,700 tonnes of 
milled rice at zero duty and 7,600 tonnes of brown rice starting in 1996 (the new 100,000 tonnes 
quota for malting barley with a 50 percent tariff reduction, which is not part of the EU schedule, 
is also allocated to the U.S.). 
There is a controversy about the actual allocation on a MFN basis of some other EU 
minimum access quotas.  The EU Schedule mentions that for 18 out of the 35 quotas under 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 Requests for details are often dismissed or answers often lack precision, in the WTO Committee for Agriculture. 
The Canadian response to a question from Hungary in the September 1999 meeting suggests that preferential tariffs 
within quota are provided to some Member countries because of regional trade agreements such as NAFTA. 63   
minimum access, the EU may count against the quota the preferential imports from Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) under the so-called Europe Agreements (concluded with 
countries that are expected to join the EU in the near future).  This is the case for pigmeat (5 
quotas), poultry (3 quotas), dairy products (7 quotas), and processed eggs (3 quotas).  The EU 
Schedule does not specify the quantities under quota that would be allocated and the eligible 
countries.  The EU is suspected of granting lower tariffs to CEECs than the regular in-quota 
tariffs. The U.S Department of Agriculture  claims that this allows the CEECs to capture a 
disproportionate share of the minimum access TRQs, and to reap most of the benefits of the 
improved market access, especially in the pork, poultry and, to a lesser extent, skim milk powder 
(USDA, 1997).  The EU claims the opposite, and that the corresponding MFN in-quota tariffs 
were reduced to the same level as those under the Europe Agreement 
26.  The U.S. raised the 
issue officially at the WTO during the November 1998 meeting of the Committee of Agriculture.  
The EU responded that imports under European agreements are counted in the tariff quotas only 
when the tariff under the preferential agreement was identical to the in-quota tariff and that in 
other cases, there was no case where preferential imports had been counted against the quota.
27  
 
5.4  Management of Import Licenses 
 
Allocation method.  In the EU, the management of tariff quotas, with the exception of the quota 
for rice and cassava, has not raised many controversies.  Tariff quotas are allocated using mainly 
three methods, the allocation as a proportion of licenses requested (44 quotas), the allocation to 
traditional importers (20 quotas), and the first-come, first-serve procedure (21 quotas), depending 
on the quota.  Though these procedures are not ideal from the viewpoint of economic theory, 
most economists find that they do at least not discriminate explicitly  among exporting countries 
(see ABARE, 1999; OECD, 1999).  Table 5.2 shows the EU management procedures in 
comparison to those used by other developed countries.  The pros and cons of each particular 
method are described in detail in OECD (1999) and ABARE (1999).   
                                                 
26 The EU initial Schedule notifies in-quota tariffs that correspond to 32 percent of the out-of-quota tariff, while 
under the Europe Agreement; preferential tariffs are, in general, around 20 percent.  This Schedule, however, was 
established before the Europe Agreements and may not include later changes.  
27 This claim is supported by information from German customs that the in-quota tariffs on live animal imports from 
third countries were lowered to the level charged on imports from the Central European countries. 
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Table 5.2 Number of TRQs Administered According to Administration Method (1997) 




EU  44  20  21  -  -  -  -  2  87 
                   
Canada  5  6  7  1  -  -    2  21 
Korea  4  -  21  10  4  5  2  21  67 
Israel  2  1  1  -  -  -  2  6  12 
Japan  -  12  -  4  1  -    3  20 
Mexico  -  1  -  -  -  -  10  -  11 
Switzerland                  28 
Thailand  10  3  2  -  5  1  2  1  23 
USA  1  -  27  -  -  -    26  54 
LoD: Licenses on demand, on the basis of quantity requested, uniform reduction if the sum of requests 
exceeds TRQ;  
His: allocated to historical importers;  
FCFS: First-come-first served.  
ST: Licenses allocated to state owned importer.  
PG: Licenses allocated to producers' organization.  
AU: Auction. 
AT: Applied tariff (unlimited imports, TRQ notified but not enforced) 
Mixed: includes lottery in the USA. 
 
 
The three types of procedures are the following cases: 
•  Licenses as a function of quantities requested.  Licenses are on demand, until they exceed 
available quantities.  The allocation of licenses can be the responsibility of the Commission, 
as it is the case for fruits (cherries, apricots, oranges, lemons), or of Member states of the EU. 
In that case, national governments indicate to the Commission the number of requests and the 
quantities requested.  If the sum of t he import licenses exceeds the TRQ, the Commission 
reduces proportionally the level of each license.  Under this system, conditions for entry are 
known and this provides a degree of certainty to importers on the precise tariffs and entry 
conditions. 
•  Allocation to traditional importers.  For some quotas, in general under current access, import 
licenses are attributed to traditional importers.  This has the advantage of maintaining 
established contacts and preventing speculators from winning control of licenses, but may 
result in rigidities in the market.  In order to leave access to the market to newcomers, a share 
of the quota is reserved to new importers in the EU.  For live cattle, for example, 20 percent 65   
of the quota is allocated to newcomers, the rest to traditional importers.  This provision also 
exists for the quotas for beef, bananas, mushroom, wheat, skim milk powder, and butter. 
•  First-come, first-served.  For 3 quotas (offals, live sheep, potatoes) there is no rule for 
allocating licenses in the EU.  They are attributed by order of request to the importer, even 
though these quotas are allocated to a pre-defined list of countries.  The advantage of this 
method is that it reduces the odds of creating vested interests, compared to a licensing 
system.  However, it may encourage concentration and seasonality of imports.  
No quotas are allocated through state monopoly and producers' organizations.  Two 
quotas are considered as managed by a mixed procedure by the WTO.  In these cases, the share 
of the quota that is pre-allocated to a given list of countries is managed on a first-come, first-
served basis, while the share of quota that is on a MFN basis is provided through import licenses. 
Administrative restrictions.  The management of the quota sometimes imposes additional 
requirements on importers (and sometimes exporters) in order to allocate licenses. For example, 
in order to be eligible to import live cattle, beef, corn, rice or wheat, importers must be registered 
under the Value Added Tax system of one Member State. In a few cases, (some beef offals) 
imports are allowed only for processing. Grape juice can be imported only if it is used in 
products other than wine.  Importers of raw cane sugar must process it before the following first 
of July, and must themselves be refiners.  In some cases, it is required that the authorities of the 
exporting country provide a certificate of authenticity of the product.  For cane sugar, a 
certificate of origin must be provided.  Finally, would-be importers of rice, corn, millet, durum or 
oats must show that they have traded this commodity within the last 12 months.  For eggs, it is 
required to have imported at least 50 tonnes of egg products during each of the last two years 
(similar conditions exist for turkey meat).  For c assava and rice, export licenses are required 
from particular countries (Indonesia in the case of cassava; Thailand and Australia in the case of 
rice).  
Validity of licenses.  For 59 out of the 87 tariff quotas, import licenses have a limited period of 
validity. This type of restriction also exists in many other countries (e.g. Canada).  In the EU, 
imports must take place within a few months, but the validity is shorter in some particular cases.  
This could be a problem for imports from remote countries.  F or example, the validity of the 66   
import license for wheat (7 days), durum (7 days) or sugar (30 days) could be an administrative 
obstacle to imports.  These provisions have been questioned within the WTO Committee for 
Agriculture. The EU claims that the system is designed to avoid excess subscription to tariff 
quotas; that, even for wheat, importers have in fact a 45-day delay between the subscription to an 
import license and the expiration of the validity of the license; and that the tariff rate quotas in 
question have been fully utilized (June 1997 meeting).  
5.5    Fill Rates 
          The fill rate expresses actual imports as a percentage of the TRQ volume concerned.  Fill 
rates can be seen as an ex-post check of the way countries have implemented the market access 
commitments of the URAA.  As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the fill rate is an ambiguous 
indicator, since market forces can explain a low fill rate.  Table 5.3 shows average fill rates.  
Bureau and Tangermann (1999) provide more details. 
 
Table 5.3 Fill Rates of TRQs, 1995 – 97 Average (minimum and current access) 
  Rate 1995  Rate 1996  Rate 1997  Average 
1995-97 
EU  75%  71%  73%  73% 
         
WTO Members 
I  65%  63%  46%  58% 
Canada  78%  85%  83%  82% 
Japan  70%  71%  70%  70% 
USA  48%  53%  56%  52% 
Korea  78%  76%  76%  77% 
Source:  WTO 
icountries notifying TRQs 
 
Current access quotas.  The fill rate of quotas under current access is, on average, 73 percent. 
Averages are, however, of little meaning because of the presence of very small quotas in the list. 
It is necessary to focus on the large quotas in order to have a better image of the fill rate.  
Sixteen of the EU’s 44 quotas under current access had a fill rate lower than 85 percent in 
97. TRQs for live animals were close to being fully utilized.  The main quota (169,000 heads of 
live young cattle for fattening) was filled at 100 percent.  Current access quotas for beef (roughly 
140,000 tonnes) are also almost entirely filled (with the exception of a very small quota for 67   
buffalo meat).
28  For sheep meat, the large quota of 283,000 tonnes was 88 percent filled in 1997, 
but the quota for live sheep and goats was filled only to 64 percent.  Regarding dairy products, 
the main quota is a 72,000 tonnes of butter allocated to New Zealand.  The fill rate has yet to be 
notified, the EU  arguing that there was a problem of product definition that was still 
unresolved.
29  Quotas for cheese (for processing and cheddar) allocated to New Zealand and 
Australia have been almost entirely filled. 
The lower fill rates observed are those for feedstuffs.  The 5.5 million tonne quota for 
cassava, allocated to Thailand, and the 600,000 tonnes of sweet potatoes allocated to China had 
low fill rates in 1997 (61 percent and 0 percent respectively).  So do the 135,000 tonnes of 
arrowroot and manioc  TRQ, allocated to China and other non-WTO countries (11 percent fill 
rate), and the 135,000 tonne quota for bran (8 percent fill rate).  The main reasons for the low fill 
rates are, according to the EU, that several years of reform of the Common agricultural policy 
and, in particular, the significant cuts of EU support prices for cereals under the MacSharry 
reform have reduced demand for imports of feed stuffs, that were used as cereal substitutes.  
There is little doubt that this was indeed the case, given the large shift in consumption from 
imported grains substitutes such as Corn Gluten Feed to domestic grains that have taken place in 
the  EU  over the last few years, in spite of the low tariffs for grain substitutes.  In addition, the 
main suppliers of cassava are themselves becoming larger users, or find increasing demand in 
neighboring countries.  This is also the case for China, whose domestic demand absorbs supply 
of sweet potatoes and arrowroots.  The large quota for maize (3 million tonnes) and sorghum 
(300,000 tonnes) has only been utilized at 70 percent in 1997 in spite of a variable tariff that is 
supposed to be adjusted so as to ensure that the quota will be filled (note that imports of sorghum 
far exceeded the quota in 1996).  It is interesting t o note that descriptive statistics show no 
obvious relationship between the rate by which the in-quota tariff is reduced relative to the out-
of-quota tariff, and quota fill. 
The quotas that correspond to non-tariffied products, are in general very small, w ith the 
exception of almonds (90,000 tonnes), which is fully utilized. 
                                                 
28 Note that imports under the 11,500 tons quota of high quality beef (from animals normally not supplemented with 
hormones) allocated to the U.S were suspended in June 1999 after the EU claimed that hormone residues were found 
in 12 percent of the meat tested. In 1998, preliminary figures suggest that this quota was filled up to 60 percent only. 68   
Minimum access quotas.  The fill rate of quotas under minimum access is 74 percent.  Again, an 
arithmetic average must be interpreted with caution, given the considerable heterogeneity  of the 
different quotas. The quota for rum and taffia, for example, has a very low fill rate because the 
last available figures notified refer to 1997, when the quota was implemented.  Overall, fourteen 
of the minimum access quotas have a fill rate lower than 85 percent.  
The three quotas (roughly 20,000 tonnes) for high quality beef are fully utilized.  So are 
the quotas for poultry cuts (30,000 tonnes at the end of the implementation period).  The quota 
for skim milk powder (40,000 tonnes) and the various quotas making up a total of 15,000 tonnes 
of cheese are also fully utilized.  The various quotas for pigmeat are among the most 
underutilized ones.  The reason is, according to the EU, the low demand from the industry for 
imports, especially in processed  products (sausages) because of the competitiveness of EU 
production.
30  (Note that minimum access quotas for pigmeat represent relatively small 
quantities, anyway). The quota for eggs for consumption shows a fill rate of as little as 1 percent. 
Again, the E U explains this situation by market conditions, and points out the 100 percent 
utilization of the quota for egg yolks and eggs not in shell.  The egg albumin quota is only filled 
up to 46 percent. 
Minimum access quotas for grains include a 500,000 tonne quota for maize, a quota for 
husked rice (20,000) and for milled rice (63,000 tons) and a quota for quality wheat (300,000 
tonnes) that are completely utilized.
31  Note that, in some cases, fill rates are below 100 percent 
with actual imports having been above TRQ volumes.  An explanation is that the administrative 
procedure for accessing imports under quotas is very complicated and involves significant costs. 
In some cases where the difference between the in-quota and out-of-quota tariff is limited, 
importers prefer a simpler administrative procedure to a lower tariff. 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 The quarrel between New Zealand and the EU about the treatment of spreadable butter has meanwhile been 
settled. 
30 One indication of the competitiveness of EU pigmeat producers is that this product is among those with the largest 
shares of non-subsidized exports among all agricultural products for which the EU has export subsidy commitments. 
In 1996/97, 65 percent of EU pigmeat exports were shipped without subsidies (according to the EU notification of 
export subsidies). 
31 The 300,000 tonne quota for quality wheat showed only a 30 percent fill rate in 1997. The EU Commission 
pointed out that this happened in spite of a zero tariff applied within the quota (see Table 2). This quota was entirely 
filled in 1998. The 50,000 tonne quota for durum showed a 86 percent fill rate in 1997; Durum imports were not 
notified for 1998 when this paper was written. 69   
In the case of the EU’s minimum access quotas, descriptive statistics show a clear 
relationship between the rate of tariff reduction and quota fill. This suggests that there may be a 
tendency for quota fill to be the higher, the lower the in-quota tariff is relative to the out-of-quota 
tariff. 
5.6  Conclusion 
 
The EU created a large number (87) of TRQs after the Uruguay Round, following the 
agreement laid down in the Modalities that minimum access should be provided and that current 
access (i.e., access that existed before the Uruguay Round) not be restricted.  Unlike those of 
nearly all other countries, quotas in the EU’s Schedule are clearly categorized as minimum 
access or current access TRQs, p roviding transparency in this regard.  Roughly two-fifths of the 
EU’s TRQs come under current access, usually providing continued access, on a bilateral basis, 
for exporters who in the past enjoyed preferential access to the EU or who had low or zero tariff 
access to EU markets for products under voluntary restraint agreements. As far as quantities are 
concerned, the EU’s current access quotas tend to be much larger than those created under 
minimum access. 
In establishing the  TRQS, it appears that the EU has generally not deviated from 
fundamental rules in the Modalities.  As in many other countries, there was a bit of “dirty 
quotification” in the EU, both in terms of product specification and the calculation of minimum 
access quantities based on domestic consumption. 
In the EU, the relationship between in-quota tariffs and out-of-quota tariffs differs greatly 
between current and minimum access.  Under current access, in-quota tariffs as percentages of 
above-quota tariffs vary widely across products, because  the individual TRQs reflect their 
historical origins and, hence, the (usually) low levels of protection that the EU had historically 
agreed with the exporting countries concerned. For most minimum access TRQs, on the other 
hand, the EU has set in-quota tariffs at a universal percentage (32 percent) of out-of-quota tariffs, 
and has not distinguished between less and more sensitive products.  For both current and 
minimum access quotas, in-quota tariffs remained constant during the URAA implementation 
period, so that over time they have risen relative to the declining out-of-quota tariffs. 70   
In administering license allocation under the TRQs, the EU has not been particularly 
inventive, either in using approaches that make it difficult to import the products concerned or in 
devising innovative approaches or methods, such as auctioning, that are economically more 
convincing than the other, more frequently used, approaches.  
Fill rates for TRQs in the EU have been reasonably high and have increased over time.  It 
is  interesting to note that some of the larger current-access quotas have exhibited relatively low 
fill rates, more so than have minimum access quotas.  This was particularly so with current 
access quotas for feedstuffs that in the past was used as cereal substitutes in the EU. With the 
significant cut in EU cereal support prices, it is no surprise that import demand for these 
feedstuffs has declined noticeably.  As far as we can see, no case has been identified in which the 
EU has deliberately used quota management procedures to make access to its markets more 
cumbersome than expected under a TRQ regime. 
Overall, it appears that the EU has played a reasonably fair game as far as TRQs are 
concerned.  Concerns do remain, though, as to the exact articulation of t he Europe Agreement 
and the quotas under minimum access.  The EU has indicated in its schedule that imports under 
the (preferential) Europe Agreement could be counted against certain quotas.  Even though this 
provision is used when preferential tariffs under the Europe Agreement and in-quota (MFN) 
tariffs are similar, other countries fear that this could result in  CEECs taking greater advantage of 
the EU increase in market access under the minimum access provisions.  
It is still difficult to make an assessment of the actual increase in access to the EU market 
that has resulted from the URAA.  The scheduled decrease in tariffs is still being implemented, 
some statistics have yet to be published, and because of short run fluctuations of world prices, 
one needs a few more years to assess changes in import flows.  However, it is very likely that 
most of the increase in access to the EU market has resulted from the setting of minimum access 
TRQs.  The 36 percent cut in bound tariff has mainly resulted in squeezing out the original water 
in tariffs that resulted from the so-called dirty tariffication process (see IATRC, 1997). Future 
cuts in bound tariffs are likely to have a significant impact on trade flows but, so far, it is the 
TRQ system that has resulted in the most significant increases in EU imports.  One explanation 
is that, while tariff cuts have been implemented progressively, the EU has set TRQs so that 71   
market access represents 5 percent of consumption several years before the end of the 
implementation period of the URAA.  Even though several TRQs were only partially filled 
during the first years, they have led to significant increases in imports in the cheese, grain and 
beef sectors (for example, the 300,000 tonne quota for quality wheat showed only a 30 percent 
fill rate in 1997 but this quota was entirely filled in 1998). 
For the next round of WTO negotiations, an interesting question is which approach might 
work best to liberalize EU trade  - reductions of in-quota tariffs or an expansion of quota 
volumes?  Clearly, the answer would differ from product to product.  However, as a general rule, 
it would appear that an expansion of quota volumes is likely to achieve more than a reduction of 
in-quota tariffs.  In most cases where fill rates are low in the EU, this appears to be the case not 
because in-quota tariffs are high but because import demand is limited on  EU markets, probably 
even at lower tariffs.  As a matter of fact, in several cases low fill rates coincide with low or even 
zero in-quota tariffs (e.g. worked oats, with zero in-quota tariff but a fill rate of only 22 percent 
in 1997).  In such cases, neither larger quota volumes nor lower in-quota tariffs would make 
imports grow. On the other hand, where TRQs are fully used, only an expansion of quota 
volumes can help to liberalize trade, while a reduction of in-quota tariffs would do no more than 
to raise the rents that tend to flow to EU-based traders. Hence, for the EU’s negotiating partners 
it may be best, in the next WTO round, to concentrate on an expansion of TRQ volumes. 72   
6  U.S. TRQs for Sugar, Tobacco and Peanuts 
6.1  Introduction 
The United States has formally notified 54 TRQs to the WTO.  Seven groups are 
delineated in Table 6.1.  The beef TRQ replaces the 1979 Meat Import Act, repealed as part of 
the URAA.  The TRQs for green olives and satsumas in airtight containers are carried over from 
earlier bilateral trade disputes.  The tobacco TRQ is the U.S. response to a GATT ruling against 
U.S. domestic content regulations for cigarettes (discussed in the section on tobacco below).  
These first three groups are exceptions to the generalizations that follow.   
Each of the four remaining groups finds the origin of its TRQs in a quota imposed to 
sustain a domestic price support program.  Most resulted from the tariffication of the quantitative 
restrictions previously in place under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Section 22 
allowed the President to impose fees or quantitative restrictions on imports of products that could 
materially interfere with the operation of domestic agricultural price-support programs.  The law 
was amended in 1948, 1950, and 1951 to specify that the right to impose such restrictions could 
not be abridged by “any treaty or other international agreement to which the U nited States is or 
hereafter becomes a party.”  The clause was designed to insulate domestic agricultural policy 
discretion from the recently formed GATT.  Import competition in the early 1950s triggered 
Section 22 actions.  Between 1951 and 1955, quantitative trade restrictions were imposed on the 
following products: cotton and certain cotton waste; wheat and wheat products; dairy products, 
including dried milk, cheese, butter, 
 
Table 6.1: U.S. TRQs notified to the WTO 
 
Product  Number   Origin 
Beef  1  Meat Import Act of 1979 
Green olives (4), satsumas in airtight containers   5  Bilateral trade disputes 
Tobacco  1  Domestic Content Law, 1993 
Cane sugar, sugar containing products (11)  12  1934 quota 
Peanuts (2), peanut butter  3  Section 22 
Cotton  7  Section 22 
Dairy products  25  Section 22 
Total  54   73   
chocolate crumb, and certain animal feed containing milk or milk derivatives; barley, rolled 
barley and barley malt; oats and ground oats; shelled and prepared almonds; shelled filberts; 
peanuts; peanut oil; flaxseed and linseed oil; and rye, rye flour and meal.  (Jackson 1969 733-
737).   
  Several parties challenged these quantitative restrictions in the GATT.  In 1955, the 
GATT granted the United States an indefinite waiver from its GATT obligations for actions 
taken under Section 22.  Because the quotas were imposed to prevent disruption of domestic 
price support or production control programs, it was often necessary to restrict not merely the 
controlled commodity but also many of its processed derivatives and substitutes.  Thus Table 6.1 
shows that in addition to cane sugar, 11 sugar-containing items are also restricted.  Similarly, 
there are 25 TRQs for dairy products, almost half the total TRQs. 
  This chapter does not attempt to discuss all 54 TRQs.  It focuses on four commodities: 
sugar, tobacco, peanuts and dairy.  Sugar, peanuts and tobacco TRQs are administrated on an 
historical supplier basis; and each one has its peculiar characteristics.  However, these cases 
represent the range of problems inherent in historical allocation.  The discussion below can be 
generalized to other TRQs as well.   
 
6.2  Sugar TRQ 
 
  The U.S. sugar quota is an excellent example of the persistence of quota allocations.  
Only exceptional economic or political circumstances have induced r eapportionment.  Supplier 
shares of the quota for U.S. sugar imports were first allocated in 1934 on the basis of trade 
volumes from 1931 to 1933.  Save for wartime controls, the allocation was essentially unchanged 
until 1948.  Legislation in 1948 and 1956 made minor adjustments to the shares of the two major 
suppliers, Cuba and the Philippines.  The trade embargo imposed on Cuba after the Cuban 
Revolution forced a reassignment of the large Cuban share in 1961.  It was formally reallocated 
in 1965 to countries, other than the Philippines, in proportion to their shares of the trade in 1963 
and 1964.  This allocation continued until 1974 when the quota was repealed.  A new quota was 
imposed in 1982 on the basis of trade shares from 1975 to 1981; this allocation was transferred 
unaltered into a tariff rate quota in 1995 and remains in effect. Each major change was prompted 74   
by an economic or political shock that, in each case, altered the structure of the sugar market.  
Despite this, the allocation of shares was based on the pattern of trade prevailing before the 
change.  
  The present U.S. sugar tariff rate quota is allocated to exporting countries on the basis of 
their ‘olympic average’ market shares of U.S. sugar imports in the period 1975 to 1981.  This 
was a  period of exceptionally high world sugar prices, so high, in fact, that in 1975 the United 
States removed the quantitative import restriction that had been in place since 1934.  During 
several months of the base period, the world price of sugar exceeded 30 cents per pound.  At 30 
cents virtually everybody is an inframarginal sugar supplier.  Thus, the market shares of U.S. 
imports during the period 1975 to 1981 included some unusually high-cost suppliers. The current 
TRQ was converted from a standard quota after Australia successfully challenged the U.S. quota 
on the grounds that it violated GATT Article XI in 1989.  Establishment of the TRQ in 1995 
resolved the dispute.  
  Skully (1998) examines the pattern of imports for quota-exempt re-export sugar.  Raw 
sugar may be imported outside of the quota if it is refined and re-exported within 90 days.  This 
trade is not distorted by tariffs or quotas (save for the embargo on Cuba), and so it provides an 
estimate of the free trade counterfactual distribution of trade.  This distribution is contrasted with 
the allocation of TRQ shares in Table 6.2.  Low-cost sugar producers located relatively close to 
U.S. refining centers in the Gulf and Atlantic ports dominate the quota-exempt distribution of 
trade.  If the quota w ere auctioned to suppliers, the quota-exempt suppliers would be those most 
likely to place the winning bids.  Similarly, they would be the likely suppliers if the quota were 
replaced with the tariff-equivalent tariff or if international quota leasing or resale were allowed. 
  The requirement that sugar imported under the TRQ must be produced in the country 
allocated the quota rights amounts to an antiscalping law and is identical to the prohibition on 
intercounty leasing of tobacco quota discussed above.  This restriction induces costly 
transactions.  Taiwan, for example, has tariff quota rights for exports of about 24,000 short tons 
of sugar to the United States.  Taiwan always fills its quota; however, this is the only sugar it 
exports.  Taiwan’s domestic p roduction does not satisfy its domestic demand.  It imports sugar 
(usually from Australia or Thailand) to cover the difference, which includes an additional 24,000 75   
Table 6.2: Market Shares of U.S. Sugar Imports: 
TRQ and Quota-exempt Reexports 
 
 






  Share  Share 
Guatemala  39.2  4.6 
Colombia  20.2  2.3 
Costa Rica  11.4  1.4 
Honduras  11.0  1.0 
Dominican Rep.  9.2  17.0 
El Salvador  5.8  2.5 
Nicaragua  1.7  2.0 
All others  1.6  69.2 
           of which:     
Brazil    14.0 
Philippines    13.0 
Australia    8.0 
Argentina    4.2 
Peru    4.0 
Panama    2.8 
All others    23.1 
 
Source: Skully 1998 
 
tons to cover the domestic production exported to the United States.  It would be more efficient 
for Taiwanese quota holders to charter a shipment of 24,000 tons of sugar from Queensland or 
Guatemala to the United States and simply pocket the arbitrage rents.  Similarly, the Philippines, 
the third largest quota holder (13 percent), has recently been unable to cover its domestic needs.  
In fact, it h as a TRQ to limit sugar imports.   To procure domestic sugar to fill its U.S. tariff 
quota, the Philippine sugar authorities have offered domestic mills 1.2 tons of imported raw 
sugar for every ton of domestic raw sugar delivered for export to the United States.   
  Hawaiian sugar production has been in decline since the 1980s (Table 6.3).  Since the 
mid-1990s, sugar production has ceased on the islands of Oahu and Hawaii, where sugarcane 
mills have been disassembled and shipped to Central America.  The sole sugar refinery on the 
U.S. West Coast was constructed primarily to refine raw Hawaiian sugar for continental 76   
Table 6.3  Hawaiian Cane Sugar, 1982 to 1999 
 






  1000 acres  1000 short tons, 
raw value 
Number 
1982  89  983  188 
1987  80  979  79 
1991  74  724  31 
1995  53  491  9 
1999E  35  350  4 
 
Source:Crop Production, NASS, USDA and U.S. Census of Agriculture. 
 
consumption.  With the collapse of Hawaiian production, the refinery has not been able to run at 
normal capacity.  Supplier TRQ shares are based on the distribution of supply to meet refinery 
import volumes between 1975 and 1981, when virtually all imports were to Gulf and Atlantic 
coast refiners.  This historical allocation has made it difficult for the West Coast to find foreign 
quota-holding replacement suppliers, which led members of the California Congressional 
delegation to request a GAO (1999) investigation into the administration of the sugar quota.  
Thus, the allocative losses from malapportioned TRQ rights are not limited to foreign 
production.  They distort the distribution of domestic sugar refining as well.   
 
6.3.  Tobacco TRQ 
 
The tobacco TRQ is of relatively recent origin.  Starting in the 1980s, U.S. cigarette 
manufacturers began to market generic cigarettes.  These low-priced alternatives to premium 
brands were produced with larger proportions of imported leaf, the lower cost of which 
apparently provided sufficient margins to offset any erosion of premium brand sales.  The 
growth in tobacco imports stressed various elements of the domestic tobacco regime.  Perhaps 
more important, antismoking interests perceived the growth of generic cigarette sales as a public 
health threat.  The regulatory response that eventually passed into law was a  section of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993.  The law required that U.S.-manufactured 
cigarettes contain at least 75 percent domestically grown tobacco.  Domestic content laws are an 
obvious violation of the GATT, and several tobacco-exporting countries promptly brought 
complaints.  The dispute was resolved by negotiation between the United States and the various 77   
interested suppliers, in accordance with Article XIII 2d.  The resolution was not simply to repeal 
the domestic content law, a s this would have resulted in the status quo ante.  Rather, a supplier 
TRQ was devised.  President Clinton issued a proclamation making the TRQ effective on 13 
September 1995.  Thus, the quota year for tobacco import starts each year on September 13.   
Table 6.4 shows the allocation of this TRQ. 
 
Table 6.4  U.S. Tobacco TRQ Allocations and Fill Rates 
 










Argentina  10,750    7.9  100  100  65 
Brazil  80,200  53.0  83  53  57 
Chile  2,750    1.8  84  59  0 
EU-15  10,000    6.6  23  31  32 
Guatemala  10,000    6.1  43  45  14 
Malawi  12,000    7.9  100  87  52 
Philippines  3,000    2.0  10  0  2 
Thailand  7,000    4.6  94  48  31 
Zimbabwe  12,000    2.0  53  24  39 
Other  3,000    2.0  100  100  99 
Total  150,700  100.0  76.7  54.7  48.8 
 
Source: Allocations, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2000), Chapter 24, Additional U.S. 
Note 5(a).  Fill rates, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Tobacco: Markets and World Trade. 
 
The TRQ is for cigarette leaf tobacco, primarily flue-cured and burley tobacco, the two 
most important tobaccos with production control programs.  Oriental leaf tobacco is not 
produced in the United States and, until the 1980s, was the principal cigarette leaf tobacco 
imported.  Cigarettes are produced from a b lend of flue-cured, burley, oriental, and other 
tobaccos.  Oriental tobacco is an essential input into cigarettes and is not subject to TRQ.  The 
TRQ covers nine eight-digit tariff lines; however, almost all in-quota imports are of “tobacco, 
partly or wholly stemmed/stripped, threshed or similarly processed, not from cigar leaf.”  
Figure 6.1 plots the TRQ fill profile for the quota year 1997/98.  The profile plots how much of a 
TRQ allocation is filled and when: the x -axis measures the quota year from 13 September and 
the y-axis measures the percentage filled.  Three profiles are plotted.  The first is  78   
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the fill profile for the 3,000 metric tons allocated to all countries on a first-come, first-served 
basis.  One would expect this quota to fill first, and it does, often very quickly.  Also plotted are 
Brazil, the largest TRQ shareholder, and the total TRQ fill.  With 53 percent of the TRQ, 
Brazil’s export pattern dominates the total.  As Brazil does not fill its share, the total T RQ also 
shows a significant under-fill.  Unlike the sugar and peanut TRQs, which always fill, tobacco 
does not.  Is this because of how the quota is administered?  Or does under-fill result from a lack 
of import demand?  Available evidence indicates that l ack of demand is the principal cause of 
under-fill, but that the non-transferability of quota among countries contributes to the problem.  
Lack of demand follows from the recent decline in U.S. cigarette production and consumption.  
Cigarette output has fallen from 755 billion pieces in 1996 to an estimated 625 billion for 1999.  
Consumption has fallen from 487 billion pieces in 1996 to an estimated 425 billion in 1999 
(Capehart 1999).   79   
Table 6.4 also reports the fill rates for TRQ holders for each quota year.  The total fill rate 
has fallen from 77 percent to 49 percent.  So there does not appear to be unmet excess demand 
for imported cigarette leaf.  However, the fill rates also indicate that quota allocation may 
contribute to under-fill.  For example, the Philippines has never filled more than 10 percent of its 
quota of 3,000 metric tons while the other FCFS category always fills its 3,000 tons.  As with its 
sugar quota, the Philippines and other exporters would benefit if they could lease their unused 
quota to quota-constrained suppliers in the “other” category. 
 
6.4.  Peanut TRQ 
 
The U.S. peanut program supports the price of raw, in-shell peanuts for human 
consumption only, not the price of peanuts for oil or meal or other uses.  The peanut TRQ covers 
raw, in-shell peanuts as well as shelled, blanched, and ‘other’ peanuts—processed substitutes in 
consumption for raw, in-shell peanuts.  There is also a separate TRQ for peanut butter. 
  The Uruguay Round obligates WTO members who had imposed import bans or other 
quantitative restrictions to allow market access of no less than 3 percent of domestic 
consumption (in a base period) in 1995, and to expand the market access to no less than 5 
percent by 2000.  Because the United States regularly imports more sugar and tobacco than the 5 
percent minimum access requirement, neither TRQ required expansion.  The minimum access 
requirement was binding on U.S. peanut imports.  Thus, the TRQ increased from 1995 through 
2000 (Skully 1999b). 
  The peanut TRQ is a hybrid of two  general forms of TRQ administration.  It mixes 
historical allocation and first come first served allocation.  The in-quota allocation respects a 
bilateral agreement between the United States and Argentina that guarantees Argentina 78 
percent of the minimum access (in-quota) volume.  Peanuts from Mexico are excluded from the 
WTO peanut TRQ because Mexican peanuts have a separate TRQ.  Peanuts from all other 
sources share access to the balance of the in-quota volume. The first come, first served method of 
administration allocates the in-quota volume to whomever imports first.  Thus, there is a 
powerful incentive to import as early in the quota year as possible, and, predictably, there is a 80   
surge of imports on April 1, when the quota year commences.  Figure 6.2 plots the monthly 
volume of imports under the U.S. peanut TRQ.  Most imports enter in April. 
While the United States allocated 78 percent of the in-quota TRQ volume to Argentina, it 
did not allocate the quota rights to the government of Argentina or to particular Argentine 






















organizations or firms.  The U.S. tariff schedule merely specifies that peanuts of Argentine origin 
are eligible to fill the Argentine share of the TRQ.  Anyone can purchase peanuts from Argentina 
at the world price and try to import them into the United States before the quota is filled and 
capture the quota rent by selling them at the U.S. price.  The government of Argentina contends 
that the quota rights and rents belong to Argentina or Argentine firms.  Argentina has formally 
raised this issue at the WTO. 
  The U.S.-Argentine peanut dispute is over who should obtain the rents from the in-quota 
trade.  While rents are at the heart of most TRQ disputes, as previously noted, the WTO is only 
concerned about whether member countries are abiding by their WTO obligations and is 
indifferent to distribution of quota rents.  The WTO principally focuses on whether in-quota 
imports are impeded and whether market access is allowed to all member nations on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.  If quota rights are assigned to Argentina that does not solve the quota 
allocation problem, but merely transfers it.  Argentina would then have to allocate TRQ rights 81   
among Argentine peanut suppliers.  Trela and Whalley (1995), in their study o f the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement, demonstrate that the allocation of MFA quota by exporting governments to domestic 
firms causes far more allocative inefficiency (eight times as much, in fact) than the initial 
quantitative restrictions imposed by importing countries.  The principal reason is that exporting 
countries tend to allocate quota rights on an historical basis. 
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7.  Dairy TRQs in the United States 
 
The TRQs introduced by the United States after the URAA for dairy products replaced 
absolute quotas.  The m ajor dairy products subject to TRQs are fluid milk and cream (fresh, 
condensed, and evaporated), butter, cheese, and milk powders (Table 7.1).  Imports of certain 
whey products, chocolate containing butterfat, infant formula, ice cream, and animal feeds 
containing milk are also restricted by TRQs.  During 1996-98, the value of these imports was 
about $0.5 billion, most of which was cheese.  Comparing import levels with apparent 
consumption indicates that the TRQs have been highly effective in controlling trade in these 
products.  During 1996-98, import penetration levels (measured by the ratio of imports to 
domestic consumption) for all major categories were 6 percent or fewer (Tables 7.1). 
Not all dairy products are subject to TRQs, however.  In fact, more than half (by value) of 
the dairy products imported into the United States between 1996 and 1998 were not subject to 
TRQs (Table 7.1).  
Most of these non-quota products, such as specific varieties of cheese imports (mainly 
cheese made of sheep’s milk), milk protein concentrates, and whey protein concentrates, are 
subject to specific and/or  ad valorem tariffs.  Generally tariffs on these products are low.  For 
example, the average  ad valorem equivalent across all non-quota imports was only 1 percent 
during 1 996-98, with cheese at 4 percent and whey protein concentrate 5 percent.  Casein, 
accounting for half of the non-quota imports and 28 percent of all dairy imports, has a duty rate 
of “Free.”  With the exception of whey protein concentrate, non-quota imports represent total 
domestic consumption for these products, with negligible U.S. production of these products. 
Most import quotas prior to the URAA were imposed in 1953 under Section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and covered virtually a ll imports of products derived 
from cow’s milk, except casein, caseinates, lactalbumin, and soft-ripened cow’s milk cheese.
32 
These quotas limited imports of products to a quantity equal to about 2 percent of the equivalent 
of U.S. production of milk.  The market access provisions of the URAA cover four areas: (i)  
 
                                                 
32 Some import quotas existed prior to 1953 under the War Powers Act.  Not all Section 22 quotas began in the 
1950s, some were introduced in the late 1970s. 83 
Table 7.1  U.S. dairy products: Imports and import penetration ratios. Average 1996-98 
Product 
Imports  Import penetration 
ratio
1/ 
  ------ million  dollars ---
--- 
------ percent ------ 
Subject to quota:     




   Butter  30  6 
   Cheese    394  4 
   Nonfat dry milk  6  1 
   Whole milk powder  5  6 
   Other  48   
      Total with quota  498   
Not subject to quota:     
   Casein  306  100 
   Milk protein concentrate  104  100 
   Whey protein concentrate  5 
2/ 
   Cheese  192  96 
   Other  5   
      Total without quota  612   
         Total all imports  1,110   
     
% imports with quota  45   
% imports without quota  55   
1/    Measured by the ratio of import value to domestic consumption value.
 
2/   Less than 0.5 of 1 percent. 
Source: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, American Dairy Products Institute, International Dairy Foods Association, 
and U.S. International Trade Commission. 
 
conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariffs, (ii) commitments to maintain current access or provide 
minimum access opportunities, (iii) tariff bindings and reductions, and (iv) special safeguards.
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7.1  Tariffication 
 
 The URAA stipulated that for in-quota tariffs, countries were to set rates low enough to 
enable commercial trade to take place (many countries used the same rates as applying on 
products under the quota system).  For out-of quota tariffs, countries were to set rates at levels no 
greater than the level of protection afforded by the non-tariff barriers, based on the 1986-88 base 
period. 
                                                 
33 Information in this section was taken mostly from, Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Statement of 
Administrative Action, published in H. Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 709-41. 84 
To illustrate how tariffication worked, suppose a country during 1986-88 had an import 
quota of 5,000 tons on  cheddar cheese and that the tariff on in-quota imports was 10 percent ad 
valorem.  Also suppose that this quota resulted in a domestic price of cheddar cheese being on 
average 75 percent higher than the world price during this period.  Then under tariffication, a 
TRQ would be established for 5,000 tons (assuming this was more than 5 percent of domestic 
consumption), with an in-quota tariff rate of 5 percent and an out-of quota rate of 75 percent. 
  For the U.S. dairy industry, the URAA’s tariffication requirements meant converting its 
Section 22 import quotas to TRQs.  In all, 16 TRQs were established, generally consistent with 
the products subject to section 22 quotas (Table 7.2).  These TRQ totaled about 156,000 tons
34 of 
dairy products in the initial year (1995), increasing to about 208,000 metric tons by the final year 
of implementation (2000).  A large share of this quota was accounted for cheese, which was 
increased from 116,445 metric tons in 1995 to 136,441 metric tons in 2000. 
 
7.2  Market access commitments 
 
For the United States, converting absolute quotas into TRQs resulted in market access 
increasing significantly for some dairy products and not for others.  For example, the combined 
Section 22 quota for butter and butter substitutes was 865 tons in 1994, while for 1995 the TRQ 
quantity was increased more than eight-fold to 7,458 tons.  The TRQ for ice cream more than 
doubled the Section 22 quota, while the quotas on dried whole milk powder and nonfat dry milk 
also increased significantly.  In contrast, there were only small increases in market access for 
fluid milk and cheese. 
The other major change as a result of the URAA was the introduction of the “any 
country” import license.  Under Section 22, licenses were allocated for imports of specific 
products from specific countries.  So, for example, the Section 22 quota for nonfat dry milk was 
820 tons, which was allocated to just two countries—Australia with 600 tons and Canada with 
220 tons. Thus imports from other countries, such as New Zealand, were excluded from entering 
the U.S. market.  Under the URAA, the United States continued this practice by allocating TRQs  
                                                 
34  Excluding products measured in liters and additional tonnage reserved for Mexico in accordance with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (see below for details on TRQs negotiated under NAFTA). 85 
 































     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - metric tons - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   percent 
Milk & cream, fluid, 1-6% fat 1/ 
2/ 
  11,356  11,356  11,356 11,356  11,356  11,356  11,356  0 
Milk & cream, fluid, or frozen, 
fresh or sour 1/ 
 4, 5  5,678  5,727  5,921  6,115  6,308  6,501  6,695  17 
Butter, & fresh or sour cream   4, 6  321  3,977  4,577  5,177  5,777  6,377  6,977  75 
Dried skim milk   4, 7  820  1,261  2,061  2,861  3,661  4,461  5,261  316 
Dried whole milk   4, 8  3  371  961  1,551  2,141  2,731  3,321  795 
Dried milk & cream   4, 9  0  100  100  100  100  100  100  0 
Articles with 5.5%-45% butterfat   4, 10  1,170  1,905  2,345  2,785  3,225  3,665  4,105  115 
Milk & cream, cond. or evap.   4, 11  2,445  2,857  3,657  4,457  5,257  6,057  6,857  140 
Dried buttermilk/whey   4, 12  225  296  296  296  296  296  296  0 
Butter substitutes   4, 14  544  3,481  4,001  4,521  5,041  5,561  6,081  75 
Cheese   4, 17-23  110,999  116,445  120,444  124,443  128,443  132,442  136,441  17 
Chocolate with > 5.5% butterfat 3/   18, 2  9,711  15,467  17,608  19,748  21,708  24,028  26,168  69 
Chocolate with < 5.5% butterfat 3/   18, 3  2,123  2,123  2,123  2,123  2,123  2,123  2,123  0 
Infant formula   19, 2    100  100  100  100  100  100  0 
Ice cream 1/   21, 5  1,633  3283  3,761  4,237  4,714  5,191  5,668  73 
Animal feed containing milk   23, 2  7,394  7,400  7,400  7,400  7,400  7,400  7,400  0 
1/ ‘000 liters.  
2/ Section 22 quotas only applied to fluid milk with a butterfat content greater than 5.5 percent. 
3/ Quotas not applicable to retail products. 
Note.—Excludes quantities allocated to Mexico under the NAFTA. 
Note.—Under the URAA MACs, countries were required to set initial TRQ quantities at 3 percent of domestic 
consumption in a 1986-88 base period, increasing to 5 percent by 2000.  With the exception of fluid milk and 
cheese, quota products were generally intermediate products for which consumption data were not readily available.  
Thus, in determining TRQ quantities for the United States (except for cheese and fluid milk), total domestic 
consumption of butterfat and solids nonfat were estimated for 1986-88.  Next the “3 percent rule” was applied to 
these consumption estimates giving a MAC for butterfat and solids nonfat.  Finally, TRQ quantities were allocated 
to individual products, such that the overall butterfat and solids nonfat commitments were met.  Thus the 3-5 
percent MAC was not applied to individual products (e.g., nonfat dry milk), but to the overall components of 
imported products.  As a result of this process, U.S. negotiators were able to commit to less than the 3 percent MAC 
for many of the most import sensitive dairy products. 
 
Source: Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
among individual countries.  However, an additional “any country” category was introduced that 
opened up the market to any country able to supply products.  For example, in 1995 the total 
TRQ for non-fat dry milk was 1,261 tons.  Australia and Canada were allocated licenses to ship 
600 tons and 220 tons, respectively, while an allocation of 441 tons was made available to any 
country, including Australia and Canada.
35  With the exception of cheese, the bilateral TRQ 
                                                 
35   So, for example, in 1996 Canada shipped all 820 tons of its country specific allocation, plus 
512 tons under the “any country” allocation, for total imports of 1,332 tons.  86 
allocations were fixed throughout the implementation period, with minimum access requirements 
met by increases in the “any country” TRQ allocation. 
 
7.3  Tariff bindings and reductions  
 
  In addition to tariffication, the URAA required that tariffs (both tariffs resulting from 
tariffication of non-tariff barriers and pre-existing tariffs) be reduced in equal installments over 6 
years by a minimum of 15 percent and on average by 36  percent (using a simple, unweighted 
average).  Owing to the sensitivity of imports, with a few exceptions U.S. policymakers 
committed to reduce out-of quota tariff rates on dairy products by the minimum 15 percent 
(Table 7.3).  For example, the United States agreed to reduce its tariffs on butter from 82 cents 
per pound to 70 cents per pound, from 46 cents per pound to 39 cents per pound for nonfat dry 
milk, and from 66 cents per pound to 56 cents per pound for cheese.  In-quota rates were held 
constant throughout the Agreement’s implementation period at 6 cents per pound for butter, 1.5 
cent per pound for non-fat dry milk, and 12 ad valorem percent for cheese. 
Table 7.3  Dairy products: Tariff commitments under the URAA 
Commodity (HTS)  Units  Base  1995  1996   1997   1998   1999   2000 
                 
Butter               
   In-quota (0405.10.10)  ¢/lb.  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.6 
   Out-of quota (0405.10.20)  ¢/lb.  82.2  80.2  78.1  76.1  74.0  71.9  69.9 
Nonfat dry milk                 
   In-quota (0402.10.10)  ¢/lb.  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5 
   Out-of quota (0402.10.50)  ¢/lb.  46.2  45.0  44.8  42.7  41.5  40.4  39.2 
Cheese                 
   In-quota (0406.90.08)  Percent  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
   Out-of quota (0406.90.12)  ¢/lb.  65.5  63.8  62.2  61.5  58.9  57.3  55.7 
Source: Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 1995-2000. 
 
 
7.4  Special safeguards
36 
 
Two types of SSGs apply to U.S. imports of dairy products—value-based and quantity-
based.
37  Value-based SSGs allow additional duties (over and above the out-of quota tariff rate) 
                                                 
36 Under Article 5 of the URAA, countries may apply special safeguards (SSG) to products whose nontariff 
measures have been converted into duties, and that are designated for SSG treatment in their schedules.  Special 
safeguards take the form of temporary additional duties and are typically applied to products particularly “sensitive 
to trade”.  Under rules in the URAA, SSGs are permissible to prevent low prices or import surges from injuring a 
domestic industry (although no determination of injury is required). 87 
to be imposed on out-of quota imports when prices fall below a fixed trigger price (based on 
average prices during 1986-88), and are invoked automatically on a shipment-by-shipment basis.  
Value-based SSG duties, published in Chapter 99, Subchapter 4 of the HTS, increase as the value 
of imports declines.  This import value is determined by the U.S. Customs Service, and defined 
as the price actually paid or payable for merchandise, excluding U.S. import duties, freight, 
insurance, and other charges.  Value-based SSGs are applied automatically and do not have to be 
formally announced when in effect, as in the case of volume-based SSGs.  Value-based SSG 
duties stayed at the same levels during the 1995-99 URAA implementation period.  In the case of 
cheddar cheese, for example, an import value of less than 29.5 cents per pound generates a SSG 
duty of 57.2 cents per pound, which is then added to the out-of quota tariff of 57.3 cents per 
pound.  Thus the overall tariff is 114.5 cents per pound.  As the value increases, the SSG  duty 
declines and reaches zero when the value reaches 83.9 cents per pound.  As a result, the SSG 
forces the unit value of out-of quota imports (import value plus over-quota tariff and SSGs) to 
remain in a fairly small range (134.5- 142.5 cents per pound). According to WTO notifications, 
products for which value-based SSGs were invoked on a significant volume of out-of quota 
imports during 1995-98 were butter and cheese. 
Quantity-based SSGs allow additional duties to be imposed on out-of quota imports if 
actual imports exceed a certain trigger level of imports.  Because the trigger import level for each 
product is based on imports over the previous 3 years, they are announced annually in the 
Federal Register.  Quantity-based SSG duties are also reported in Chapter 99, Subchapter 4 of 
the HTS, and in general decline 15 percent during the URAA implementation period.  Again, in 
the case of cheddar cheese, the Federal Register (March 9, 2000) announced a trigger quantity of 
out-of quota imports of 14,725 tons for calendar year 2000.  If this trigger were reached, an 
additional tariff of 18.6 cents per pound would be applied to the out-of quota rate.  According to 
WTO notifications, only value-based SSGs were invoked during 1995-98, thus quantity-based 
SSGs were not invoked during this period. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 Only one SSG type (either price-based or quantity-based) can be applied at any particular time. 88 
7.5  U.S. Dairy TRQs under NAFTA 
   
NAFTA is an agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada to remove all 
trade barriers, including those on agricultural products, over a 15-year period (1994-2008). 
Because Canada  excluded its dairy sector from the Agreement, NAFTA provisions affect dairy 
trade only between the United States and Mexico. Under the market access provisions of 
NAFTA, the United States replaced Section 22 quotas with TRQs.  These TRQs are additional to 
those established under the URAA.  Five separate TRQs were established
38 for U.S. dairy 
imports from Mexico, with initial allocations based on historical trade.  The initial quota 
quantities were small and are increasing at 3 -percent compounded annual rate  over a 10-year 
period.  For example, an initial TRQ for milk powder was established at 422 metric tons 
increasing to 535 metric tons by 2002, while the TRQ on cheese is increasing from 5,550 metric 
ton to 6,433 tons over the same period.  Beginning in year 2003, all quantitative restrictions will 
be eliminated. 
In-quota shipments enter the United States from Mexico with a duty rate of “Free.”  Out-
of quota tariff rates were established based on the 1989-91 tariff equivalent of the section 22 
quotas, and are being phased out over 10 years.  These out-of quota tariffs will be completely 
phased out beginning 2003.  SSGs do not apply to imports from Mexico. 
 
7.6  TRQ Administration 
   
  As indicated in Table 7.1, about one-half of U.S. imports of dairy products are subject to 
TRQs.  These products are classified as either in-quota imports or out-of quota imports.  In-quota 
imports are classified in 8 -digit HTS subheadings, which give the in-quota tariff rates.  Out-of 
quota imports may enter the U.S. domestic market without import licenses and in unlimited 
quantities, thus the main factor limiting out-of quota imports are the out-of quota tariffs that are 
often prohibitive.  Out-of quota imports are classified in separate 8 -digit HTS subheadings 
                                                 
38 (i)  Milk and cream, fluid or frozen, fresh or sour, ice cream; (ii) butter, & fresh or sour cream, dried milk & 
cream, butter substitutes; (iii) dried skim and whole milk, dried buttermilk/whey, animal feed containing milk; (iv) 
articles containing over 5.5%-45% butterfat, milk & cream condensed and evaporated, chocolate containing butter 
fat; and (v) cheese. 
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(typically adjacent i n the HTS to the in-quota subheadings) which give the out-of quota tariff 
rates.  The TRQ quantities are specified in the “additional notes” to HTS Chapters covering dairy 
imports (mostly in Chapter 4).  Each TRQ has its own additional note. The additional notes also 
list the HTS subheadings that are counted toward the TRQ quantity.
39 
  In the United States, TRQ administration—the method by which in-quota TRQ quantities 
are allocated among importers—is highly complex, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
40 In-quota 
imports are either subject to licensing requirements or are administered on a first-come, first-
served (FCFS) basis.  Imports not subject to TRQs are considered non-quota imports and are 
permitted into the U.S. dairy market in unlimited quantities and without the requirement of an 
import license. 
 
Figure 7.1.  Administration of U.S. Dairy Imports 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
39 Additional note 6 of the 1999 HTS Chapter 4 indicated that the total quantity of butter and milk and cream 
exceeding 45 percent fat (entering under tariff subheading 0401.30.50, 0403.90.74, and 0405.10.10) must not exceed 
6,377 tons, and were subject to an in-quota rate of 5.6 cents per pound.  Out-of quota imports were classified as 
“Other” imports of butter and milk and cream exceeding 45 percent fat (imports entering under tariff subheading 
0401.30.75, 0403.90.78, and 0405.10.20), and faced the out-of quota tariff rate of 71.9 cents per pound. 
























Imports NOT subject toTRQs
(imports unlimited, not licensed)90 
7.6.1 TRQs administered through import licenses 
Import license specification 
  About three-quarters of the dairy products subject to TRQs require a license to be 
imported into the United States.  The licensing authority is the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) which allocates licenses annually to importing firms that 
conduct business in the United States and have an office and an agent in the United States.  
However, because firms are not required to be of U.S. origin, foreign firms are also eligible to 
apply for licenses.
41 
  Import licenses give holders the right to import product at the in-quota tariff rate.  
However, they place restrictions on the licensees by specifying certain conditions of importing.  
For example, the licenses specify the type of product (by stating the HTS Chapter and additional 
note) and the quantity that can be imported (licenses are not of uniform import volume).  
Licenses also specify the period during which shipments must take place (generally imports must 
take place within a calendar year beginning January 1 each year).  Further, import licenses 
specify the country or group of countries from which license h olders must source imported 
products.  There are three types of license based on country designation—“country specific” 
licenses, “other country” licenses, and “any country” licenses.  A “country specific” import 
license indicates a specific country from w hich the firm must source the imports.  An “other 
country” license allows importing firms to select from a list of eligible exporting countries other 
than those with country specific licenses.  “Any country” licenses allows importing firms to 
source product from any eligible exporting country (including countries with country specific 
licenses).
42 
                                                 
41 The New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) exports large amounts of dairy products to the United States under the 
TRQ regime, but also is as an importer of the products because the NZDB has purchased subsidiary companies that 
own import licenses in the United States. 
42 In 1999, the TRQ for butter was 6,377 tons (HTS chapter 4, note 6).  Country specific licenses were issued to 
importers sourcing product from New Zealand (totaling 151 tons) and the EU (totaling 96 tons).  Other country 
licenses totaled 74 tons (i.e., quota exclusively for countries other than New Zealand and the EU).  Any country 
licenses accounted for the remaining tonnage (6,056 tons), and could be sourced from all eligible countries including 
New Zealand and the EU. 91 
Types of import licenses 
FAS allocates three types of import license: (i)  historical, (ii)  non-historical, and (iii) 
designated licenses.  Of the total import licenses allocated on a yearly basis, approximately 75 
percent are historical, 15 percent are non-historical and 10 percent are designated.
43  
Historical import licenses 
Historical licenses are allocated automatically to the same importing firms that held 
historical licenses in the previous year.  Dating back to the early 1950s,
44 historical licenses were 
first allocated to firms that had built a historical base of imports during a previous representative 
period (called “old historical licenses”).
45  As a result  of increasing quantities on existing quotas 
and the creation of new quotas during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, an 
additional set of historical licenses was allocated to firms that had built a historical base of 
imports in the applicable representative period (called “new historical licenses”).  After the 
Tokyo Round, the quantity of dairy imports covered by historical licenses was fixed and has not 
increased since; however, each year the amount of historical licenses allocated falls s lightly due 
to licenses being permanently surrendered or revoked.  Only those firms that received historical 
licenses prior to, and as a result of, the Tokyo Round are allocated historical licenses every year 
(as long as the firm utilized the required amount of the import license in the previous year). 
Under licensing regulations, the licensees need use only 85 percent of the quota amount 
each year to be eligible for the full amount the following year.  If a firm fails to use at least 85 
percent of its allotment, the FAS will revoke the license and the firm will not be eligible to 
receive a historical license the following year.
46  The importing firm has the option, however, of 
surrendering unused portions of their allotment so as not to be penalized.  Surrendered amounts 
                                                 
43 Personal conversation with Richard Warsack, FAS. 
44 The historical licensing procedure was instituted in 1951 under authority of Section 104 of the Defense Production 
Act of 1950. 
45 The previous representative periods were as follows: 1930-34 for butter; 1948-50 for dried buttermilk and whey, 
non-fat dried milk, whole milk powder, blue mold cheese, and edam and gouda cheese; 1956 for butter substitutes; 
1961-65 for cheddar and American-type cheese; 1967-69 for ice cream; and 1967, 1970, and 1978-79 for swiss or 
emmenthaler cheese, gruyere cheese, and cheese substitutes (USDA, 1988). 
46 The 85 percent requirement does not apply if the licensee can demonstrate that the level of imports fell short 
because of reasons such as a breach of contract by the transporter or the supplier or because of an act of nature.  
Also, if a known export monopoly exists in a country specified on the import license, the 85 percent requirement 
does not apply to that licensee. 92 
are excluded from the 85 percent utilization requirement.
47  The FAS reallocates the surrendered 
licenses to other license holders or even to the same holder that surrendered its amount earlier in 
the season.
48   If a firm has been reallocated surrendered amounts, the amounts are then included 
in the 85 percent utilization requirements (i.e., reallocation increases the overall size of the firm’s 
historical license for that year).  Starting in 1999, licensing rules require that if more than 50 
percent of the amount is surrendered for three consecutive years, the following year’s license 
amount will be an average of the annual quantities actually imported.
49 
Non-historical import licenses 
Non-historical licenses are licenses that are allocated on a  yearly basis through a rank-
and-order lottery system to those importing firms that imported required amounts of the selected 
product in the previous year (i.e., by importing at the out-of-quota rate or with non-historical 
licenses).
50  Firms apply every year by ranking commodities on their application based upon 
preference.  A series of random draws is then conducted commodity-by-commodity to determine 
which firms will receive licenses.  Non-historical licenses are allocated to individual products 
separately, so it is possible for a firm to obtain more than one non-historical license in a given 
year.  Non-historical licenses are non-renewable; however, an importing firm may reapply the 
following year for the identical non-historical import license, but, because allocation is random, 
the license is not guaranteed. 
                                                 
47 For example, if a firm only uses 65 percent of its license in a given year, surrendering 35 percent of its license, the 
firm will not be penalized for falling 20 percent below the 85 percent usage requirement.  If the firm did not 
surrender the unused portion (the 35 percent), then it would not be eligible for the historical license the following 
year.  Thus, it is often in the best interest of the firm to surrender unused amounts. 
48 In 1997, New Zealand owned 28 percent of the dried buttermilk and whey import quota (Canada owned the 
remainder), but because firms importing from Canada surrendered all of their import licenses, firms importing from 
New Zealand obtained the surrendered portion through the reallocation process.  Thus, New Zealand imports 
accounted for 100 percent of the dried buttermilk and whey TRQ for that year. 
49 Rule changes to be introduced in 2001 will mean that if 50 percent of the amount is surrendered in 3 of the 5 prior 
years, the average of the 5 years will be allocated the following year. 
50 In the case of cheese, to be eligible for a non-historical license, the importing firm is required to have (1) made at 
least 3 entries of at least 57,000 kg where each of the 3 entries were not less than 2,000 kg each; (2) made 8 entries 
(two entries in each of at least three quarters) of at least 19,000 kg (not less than 450 kg) per shipment; or (3) is the 
owner or operator of a cheese processing plant that processed or packaged at least 450,000 kg of cheese or cheese 
products in its own plant in the previous year.  To be eligible for a non-historical license for non-cheese products, a 
firm must meet the criteria in (1) – (3) above, or be the exporter of dairy products in the required amounts of (1) – 
(3) above. 93 
The quantity of imports covered by non-historical licenses increases each year.  For 
licensed non-cheese products, increases are sourced from (i) transfers of permanently 
surrendered or revoked historical licenses, and (ii) committed increases in the TRQ from the 
URAA.  For licensed cheese products, increases are sourced only from transfers of permanently 
surrendered or revoked historical licenses. 
Designated import licenses 
Negotiated during the URAA, designated licenses are allocated to firms importing cheese 
that the exporting government has specifically designated.  The quantity of imports covered by 
designated licenses has increased each year since 1995 to account for the committed increases in 
the cheese TRQ under the URAA.   
7.6.2  TRQs administered on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis 
  The U.S. Customs Service on a FCFS basis administers imports of certain dairy products 
subject to TRQs.
51  Under this system, imports arriving in the United States face the in-quota rate 
of duty up to the point at which the quota is filled.  Any subsequent imports face the out-of quota 
duty rate. Thus there is risk involved for importers because the TRQ could fill while the 
shipments are en route, leaving them  to face the out-of quota rate when the product arrives at the 
port.  When this situation arises, some importing firms put products in storage at or near the 
border so that they are first in line when the next TRQ season opens.  However, if the product is 
highly perishable or if it is too expensive to store or to reroute, firms may ship the product to 
alternative markets or simply dispose of the product.  
7.6.3  Issues concerning TRQ administration 
The concern about the administration of U.S. dairy TRQs centers on two issues: barriers 
to entry and barriers to trade.  Several industry representatives indicate that the import licensing 
system is costly and cumbersome, and serves as a significant barrier-to-entry for firms wishing to 
operate in the United States.  All import licenses are non-tradable (i.e., they cannot be resold).  
                                                 
51 The products covered under FCFS include: dairy products from Mexico; certain dairy products from Israel; 
cheddar cheese from Canada (made from unpasteurized milk and aged for 9 months or more); fluid milk or cream 
(fresh or sour); milk or cream (condensed or evaporated in airtight containers); dried buttermilk or whey; infant 
formula; ice cream; and animal feed containing milk. 94 
Therefore, there are two ways firms wishing to enter the market can obtain a license, neither of 
which is costless nor guaranteed.  One option is to purchase a firm that already holds a historical 
import license.  However, because rents associated with the quota become capitalized into the 
value of the firm, this option typically is extremely costly.  Alternatively, a potential entrant 
could obtain a non-historical license through the random selection process, hoping for the “luck 
of the draw” on a yearly basis.  According to some importers, the FCFS allocation creates 
uncertainty about the ability to obtain products on a continuous basis, so that business planning 
and establishment of normal, long-term supplier/customer relationships are comprised.
52  
In addition to being a barrier to entry, some importers argue that the licensing system is a 
significant non-tariff barrier to trade. They point out that most quotas are not filled even though 
U.S. prices are significantly above international prices. When an import quota goes unfilled, the 
gap between the domestic and the world price widens, thereby increasing the market distortions 
and welfare losses associated with the TRQ regime.  
TRQ fill rates for licensed dairy products for the years 1995 through 1999 are reported in 
Table 7.4.
53   
In general fill rates have been high and fairly stable over time.  For example, during 
1996-99 utilization rates for cheese, and butter and butter substitutes w ere all close to 100 
percent.
54  However, for a few product categories, the rates fluctuated and/or were lower, such as 
dried buttermilk/whey during 1996–99. 
A low quota fill rate does not necessarily mean that the TRQ is acting as a non-tariff 
barrier to t rade.  For instance, if there is insufficient domestic demand for the product at 
prevailing world market prices, imports may not reach the TRQ quantity level.  For example, the 
1995 in-quota price of butter (the world price plus the in-quota tariff) exceeded the U.S. price by 
several cents per pound, limiting imports and resulting in a TRQ fill rate of only 6 percent.   
 
                                                 
52 NZDB, Submission before the U.S. International Trade Commission, for Investigation 332-325, June 1998. 
53 Calculated from TRQ levels and in-quota imports reported in Dairy Monthly Imports. 
54 A fill rate greater than 100% indicates that over-quota imports have occurred.  Over-quota imports are imports 
than enter at the in-quota tariff rate, but are in excess of the allotted amount for a given year. 95 
Table 7.4  Licensed dairy products: Import quota fill rates, 1995 – 1999 
Product  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   percent  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Butter  6  88  97  99  98 
Butter Substitutes  0  90  118  98  99 
Nonfat dry milk  27  94  77  96  98 
Wholemilk powder  22  75  100  98  98 
Dried Buttermilk/Whey  0  99  28  28  28 
Cheese  87  89  77  85  94 
     Other—NSPF  90  94  75  86  98 
     Blue Mold  91  93  93  94  97 
     Cheddar  91  96  86  98  96 
     American  84  94  87  92  96 
     Edam & Gouda  95  88  77  86  96 
     Italian  85  85  94  97  98 
     Gruyere  89  82  71  87  90 
     Other—Lowfat   87  74  56  40  53 
     Swiss  82  85  74  80  95 
Ice Cream  1  1  1  2  69 
Chocolate > 5 % butterfat  26  26  78  77  78 
Chocolate < 5 % butterfat  22  0  0  0  0 
Source: USDA, FAS, Dairy Monthly Imports. Various issues. 
 
During 1996-99, the U.S. price exceeded the in-quota price, and consequentially the fill rates 
were much higher in those years. 
Although low fill rates can result from market factors, TRQ administration may also have 
led to actual imports falling short of TRQ quantities.  Reasons for this include: (i) the assignment 
of country specific licenses to countries that may not produce or export the product, or are high-
cost producers (e.g., the ice cream TRQ allocated to Jamaica), (ii) the allocation of TRQs in 
insufficient volume to make importing economically viable (e.g., infant formulas (100 tons) and 
cream powder (100 tons)), (iii) the difficulty in forming long-term business relationships among 
importers, exporters, and end-users for products administered by FCFS, (iv) the reallocation 
methods for country specific quotas which are complicated; and (v) the failure of importing firms 
to surrender unused amounts to be used for reallocation.
55 
Industry representatives have also expressed concern over procedures for the allocation 
of non-historical licenses.  They allege that the small import volumes associated with each 
license encourage some companies to circumvent the rules by breaking into smaller, subsidiary 
companies, each of which applies for licenses separately.  These companies place their name in 96 
the pool for the lottery to increase the combined probability of “winning” a license.  It is argued 
that some of these companies are entering the lottery regardless of whether they have a need for 
the product—they are simply importing the products, reselling in the domestic market, and 
collecting the quota rents from the transaction.  In the EU, a similar situation has arisen in which 
companies have set up several subsidiaries in order to increase their chances of gaining import 
licenses (International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium). 
 
7.7  Impact of TRQs on the Dairy Product Imports, Quota Rents and Tariff Revenues 
 
Overall, the U.S. dairy TRQ regime was highly effective in limiting imports of dairy 
products during the period 1995 through 1999.  In general, prohibitive out-of quota tariff rates, 
coupled  with complicated and costly TRQ administration procedures have made it virtually 
impossible for “new” trade to occur on either side of the market.  During 1995-99, out-of quota 
imports were very limited for most products in all years (Table 7.5), with the  share of out-of 
quota imports to total imports less than 30 percent for most products (excluding 1998).
56  For 
some products there was virtually no out-of quota trade (e.g., out-of quota imports of cheese 
have been considerably low).  However, for others, t he share of out-of quota imports in certain 
years was high (e.g., over 50 percent).  High out-of-quota imports generally are not maintained 
from year-to-year (e.g., rates for non-fat dry milk and whole milk powder in 1995 fell in 1996).
57 
Given fluctuating  world prices, declining tariffs and increasing quota quantities, the 
impact of TRQs on U.S. dairy imports is dynamic, as illustrated by the U.S. butter market during 
1995-99 (Figure 7.2).  When the U.S. price for butter exceeded the in-quota price (world price 
plus the in-quota tariff), in-quota imports occurred (starting in the second quarter of 1996).  
Similarly, when the U.S. price exceeded the out-of-quota price (world price plus the out-of quota 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 See Boughner and Boughner and de Gorter for further reasoning behind low quota fill rates.  
56 In 1998, out-of quota imports make up a larger share of total imports for all products in comparison to 1997 
shares, most likely because of high domestic prices for dairy products.  
57 Shares for chocolate with less than 5 percent butterfat are high due to the non-existence of in-quota imports. This 
is a case where quota portions were not allocated to major producers of the product.  The United States was not 
required to increase the TRQ over the implementation period because they already met their market access 
commitment level.  Thus, the “any country” category does not exist for this TRQ, so all imports other than those 
from Ireland, New Zealand (1 kilogram allocated), and the United Kingdom enter at the out-of quota tariff rate.  97 
Table 7.5 
Dairy products: Out-of quota imports as a share of total imports, 1995 – 1999 
Product  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  percent   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Butter  3  5  12  69  14 
Butter substitutes  0  0  0  62  51 
Nonfat dry milk  46  18  14  24  21 
Wholemilk powder  60  0  2  9  12 
Dried Buttermilk/Whey  0  0  34  71  13 
Cheese  0  2  1  8  12 
Ice Cream  5  0  0  11  50 
Chocolate > 5 % butterfat  0  0  0  2  2 
Chocolate < 5 % butterfat  4  100  99  100  99 
Note:—Excludes out-of quota imports from Mexico which enter at a preferential out-of quota rate. 
Source: Dairy Monthly Imports, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. International Trade Commission 
 
 
Figure 7.2.   Butter: Prices and Imports, 1995-99   
Note—SSGs not included in calculation of out-of quota prices 
 
 
tariff), out-of-quota imports occurred (in third and fourth quarters of 1998).  When the U.S. price 
was below the in-quota prices, imports fell to very low levels (in 1995 through the first quarter of 
1996).  Thus, over the past five years, policy regimes have switched from the import quota 
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levels of world and domestic prices, out-of-quota tariff rates, and TRQ quantities.  In turn, tariff 
revenues, quota rents and import quota fill rates are affected. 
Quota rents were estimated to be about $165 million in 1997 (Schluep).  Existence of 
such rents may lead to firms allocating resources to obtain the rights to these rents (e.g., applying 
for non-historical import licenses or purchasing firms that  hold historical licenses).  Once they 
have obtained the rights, resources may be allocated in trying to capture the rents (e.g., 
bargaining between importing and exporting firms over the rents).  Importers do not capture all 
quota rents, however.   For example,  Hornig, Boisvert and Blandford analyze the distribution of 
rents for U.S. cheese imports and conclude that unequal market power exists between importers 
and exporters, and that exporters extract a greater share of the rents.  As the level of rents rises, 
exporting firms are interested only in maintaining a price-cost ratio and so allow the importers' 
share to increase, approaching a more equal division of the rents. 
Tariff revenues were estimated to be approximately $100 million in 1999, of which 95 
percent were from imports of cheese, butter, non-fat dry milk and ice cream tariffs.  Cheese tariff 
revenues made up 73 percent of total dairy tariff revenues in 1999. 
 
7.8  Conclusions 
 
Although TRQs are an important component of U.S. dairy policy, only about half of the 
total value of imports are subject to TRQs.  The U.S. introduced TRQs for most major dairy 
products during the URAA, which increased potential market access opportunities substantially 
for some dairy products (e.g., butter (75 percent), wholemilk powder (795 percent), and non-fat 
dry milk (316 percent)) and not for others (e.g., fluid milk (0 percent) and cheese (17 percent)).  
However, high out-of-quota rates of duty, small tariff reductions, and the SSG provisions have 
meant that large quantities of out-of-quota imports have been prevented from entering the 
domestic market.  Generally, out-of-quota imports occur only in periods of low world prices and 
high domestic prices. 
The administration of U.S. dairy TRQs has been proven to be extremely complicated, 
burdensome, and non-transparent.  The import licensing procedures serve as a significant barrier-
to-entry for firms wishing to start importing dairy products into the United States, as well as a 99 
significant non-tariff barrier to trade.  Low quota fill rates have ensued as a result of the intricate 
licensing procedures. 
Negotiators can further liberalize markets by either increasing import quotas or reducing 
out-of-quota tariffs, or a combination of the two.  For the U.S. dairy, significantly r educing the 
prohibitive out-of-quota tariffs and removing (or substantially reducing) SSG rates are necessary 
to increase market access.  Import quota rents can be significantly reduced and displaced by out-
of quota tariff revenues as a result of out-of-quota tariff reduction.    
The next round may also include provisions governing how TRQs are administered.  U.S. 
industry representatives, in particular, have urged for such disciplines, although details of such 
provisions have not been forthcoming, other than that administration procedures should be 




                                                 
58 Statement of Janet A. Nuzum, International Dairy Foods Association before the Trade Policy Staff Committee on 
the Upcoming WTO Negotiations, May 19, 1999. 100 
8.  Tariff Rate Quota Implementation and Administration by Developing Countries 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
  Fourteen developing countries have notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) that 
they utilize tariff quotas for imports of over 180 agricultural commodities.
59 Those notifications 
include reports on the mechanisms by which tariff quotas are implemented and administered, the 
quotas in force, and the extent to which imports under the quota meet market access 
commitments.  Countries examined here include Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and 
Venezuela. These countries primarily use tariff quotas for imports of cereals, oilseeds, meats, 
dairy products, sugar, fruits and vegetables. 
  Abbott and Morse (1999) contend that the TRQ was a poorly understood instrument at 
the time the U.S.-European Union (EU)  compromise was reached to conclude the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. Relatively few developing countries have adopted this instrument, and in 
most cases where they have implemented it, it is quite different from the original conception of 
how a TRQ was to function.  In developing countries, TRQ implementation mechanisms are 
frequently either MFN tariffs at levels well below GATT bindings or modifications of state 
trading or licensing regimes. In the latter case, most import levels are well in excess of minimum 
access commitments.  Some more recent adoptions of tariff quotas, such as in the U.S.- China 
agreement on agricultural trade (USTR, 1999), appear to use these commitments as maximum 
rather than minimum trade levels, however.  Recent WTO entrants in Eastern Europe have also 
used true TRQs much more extensively, resulting in more protectionist trade regimes. 
  Several issues arising from alternative implementation mechanisms employed for TRQs 
are relevant to the debate on how this instrument might be viewed in the trade negotiations.  We 
first briefly explore these issues  –- discrimination, under-fill, state trading, and protectionism. 
We then examine data on TRQ commitments, actual imports, and trends in those imports to 
evaluate the relevance of these issues as they apply to developing countries’ agricultural imports. 
                                                 
59 Data was collected for the major agricultural commodities that fall under the distinct product categories listed in 
Table 1.  Some minor categories have been ignored in this analysis.  To keep the project manageable, we have also 
excluded from our study implementation of tariff quotas by Eastern European countries, in that implementation 101 
From this analysis, we make recommendations regarding the role of TRQs in the further 
liberalization of trade regimes.  
 
8.2  Issues in TRQ Implementation and Administration 
 
  The four key issues of concern in WTO negotiations that relate to trading rules and 
practices include  discrimination among exporters by importers,  under-fill  (the extent to which 
minimum access commitments are not met),  state trading as an implementation mechanism, and 
the impact on protectionism (or liberalization) resulting from the adoption of this instrument. 
  First-come, first-served administrations are seldom used by the 14 developing countries 
studied here, who typically employ either an applied MFN tariff regime or m ore traditional 
licensing schemes.  MFN regimes include neither a mechanism to allocate rents nor a means to 
enforce the quota limitation.  Under the licensing mechanism, discrimination concerns arise with 
the need to determine license allocation procedures.  State trading and apparent state managed 
regimes are common methods, although countries often do not report how licenses are 
distributed. Skully elaborates on the potential unfairness and inefficiencies of these mechanisms 
relative to auctions, which are also rarely implemented by these 14 countries. 
  The notifications submitted by these developing countries to the WTO reveal many 
instances in which countries do not import sufficient quantities to meet their minimum access 
commitments.  This outcome, called “under-fill” can occur under two distinct scenarios.  The 
two possible reasons for under-fill have quite different implications for the effectiveness of the 
TRQ instrument.  One possibility is that administration mechanisms are costly and cumbersome, 
limiting access to the low tariff and rendering it ineffective. Thus, administrative mechanisms 
function as a non-tariff trade barrier (NTB). Alternatively, demand may simply have been 
inadequate, even at a domestic price determined by the low tariff, to g enerate imports sufficient 
to meet the minimum access commitment. In this case, it should be borne in mind that these 
commitments were not intended as guaranteed import levels, but rather as levels of market 
access for which additional barriers to trade would not be erected. An important task in gauging 
the significance of under-fill is assessing which reason lies behind that outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                             
issues may be somewhat different in those countries, especially where tariff quotas were proposed and implemented 102 
  State trading is an issue in its own right in the upcoming WTO Millennium Round 
negotiations. This discussion will necessarily overlap debate on the TRQ instrument.  One fear is 
that this instrument has helped not only to continue the need for state trading, but has caused its 
expanded use.  Since importing rights must be allocated, a government institution must exist to 
do so. That institution may control imports handled by private firms or may handle the product 
itself.  While the distinction of who physically handles imports may not be critical (Abbott and 
Young, 1999), the government remains closely involved in managing trade. The need to allocate 
valuable quota rents ensures that concerns regarding “rent seeking” remain. 
  There is also concern that TRQs as implemented may increase rather than reduce the 
extent of protectionism applied to agricultural imports.  GATT bindings of MFN tariffs in many 
instances are very high, often reaching prohibitive levels when TRQ regimes are in place.  
However, in most of these developing countries, applied tariffs are much lower than GATT 
bindings  – a situation called “dirty tariffication”  (Ingco, 1995).  The high GATT commitments 
increase concern that liberalization of import regimes was not accomplished in the Uruguay 
Round. Practice shows, however, that in most developing countries tariffs are bound at high 
levels not to raise applied tariffs, but rather to maintain flexibility in trade regimes.  Since a tariff 
may be changed so long as it remains below the GATT binding, tariffs can be and are adjusted as 
world prices change, much like what is accomplished under a variable levy.  
Behaviors by these 14 developing countries discussed below show that low MFN tariffs 
are found in the most liberal trade regimes. 
 
8.3  Quota Fill Rates 
Overfill is a much more common occurrence in these developing countries. Imports 
reported as under the quota may  in fact exceed the quota, sometimes substantially. The frequency 
of this outcome is due to the prevalence of two trading regimes – applied tariffs and variants on 
state-managed regimes.  Applied tariff regimes set one tariff, and no mechanism limits imports to 
the minimum access commitment.  We found that these one-tariff regimes often set the applied 
tariff below the bound TRQ rate.  Implementation by variants of state-managed trade, including 
state trading, licenses, or bilateral quotas frequently resulted in overfill as well. It has not been 
                                                                                                                                                             
well after the signing of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement. 103 
uncommon in the past for state agencies to vary effective quotas based on domestic “need” 
which would vary with domestic production. As long as a quota is above a country’s bound 
minimum access commitment, it may be v aried in this manner in compliance with WTO 
requirements.  This case has been labeled an “endogenous quota” in that the quota level each 
year depends on domestic market outcomes (Abbott and Morse, 1999).  It is difficult to ascertain 
if this is truly the r egime in place, as licenses may be given simply to ensure compliance with 
food safety regulations and may not be limited, or may be limited in a non-transparent way by 
the government.  
8.4  Information Sources on Developing Country TRQ Regimes 
 
   To determine which trade regimes were in place and how TRQs are performing in the 14 
developing countries examined here, we supplemented data available from WTO notifications 
with information on GATT commitments, actual imports, and applied border measures.   
  From  the WTO, we collected two types of notifications provided by individual countries 
as well as GATT Uruguay Round commitments.  Each reporting country has submitted an MA:1 
notification describing administration methods applied to its TRQs  and market access 
commitments. MA:2 notifications are annual country self-reports on quota levels (market access 
levels) and in-quota imports.  In addition, the WTO makes available initial TRQ offers of 
binding MFN and in-quota tariffs as well as minimum access commitments on a CD Rom 
(WTO, Complete Results of the Uruguay Round, 1996).   
Applied MFN and in-quota tariffs were collected from the UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) 
database for 1995 to 1997. In cases where true TRQs exist, two tariffs were available from 
TRAINS. In most cases, only MFN tariffs are reported in TRAINS.  
In order to determine if out-of-quota imports were occurring, we collected total import 
data for 1980 through 1997 from the FAO AGROSTAT database. The earlier data, from 1980 to 
1994, was used to project trend imports for 1995 to 1997.  The 1995 to 1997 total import data 
were compared both with trend projections and with the WTO notifications on in-quota imports.   104 
  Based on all the evidence we found, including descriptive information on administrative 
method and WTO classifications, we determined the most likely economic model to apply in 
each commodity case: a pure tariff regime, a pure quota regime, a true TRQ regime, or an 
endogenous quota regime.   
8.5  Findings 
 
  Table 8.1 summarizes information on use of TRQs by country. It reports the number of 
commodities in each developing country for which we were able to collect data on TRQ 
implementation; the trade regime in place; the relationships between bound and applied tariffs; 
and comparisons of total imports, trend imports and quota fill. Table 8.2 summarizes the same 
information by commodity for the major commodity groups (meats, milk, cereals, potatoes, 
soybeans, and sugar). 
Country Summaries 
  Half of the trade regimes in developing countries submitted as TRQ notifications are run 
as pure tariff regimes. Over a third of the total cases employ licensing schemes or state trading. 
True TRQ regimes are found only in Korea and the Philippines, and the only pure quota regimes 
are found in Korea.  We found no cases where applied tariffs were above the base GATT offer 
(the initial reduction in 1995), and in two-thirds of cases, applied tariffs were already below 
these countries’ GATT bound rates, a condition which does not need to be achieved until 2004.  
On average, applied tariffs are half of GATT bindings, and in many countries tariffs are less than 
25 percent of GATT bindings. This result is consistent with both systematic overestimation of 
tariff equivalents in the baseline and substantial liberalization of these markets. Only in Korea 
and the Philippines, where true TRQs are applied, are MFN tariffs close to the relatively high 
GATT bindings. In Korea, the applied TRQ rates are about one-quarter of MFN rates. In the 
other countries, applied MFN tariffs are almost always below the GATT-offered in-quota tariffs.  
In summary, except where true TRQs are actually applied, pure tariffs well below commitment 
rates are generally found, indicating substantial liberalization for those markets. 105   
Table 8.1. Trade Regime, Tariffication, Quota Fill and Import Trends by Country       
                 
Administration  All 14  Brazil  Colombia  Costa Rica  Guatemala  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia 
TRQ Notifications to WTO  180  2  33  5  12  1  28  8 
  Tariff Regimes  91  2  19  5  7  0  0  0 
  State Regimes  65  0  14  0  5  1  10  8 
  Quota Regimes  2  0  0  0  0  0  2  0 
   True TRQs  24  0  0  0  0  0  18  0 
                 
Tariffication                 
Applied MFN Tariff / GATT MFN Offer  0.52  0.45  0.15  0.26  0.19  0.00  1.20  0.01 
    Applied Tariff less than MFN Offer  120  2  33  5  12  1  0  6 
    Applied Tariff less than TRQ Offer  109  2  33  5  12  1  0  6 
TRQ Offer / GATT MFN Offer  0.61  1.06  0.99  0.65  0.40  0.56  0.62  0.79 
 TRQ Applied / MFN Applied Tariff  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.23  - 
                 
Imports versus Quotas                 
Total Imports / Quota  8.03  1.64  27.47  2.94  4.42  26.93  18.37  6.09 
    Under-fill cases  41%  0%  23%  93%  22%  0%  44%  33% 
    Overfill cases  38%  100%  76%  0%  44%  100%  36%  33% 
Imports increased after 1994  72%  83%  80%  73%  61%  100%  74%  92% 
    + 1 Std  39%  83%  43%  53%  39%  67%  39%  54% 
    + 2 Std  23%  67%  24%  27%  14%  67%  29%  42% 
Imports decreased after 1994  28%  17%  20%  27%  39%  0%  26%  8% 
    - 1 Std  6%  0%  4%  20%  8%  0%  4%  0% 
    - 2 Std  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
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Table 8.1. (continued) Trade Regime, Tariffication, Quota Fill and Import Trends by Country   
               
Administration  Mexico  Morocco  Panama  Philippines  Thailand  Tunisia  Venezuela 
TRQ Notifications to WTO  1  11  8  9  20  10  32 
  Tariff Regimes  0  7  8  2  9  2  30 
  State Regimes  1  4  0  1  11  8  2 
  Quota Regimes  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
   True TRQs  0  0  0  6  0  0  0 
               
Tariffication               
Applied MFN Tariff / GATT MFN Offer  1.47  0.65    1.47  0.52  0.22  0.21 
    Applied Tariff less than MFN Offer  0  7    2  11  9  32 
    Applied Tariff less than TRQ Offer  0  7    1  4  7  31 
TRQ Offer / GATT MFN Offer  0.00  0.85    0.93  0.36  0.32  0.43 
TRQ Applied / MFN Applied Tariff  -  -    0.59  -  -  - 
               
Imports versus Quotas               
Total Imports / Quota  1.30  8.95  3.74  4.72  3.76  0.69  1.32 
    Under-fill cases  0%  30%  25%  71%  63%  75%  39% 
    Overfill cases  100%  3%  13%  25%  37%  0%  28% 
Imports increased after 1994  0%  70%  100%  100%  78%  50%  54% 
    + 1 Std  0%  52%  88%  83%  35%  5%  13% 
    + 2 Std  0%  36%  38%  58%  17%  5%  4% 
Imports decreased after 1994  100%  30%  0%  0%  22%  50%  46% 
    - 1 Std  0%  9%  0%  0%  2%  25%  10% 




  This liberalization has led to increased imports. Imports increased beyond trend levels in 
nearly three quarters of the cases, and the increase is statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
in one quarter of the cases. Imports fell below trend in only one quarter of the cases, and the 
decline in imports was never statistically significant. Total imports of these commodities were, 
on average, eight times the m inimum access commitments, with substantial variation by 
commodity. While under-fill was found in 41 percent of the cases, overfill was found in nearly as 
many cases (38 percent).  Moreover, the magnitude of overfill was substantial enough to achieve 
the o bserved ratio of imports to quotas to be greater than one.  In Costa Rica, where auction 
mechanisms are reported, under-fill is the most prevalent outcome, and in Korea, where true 
TRQs are implemented by state agencies, overfill is substantial and imports have increased 
significantly in many cases. Only in Tunisia are total imports routinely less than the quota. 
Commodity Summaries 
  Observations from Table 2 offer insight into three issues. First, state regimes are 
generally applied to politically sensitive staples, whereas applied tariffs are more generally found 
for goods that were largely not previously traded. Second, the occurrence of under-fill and 
overfill differs by commodity group and by extent of tradability.  Third, structural shifts in 
import trends due to liberalization can be explained in part by commodity-specific elasticities. 
The contrast between cereals and oilseeds on the one hand, and meat and dairy products 
on the other hand, is reflected in trade regime choice. Whereas cereal imports are most often 
controlled by a state regime, tariff regimes are more prevalent for meat and dairy products. State 
regimes generally ensure that quotas fill.  The low wheat tariffs are likely due to the fact that 
state agencies control trade. Tariff regimes a re frequently applied to products that are historically 
non-tradable. Where the private sector is more involved, as appears to be the case for non-
tradables, tariffs are closer to GATT bindings. Several regimes are applied to sugar, with varying 
results. Nevertheless, applied tariffs are generally below GATT bindings.  
Under-fill cases are most prevalent for meat and dairy products. These goods would have 
been thought of as non-tradable prior to 1994 in most of these countries. It should be noted, 
however,  that meat and dairy imports frequently increased at least one standard deviation above 
trend and seldom fell below trend. For cereals and oilseeds, which were traded more heavily 108 
prior to the 1994 GATT agreement, under-fill is quite rare and overfill is common. Increases in 
cereal and oilseed imports relative to trend are less pronounced, but decreases are only found for 
wheat. In the wheat cases, imports are only 30 percent above minimum access commitments on 
average, whereas much greater ratios of imports to quotas are found for the other cereals.  For 
sugar cases, under-fill is frequently found. 
Structural changes in trends can also be related to commodity characteristics.  To ensure 
increased market access following liberalization, structural change may  be necessary.  While on 
average sugar imports are well above minimum access commitments, imports appear to have 
remained on trend more than other commodities, so under-fill is more common than over-fill. 
This may reflect low demand elasticities for sugar,  since tariff reductions would have lowered 
domestic prices.  Cereal imports are also less likely to expand than meats or dairy products when 
tariffs fall due to low elasticities. Imports of meats and dairy products generally increased, 
though in several cases that increase was insufficient to fill quotas. 
 
General Themes 
  The above observations together with the detailed country information described in 
Abbott and Morse (1999) permit us to make some generalizations about TRQ implementation 
and administration in developing countries. 
Use of TRQs -Tariff rate quotas were used relatively little by developing countries as part 
of their trade regimes following the Uruguay Round Agreement. Only 14 developing country 
WTO members are providing notifications on the u se of this instrument.  In many cases, those 
notifications seem intended to report that imports are meeting minimum access commitments, as 
the regime in place is seldom a true TRQ. We found TRQs implemented as designed only in 
Korea and the Philippines.  I n other countries, either applied tariffs are below the low in-quota 
tariff included in GATT offers, or TRQ notifications correspond with some state control of trade, 
through licensing or state trading.   State regimes are more prevalent for the politically sensitive 
staples, commodities that account for a substantial number of TRQ notifications.  
   Liberalization  - In spite of possible continued state involvement in management of 
agricultural trade, substantial liberalization of trade regimes is found in t hese cases.  Tariffs have 
been reduced, and imports have generally expanded.  Moreover, applied tariffs are generally 109 
 
Table 8.2  Trade Regime, Tariffication, Quota Fill and Import Trends by Commodity       
                       
Administration  Beef Pork Poultry Milk Potato Wheat Barley Maize RiceSoybean Sugar
TRQ Notifications WTO  7 7 7 10 4 4 5 7 8 3 5
  Tariff Regimes  3 3 2 5 1 0 0 2 2 1 2
  State Regimes  4 2 3 4 2 4 4 4 6 2 2
  True TRQs  0 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
                       
Tariffication                       
Applied MFN Tariff / GATT MFN Offer  0.58 1.01 0.77 0.35 1.19 0.06 0.37 0.61 0.27 0.43 0.48
    Applied Tariff less than MFN Offer  5 3 4 7 1 4 4 3 4 2 4
    Applied Tariff less than TRQ Offer  3 4 5 8 1 4 3 5 6 2 4
TRQ Offer / GATT MFN Offer  0.95 0.97 0.80 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.53 0.56 0.69 0.42 0.46
TRQ Applied / MFN Applied Tariff  - 0.72 0.59 0.09 0.33 - 0.06 0.22 - - 0.63
                       
Imports versus Quotas                       
Total Imports / Quota  4.05 1.09 2.81 5.25 5.75 1.29 3.18 11.34 4.82 16.65 19.88
    Under-fill cases  62% 43% 57% 32% 38% 13% 10% 7% 20% 0% 43%
    Overfill cases  8% 14% 29% 26% 25% 63% 50% 64% 47% 100% 25%
Imports increased after 1994                       
    + 1 Std  0% 0% 43% 16% 13% 0% 10% 29% 13% 17% 14%
    + 2 Std  38% 79% 21% 16% 63% 0% 10% 36% 27% 33% 14%
Imports decreased after 1994                       
    - 1 Std  15% 0% 0% 21% 0% 25% 10% 0% 0% 0% 14%
    - 2 Std  0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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below GATT bindings, offering flexibility to these governments in varying applied tariffs as 
world prices fluctuate. We know that flexibility (effective variable levies) not increased 
protectionism has been the rationale behind “dirty tariffication” in several cases. Where true 
TRQs have been implemented, applied tariffs are closer to GATT bindings, but substantial 
expansion of trade has generally occurred, because imports are often above trend projections. 
Total imports are generally several times the minimum access commitments. In those cases, state 
or producer organization management of trade is important.  Thus, liberalization is more likely 
due to actual tariffication and reduction of MFN tariff than to the use of TRQs. 
State Trading and Endogenous Quotas - One difficulty in evaluating these trade regimes 
is due to their extensive use of licenses.  Licenses may ensure that food safety regulations are 
met or may limit imports. If they do limit imports, the state is commonly setting quotas above 
minimum access commitments, which results in overfill being as common as under-fill.  It is 
likely that quotas are adjusted annually by the state based on domestic market conditions, along 
the lines of the endogenous quota model discussed earlier.  This flexibility in policy is in 
compliance with WTO commitments since these quotas generally remain above minimum access 
commitments. 
Under-fill  - Imports less than minimum access commitments were identified as a concern 
based on initial notifications of imports under TRQs. At least in these developing country cases, 
this seems to be a misplaced concern.  Over-fill is as common a s under-fill. Imports of 
commodities are usually substantially greater than the commitments and are expanding. On 
average, total imports are at eight hundred percent of commitment.  In cases where under-fill is 
observed, products were unlikely to have been extensively traded prior to 1994, and low demand 
elasticities mean that liberalization is unlikely to lead to demand increases sufficient to meet 
minimum access commitments.  Evidence on administrative methods shows only a few cases in 
which requirements  to obtain access to quotas or transactions costs associated with these quotas 
could lead to reduced imports. In the case of Costa Rica, for example, where auctions to allocate 
quota rights seem to be failing, out-of-quota imports are well above the quota. This result may be 
due in part to the small difference between in-quota and MFN tariffs. In the two countries where 
true TRQ regimes are functioning, cases of under-fill are more common. In both Korea and the 
Philippines, under-fill often appears to be due to weak demand, but problems with the 112 
administration of quotas by producer groups have been noted.  In at least one instance, 
procedures have been challenged in the WTO dispute settlement process and have been modified 
several times as governments seek to ensure that producer groups comply with the intent of the 
TRQs. 
Quota Rights and Rents  - Since quota regimes are rare, administrative methods seldom 
need to allocate rights to import under low tariffs, and hence to the rents accruing to these rights.  
Where rents might accrue, institutions typically are designed to give those rents to domestic 
agents.   Assigning administration of quotas to producer groups or processors is common.   When 
endogenous quotas are in place, constraints related to prior sale of  domestic production are also 
found.  There are very few bilateral quotas implemented by developing countries.  Bilateral 
quotas are commonly used in the U.S. and EU as part of their preferential trade arrangements and 
to offer foreign aid via trade opportunities by allowing developing country exporters to capture 
the quota rents. This same motivation is not relevant to these developing countries that have little 
incentive to use this institution to direct trade toward politically favored partners. 
8.6  Conclusions 
 
  Only fourteen developing country members of the WTO are reporting that they use tariff 
rate quotas as part of their agricultural import regimes.   Evidence regarding administration of 
those imports indicates that true TRQ mechanisms as initially e nvisioned, and as implemented in 
the U.S. or EU, are used in only two of those fourteen countries – Korea and the Philippines.  
Our belief, supported by the notifications on administration methods, is that in many 
cases, countries are not actually implementing TRQ regimes, and the purpose of their 
notifications to the WTO is simply to verify that imports are meeting their minimum access 
commitments.  In half of the cases examined here, regimes described in notifications to the WTO 
are simple applied tariff  regimes, and those countries only report the use of MFN tariffs to 
UNCTAD.  In two thirds of the remaining cases, licenses are employed and some state 
involvement in trade regimes may remain.  While these latter cases are not transparent regimes, 
they appear at times to continue institutions similar to pre-Uruguay Round trade regimes. In 
addition, these regimes may employ endogenous quotas that can ensure that minimum access 
commitments are met and can adjust in response to domestic market conditions or world prices. 113 
  Both dirty tariffication and endogenous quotas permit developing countries to operate 
flexible policy regimes within their WTO commitments.  These regimes permit stabilization of 
domestic markets in the face of volatility in world prices. 
  In s pite of continued state involvement in trade, substantial liberalization of the trade 
regimes for commodities notified as being under TRQ regimes has occurred.  Tariffs are well 
below GATT bindings, both for MFN commitments and lower in-quota tariff commitments.  
Imports have expanded, often significantly above trend imports, and overfill of quotas is as 
common as under-fill.  Imports below minimum access commitments are more likely caused by 
weak demand than by costs associated with meeting TRQ administrative requirements.  Under-
fill is more common for meat and dairy products that would have been viewed as non-tradable 
prior to 1994 and for which the observed significant expansion of imports is still below those 
commitments.  For the politically sensitive  staples, demand has expanded less, but under-fill is 
rare.  Low demand elasticities for agricultural goods are also likely to contribute to under-fill, 
since lower tariffs may have little impact on demand levels.  
  Problems of under-fill, discrimination in the distribution of rights to import, and rent 
seeking could increase in the future if countries choose to make further use of TRQs. In China’s 
accession offer to join the WTO, and in trade regimes adopted by recent Eastern European 
entrants to the WTO, m ore extensive use of true TRQs has led to more protectionist regimes, at 
least in the long run, than were found in the fourteen developing countries studied here.  
The substantial liberalization found here is due to tariffication and lowering of MFN 
tariffs, not to increased market access via TRQs.  Future liberalization of agricultural trade 
regimes is more likely to arise from reductions of MFN tariffs than from expansion of either 
minimum access commitments or greater use of TRQs as a device to guarantee access.  
Lowering in-quota tariffs will most likely only increase rents to privileged agents, and allocation 
mechanisms generally direct those rents to domestic agents or intermediaries, not exporters.  
Expanded minimum access commitments permit quantitative restrictions to persist.  Lowering 
out-of-quota or MFN tariffs is likely to lead to more liberal markets in the future, while avoiding 
problems of rent allocation from either expanding quotas or decreasing in-quota tariffs. 114 
9  Management of Tariff Rate Quotas in Korea and Japan  
 
9.1.  Introduction 
 
The agricultural trade policies of Korea and Japan drew much attention during the 
URAA negotiations because they had been using non-tariff barriers and many domestic 
intervention measures in agriculture.  As  a part of the URAA, Korea and Japan accepted 
tariffication for all of their agricultural commodities except rice, which received a waiver.  
Agricultural products with prior import bans (or very low access) faced minimum market access 
commitments as a part  of TRQ programs and others held the current market access provisions.  
Korea and Japan, as importing countries, have enforced TRQs strictly during the first four years 
of the URAA implementation period.   
The objective of this chapter is to investigate implications of tariff-rate quota 
management for agricultural products in Korea and Japan and to describe the procedure that 
created TRQs for Korea and Japan and the role of TRQs in agricultural imports.   We will 
analyze quota fill rates to show how the rates differ depending on administration method.  The 
role of state trading enterprises (STEs) in TRQ management will also be considered.  Finally, we 
identify some welfare implications of TRQ administration. 
 
9.2 TRQs under Market Access Commitments to Implement the URAA 
 
Korea 
Before the URAA, imports of most agricultural products were limited by quantity 
restrictions, except for a few raw materials required for manufacturing.  Wide-scale trade reform 
for agricultural products took place in 1989.  When the GATT Committee on Balance of 
Payments (BOP) decided to terminate concessions allowing Korea to use non-tariff import 
barriers because of deficits in the balance of payments, the Korean government announced a 
reform schedule of agricultural markets for 1991 t o 1997.  As the result of UR negotiations, 
livestock products, vegetables, and oranges were the main products included as BOP items in the 
country schedule.  The URAA resulted in higher initial tariffs for some of those BOP items, but 115 
with the agreement, t he tariffs would be reduced to their original, applied levels at the end of 
implementation period.    
Under the URAA, Korea applied tariffs or created TRQs for all agricultural products 
except rice.  Rice tariffication was waived and rice became subject to a pure quota.  Tariffication 
of rice is scheduled to be renegotiated during 2004, one year before the end of the 
implementation period.  
Market access commitments were made for 220 agricultural products,
60 and TRQs were 
created for 190 items,
61 while the rest of the agricultural market was opened with a tariff-only 
provision.  Quota quantities, in-quota tariffs, and bound tariffs for major TRQ products are 
described in Table 9.1.  For some items, the TRQ has already expired. For example, the TRQs 
for pork, p oultry meat, and orange juice were removed in July 1997.  The TRQ for beef will 
expire on December 31, 2000. 
After the verification of the country schedule in 1994, 97 of the 190 TRQ items gained 
approval for additional markups of in-quota imports.  Markups were provided for BOP items as 
well as for tariffication items.
62  Of these 97 markup items, 83 were notified as the state-traded 
products.  Among them, some BOP items were given specific time limits for state trading.
63  
Beef imports will be provided by t he private sector no later than January 2001.  Imports of 
remaining items will be privatized after 2004.   
The creation of TRQs under the market access provisions effectively increased 
agricultural imports (Table 9.2).  For example, foreign rice, potatoes, and oranges are now 
shipped into Korea, while they were previously allowed only in the case of emergent crop 
                                                 
60  This applies to products defined on 10-digit HS codes.  The number increased to 242 as the classification method 
has changed.  The products remain basically the same.   
61  This is the same as 67 items with 4-digit HS codes (common names).  The market access is provided through 
minimum market access for 104 items and through current market access for 86 items. 
62  BOP items are subject to the following statement.  “The Government of Republic of Korea or its designated 
agencies can take measures consistent with the Agreement establishing the WTO to ensure orderly domestic markets 
and to designate revenues resulting from the sales of these products in Korea (Note 5 of Tariff Rate Quota-Market 
Access, The Country Schedule of Korea).”  Items under the URAA tariffication are subject to a more explicit 
statement on the markup.  “The Government of Republic of Korea or the designated state trading agent can impose 
markup on sales of these products in Korea in addition to the in-quota tariff  (Note 4 of Tariff Rate Quota-Market 
Access).” 
63  The artificial honey and cocoons were removed from the list of state traded items in June 1996, and silk was 
removed in June 1997.
  116 
failures.  Imports of beef, onion, sesame, and pepper also showed substantial increases during 
1995 to 1997 compared with the period 1992 to 1994. 
 
Table 9.1. Tariff Rate Quotas for Selected Products, Korea: 1995-2004 
Quota (tons)  Tariff (%)   
Product    Initial    Final  In-quota         Initial          Final 
Rice       51,307     205,228          5         n.a.             n.a. 
Barley       14,150       23,582        20     333/ 410
3)    229.7/ 361
3) 
Corn  6,102,100  6,102,100          3        365         328 
Soybeans  1,302,152  1,032,152          5     541/ 1,062
3)       487/956
3)  
Potatoes       11,286       18,810        30         338          304 
Onions       12,369       20,645        50     150/ 200
3)       135/ 180
3) 
Garlic         8,680       14,467        50     400/ 2,000
3)      360/ 1,800
3)  
Red pepper         4,311         7,185        50     300/ 6,900
3)       270/ 6,210
3)  
Oranges       15,000       57,017        50          99           50 
Ground nuts         4,907         4,907        40        256.1        230.5  
Sesame         6,731         6,731        40     700/ 7,400
3)       630/ 6,660
3) 
Beef     123,000    225,000
1)  43.6/ 
41.6
1) 
44.5 & 70% 
markup 
40 & 0% markup
1) 
Pork       21,930      18,275
2)        25           37            25 
Poultry         7,700        6,500
2)        20           35            20 
Skim milk powder            621        1,034        20         220          176 
Whole milk powder           344           573        40         220          176 
Whey        23,000       54,233        20           99            49.5 
Butter             250            420          40           99            89 
1)  2001 
2)  1997 
3)  %/ won per kg: applied tariff is the percentage of product value or won per kg, whichever is higher. (The 
        exchange rate in 1995 was 774 won/US$.  It was about 1,150 won/US$ in late 1999.) 
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For rice, the import ban was lifted and a minimum market quota was established at 
51,307 tons in 1995, increasing to 205,228 tons in 2004.  For wheat, for which the market was 
liberalized before the URAA, the tariff rate is to be reduced from 3 percent to 1.8 percent by 
2004.  The TRQ for corn and corn products is 6,102,100 tons, and the in-quota tariff will decline 
from 3 percent to 1.8 percent by 2004.  A TRQ for barley and barley products of 14,150 tons was 
established and will increase to 23,582 tons by 2004.  
For beef, the TRQ expands from 187,000 tons in 1998 to 225,000 tons in 2000.  The 
private portion of TRQ under the simultaneous-buy-and-sell (SBS) system was set to increase by 
10 percent each year, up to 70 percent in 1999 and 2000, and markup was set to decline from 70 
percent in 1995 to zero in 2000.  All non-tariff import barriers will be removed in January 2001.  
The tariff, set at 44 percent in 1995, will fall to 40 percent in 2004.  For pork and chicken, all  
 
Table 9.2.  Imports of Major Agricultural Products in Korea: Pre- and Post-UR 
Product  Unit Ton 
  1992-94  1995-97  Change (%) 
Rice  0  213,780  Not applicable 
Barley  0  83,850  Not applicable 
Pepper  6,722  14,229  111.7 
Garlic  39,396  28,227  -28.4 
Onions  61,798  95,200  54.0 
Sesame  162,163  174,800  7.8 
Soybeans  3,605,822  4,530,000  25.6 
Potatoes  0  5,536  Not applicable 
Beef  352,119  447,210  27.0 
Oranges  2,902  54,685  1,784.4 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
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quantitative import restrictions were eliminated on July 1, 1997 and tariffs will be reduced 
annually until 2004.  
  For dairy products, the TRQ of 23,000 tons of whey was established in 1995, to increase 
by 10 percent annually over ten years.  On January 1, 1995, imports of all types of cheese, infant 
formula, and other dairy preparations were put under tariffication at a rate of 40 percent, to be 
reduced to 36 percent over ten years.  For oranges, the TRQ is increasing from 28,125 tons in 
1998, to 57,017 tons in 2004. The in-quota tariff is 50 percent, and the out-of-quota tariff of 79.4 
percent in 1999 will be reduced to 50 percent in 2004. The orange juice import tariff was set at 
60 percent on July 1, 1997.  
 
Japan  
  Japan is known for high agricultural trade barriers, but Japan’s agricultural market was 
actually less restrictive than Korea’s before the UR negotiations.  Fewer items are under TRQ 
programs in Japan than in Korea.  
  When it joined the GATT in 1955, Japan claimed the right to regulate trade in rice 
and in some other commodities under the GATT/BOP clause.  In 1963, Japan ceased applying 
the BOP clause, except to some agricultural products, such as rice and beef.  Under a bilateral 
agreement with the United States, quantitative restrictions on the beef market were eliminated in 
1988.  Under the URAA, Japan converted 28 commodities from non-tariff protection to tariffs 
(IATRC, 1997).  TRQs were created for 19 items. Among these, 10 are dairy products, including 
skim milk powder, whey, and butter (Table 9.3).  Other TRQ items are legumes, starches, ground 
nuts, konnyaku roots, and cocoons.  Rice was granted a waiver from tariffication under Annex 5 
to the URAA.  Annex 5 increased access to the Japanese  market from 4 percent of average 
annual consumption during 1986-88 (379,000 tons) in 1995 to 8 percent (758,000 tons) in 2000.  
However, in April 1999, Japan changed its rice import policy to tariffication with minimum 
market access.  With the tariffication, Japan announced that it would reduce the annual increase 
in rice imports quota from 0.8 percent to 0.4 percent (682,000 tons in 2000) and apply a tariff of  
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Table 9.3. Tariff Rate Quotas, Japan: 1995-2000 
 
           Quota (tons)                    Tariff (yen/kg)     Product 
    Initial       Final  In-quota     Initial        Final 
Rice     379,000    682,000
1)  Various  351.17
2)         341 
Wheat & processed 
products 
5,565,000  5,740,000     Various              65          55 
Barley & processed 
products 
1,326,500      1,369,000  Various          46           39 
Starches     157,000        157,000  Various        140         119 
Ground nuts       75,000       75,000      10        726         617 
Konnyaku roots            267            267      40      3,289      2,796 
Legumes     120,000     120,000      10        417        354 
Cocoons        2,968      2,523 
Raw silk 
          798            798  various 
    8,209      6,978 
Skim milk powder 
(school lunch) 
       7,264         7,264        0  466+25%  396+21.3% 
Skim milk powder 
(others) 
     85,878       85,878  Various  466+35%  396+29.8% 
Evaporated milk         1,585         1,585  Various  Various  Various 
Whey (feed)       45,000           45,000       0  Various  Various 
Whey (infant)       25,000       25,000      10  Various  Various 
Butter & butter oil         1,873         1,873      35  Various  Various 
Concentrated whey       14,000            14,000    Various   Various  Various 
Prepared edible fat       18,977       18,977      25  Various  Various 
Other dairy products     124,640     133,940    Various  Various  Various 
Designated dairy 
products 
   137,202     137,202  Various  Various  Various 
1)  The original quota quantity in the country schedule was 758,000 tons. 
2)  For 1999. 
Note: Exchange rate was 125 yen/US$ (1995) and about 105 yen/US$ (late 1999). 120 
351.17 yen/kg (equivalent to about 450 percent
64) in 1999.  In-quota rice imports are subject to 
further markup of up to 292 yen/kg.  
 
9.3 Quota Administration Methods and Quota Fill Rates 
 
TRQs in Korea are administered in four ways: (1) first come, first served,  (2) auction of quota,  
(3) license on demand, and (4) state trading.  License on demand is allocated to designated 
multiple importers or qualified end-users and to new entrants to the market.  Qualification is 
based on import history.  Quota rent goes to the importing firm and, the markup goes to the 
government.  For some items under auction and state trading, part of the quota is allocated with 
the license on demand.  For auctioned products, the government gets the quota rent.  State-traded 
products are administered using open tender, and the STEs get the quota rent. 
  For any TRQ products (excluding rice), out-of-quota importation is possible.  Products 
with lower out-of-quota tariffs, such as oranges, whey, and butter, have real potential for such 
importation.  In some cases, the TRQ has been expanded for raw materials, feed, and other 
products.  During 1995 to 1998, about twenty product group TRQs were expanded to allow low 
tariff imports.  Corn, soybeans, barley, and sesame have been included every year in this list.  
In the following paragraphs, we consider more details on the administration of TRQ for 
some products important in world trade. 
Rice is a state-trading item without out-of-quota imports. The in-quota tariff rate is 5 
percent.  The M inistry of Agriculture and Fisheries administers the quota through an open tender 
system with sealed bids.  For example, the “Invitation for Bids” (Supply Administration of 
Korea, 1998) contains conditions of contract, specifications, and forms.  The tender specifies the 
10-digit HS code.  The invitation describes the specification and quantity as “Non-glutinous 
brown rice medium or short grain (Japonica type) in 40 kg Jute bag or P.P. bag; Crop year: 1997 
or 1998; Grade: U.S. No. 3 or better for the classes of brown rice; Unit and Quantity: 20,000 
M/T net.”  To be eligible to import, a company’s offers are judged as qualified after passing the 
sample examination.  Then the lowest price bidder wins the right to import. 
                                                 
64 This is based on exchange rates on April 1999 and U.S. rice export prices (Dyck, et al.). 121 
State trading for beef is administered  by the Livestock Products Marketing Organization, 
a subsidiary company of the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation.
65  Rent and markup 
income from imports are added to the Livestock Development Fund.  An invitation for bids in 
1998 included the following contents: Commodity: Frozen beef (Primal cuts packaged in a 
carton must be able to store under optimal conditions under  -18￿C for up to 24 months); 
Quantity: 9,323 M/T; Origin: USA, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, 
Finland, Mexico; and Netherlands; and Qualification: Registered with the Korean Foreign Trade 
Association and also with Livestock Products Marketing Organization, at least, one day prior to 
the tender date.  
The orange TRQ is administered  by the Cheju Citrus Growers Agricultural Cooperative.  
To avoid competition, imports are allowed only for the season during which no local mandarins 
are in the market.  So far there have been no out-of-quota imports.  In 1997, around 38 billion 
won (about  $40 million at 1997 exchange rate of 951 won per US$) was collected for research 
and development and for purchasing sub-quality mandarins.  The quota rent was equivalent to 
about 5 percent of the total revenue (about $753 million) from mandarins.  
In Japan, imports under TRQs are managed by import licensing and state trading.  
Quantities under import license are allocated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries to private importers, based on historical business records and business plans.  F or 
imports of pork, a differential tariff system similar to the variable levy of the European Union is 
allowed (IATRC, 1997).  For some products, such as whey, butter, and ground nuts, the 
quantities of in-quota tariff imports were increased by applying the higher, final-year quota 
quantity to the initial year of implementation.   
The average quota fill rate for TRQs in Korea during the period 1995 to 1998 was 113 
percent (Table 9.4).  During the same period, Japan showed an average fill rate of 87 percent.  
Fill rates varied with management methods.  In Korea, the auction method had the lowest fill rate 
(71 percent) followed by the first come, first served fill rate (79 percent).  License on demand 
had the highest fill rate (156 percent).  An average fill rate for products under state trading was 
146 percent during the same period.  In Japan, the average fill rate for products imported under 
                                                 
65 On November 29, 1999, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that it would administer the state 122 
licenses was 60 percent, and the average fill rate for products under state trading was 113 
percent.  
For commodities  using the first come, first served method, the relatively low fill rate 
could be the result of weak import demand.  In some cases, neither the in-quota tariff nor the 
quota quantity was binding.  For the state-traded commodities, the tendency was to implement 
commitments precisely, because state-traded commodities are generally those considered 
politically important by the governments of Korea and Japan as well as by exporting countries.    
Table 9.4  Quota Fill Rates by Management Methods, 1995-98   
  First come, 
first served 
Auctioning  License on Demand  State Trading  Average 
Korea  79%  71%  156%  146%  113% 
Japan  n.a.  n.a.  60%  113%  87% 
 
n.a.: Not applicable. 
Note: The numbers are a simple average, not trade weighted or domestic market weighted.  So, for example, rice 
receives the same weight in the table as sesame.  
Source: Author calculations. 
 
9.4.  The Role of State Trading Enterprises 
Korea 
Seven importing STEs handle seventeen agricultural products in Korea (Table 9) (Choi, 
et al., 1998).  The STEs, except for the Cheju Citrus Growers Agricultural Cooperative and the 
National Ginseng Cooperatives Federation, are not involved in exporting any of the commodities 
they handle.  TRQs allocated to the state trading enterprises contributed significantly to increased 
imports of those products.
66 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is the designated importer for the TRQ of rice 
and barley.  Private companies registered with the government participate in bidding and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
trading of beef imports by auctioning during 2000.   
66 It is not clear, however, that the STEs generally show higher fill rates than the private sector.  For example, beef 
imported both through the STE and through private traders in 1998 equaled about 47 percent of the committed 123 
lowest bidder meeting minimum quality or other requirements wins the right to supply.  As a 
result of straight price-bidding, low-quality rice has been imported from India, China, and 
Thailand during the period 1995 to 1998.  Imported rice is sold through an open auction system 
to rice processors or is stored.  
Barley is imported directly by private animal feed manufacturers who acquire import 
licenses from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.  Since imported barley is used mostly for 
feed manufacturing, it does not compete with domestically produced barley.  
The Agricultural and Fishery Marketing Corporation is designated to administer the 
TRQs of ten state traded items: pepper, garlic, onions, sesame, ground nuts, edible soybeans, 
beans, buckwheat, ginger, and potatoes.  For these items, a large gap exists between international 
and domestic prices.  Private importation would have induced windfall profits and confronted 
domestic sellers with competition from low-priced imports.  Established in 1967, the 
Agricultural and Fisheries Marketing Corporation is a semi-governmental organization that 
trades and stores in the domestic market.  For imports, it publicly solicits bidding.  The 
announcement includes the item name, delivery date, quantity in tons, and the arriving harbor.  
There is little restriction on participation in the bidding.  Among import items, some sesame and 
ginger are imported by the private sector.  Also, part of the soybean import quota is imported by 
the recommended end-users.  The corporation sells the imported items through the auction 
system in the public wholesale market.  Domestic prices, determined by the auction, tend to be 
lower than local product prices, due to quality differences. 
State trading of beef TRQ lasts until beef market tariffication.  Part of beef TRQ is 
imported by open bidding administered by the Livestock Products Marketing Corporation.  The 
remaining beef is imported by the private sector through the SBS system.  Under the SBS 
system, beef is imported directly by the wholesalers/end-user group.  The proportion of TRQ 
quantity imported under the SBS system increased from 30 percent in 1995 to 70 percent in 
2000. Domestic sale price is determined through auction in the wholesale market or by the 
importing STE, taking import costs and domestic price into account.  The National Livestock 
Cooperatives Federation (natural honey), the National Ginseng Cooperatives Federation 
                                                                                                                                                             
quantity.  The market situation was not favorable to imported beef due to low demand and high dollar value, 124 
(ginseng), and the National Forestry Cooperatives Federation (pine nuts) operate in a manner 
similar to other importing STEs. 
   
Japan 
Japan reported six STEs to the WTO.
67  Among these, four STEs import agricultural 
products.
68  The Food Agency administers Japan’s market access commitments for rice, wheat, 
and barley.  The Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation managed TRQ imports of dairy 
products such as milk powder, condensed milk, buttermilk powder, whey, and butter.  The Japan 
Raw Silk and Sugar Price Stabilization Agency administered the TRQ of raw silk until October 
of 1996, when the two STEs merged into the Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation.
69  
The Japan Tobacco Inc., now a private agency, imports leaf tobacco.   
  State trading activities are based on legislated import rights and, in some cases, by 
specific monopoly rights over domestic production and distribution, as is the case with tobacco 
products and Japan Tobacco Inc.  STEs still monopolize imports of several commodities and 
limit imports into Japan. 
  The Food Agency, the largest STE in Japan, monopolizes import and domestic markets 
of rice, wheat, and barley, although public traders are allowed to import if they pay import 
duties.  The stated reason for maintaining an importing STE in rice, wheat, and barley is “to 
stabilize supply and demand situations of prices for such staple foods and for promoting stability 
of national life and economy” (Japan’s notification to WTO).  The Food Agency collects prior 
information on the demands for rice by type and origin and allocates the TRQ to exporting 
countries based on that information. Actual imports are administered by open tender under the 
SBS system, whereby importers and wholesalers offer simultaneous tenders for the buying and 
selling prices of each variety of rice.
70  As a result, the United States, Australia, Thailand, and 
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70 In the Japanese rice SBS, buyers and sellers propose a quantity and price of rice to be exchanged.  The Food 
Agency then examines all bids, choosing those that have the widest margin between the proposed selling and buying 
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China were the major suppliers of rice to Japan in 1998.  The minimum share of SBS mandated 
in the URAA increased from 3 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 1998.  
  Leaf tobacco markets were opened in 1985, but effective control over trade in tobacco 
continues to be exercised by Japan Tobacco Inc. through its monopoly rights as the sole domestic 
producer of tobacco products.  Although private traders can import leaf tobacco, the existing 
monopoly renders all importers of leaf tobacco dependent on its subsequent purchase by the 
Japan Tobacco Inc.  
  Private traders can import dairy products and raw silk, subject to out-of-quota tariffs.  
The Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation collects the tariffs and inspects the quality 
and safety of imports.  As with rice, markups on designated imported dairy products are bound 
by the Country Schedule of Japan.  The bound markups were reduced by 15 percent between 
1995 and 2000.  Domestic sale prices for dairy products and raw silk are based on import prices, 
management costs, and domestic prices for dairy products. 
 
9.5.  Welfare Implications of TRQ Administration 
 
As described in Chapter 2, different methods of allocating import quantities may have 
different implications for consumers, producers, exporters, importers, and for revenue from 
quota.  Contrast the quota auction used for non-STE products with the low price bid used for rice 
and other STE items in Korea.  With an auction, the government maximizes revenue earned from 
the restriction on import quantity, and the specific qualities and product characteristics reflect the 
highest offer.  Note that the outcome in this case is the same as if the tariffs were set at the quota 
auction price.
71  A system that offered imports to the low-price seller would have identical results 
only if there were no product or supplier quality variations within the quota category.  The low-
price bid system encourages minimum quality within a category, not the quality for which 
Korean customers would pay the largest differential.  Thus these two systems may have quite 
different allocative and distributional outcomes. 
Korea seems to pursue multiple objectives in its TRQ administration, while abiding by 
the obligations of its URAA commitments.  The four objectives that we have identified are to: 126 
1) maximize revenue (STEs, markup, quota auction) or rent (license on demand); 
2) maximize farm profit or minimize damage to farmers from a given import quantity; 
3) minimize domestic market price variability; and  
4) maximize social welfare. 
The Trade Policy Review Body for Korean agriculture stated that “ongoing reforms have 
been driven mainly by external requirements, rather than efficiency considerations or consumer 
welfare (WTO, p.3).”  The unstated background condition is that the farm constituency has been 
primary.  Protection policy has continued with implementation of the URAA.  The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry states that “for state trading products, the import season is adjusted with 
flexibility so as to minimize conflicts with domestic production and to mitigate undesirable 
effects of  imports.  Revenues from the operation of STEs and quota auction are added to funds 
for rural projects.  In 1997, revenue from STEs was about 375 billion won ($394 million) and 
quota auction revenue was 25 billion won ($26 million)” (MAF, 1998). 
  As described in Chapter 3, are TRQs administered with commercial considerations on a 
MFN basis?   What are the domestic welfare implications, especially given that domestic issues 
are affected by who gets the quota rent and how alternative methods of TRQ administration 
influence producer and consumer surplus?   As for MFN treatment, Josling, et al. (1996) argue 
that “the test of commercial behavior is unlikely to be conclusive....The solution to this problem 
is likely to rest in the direction of a meshing of national antitrust legislation, international codes, 
and the new provisions on anti-dumping, subsidies, and dispute settlement procedures that have 
now been incorporated into the GATT/WTO.”  The quotation focuses on the STEs, but it can 
also apply to the overall T RQ administration.  From the administrator’s point of view, TRQs 
must be administered transparently and fairly enough to conform to the international rules. 
  Korea’s TRQ practices for rice and oranges serve as interesting cases.  For rice, the 
government’s main objectives have been to minimize impacts on the domestic market and on 
producers.  It was politically important for the government to keep the promise of mitigating the 
adverse impacts of market access.  With the operation of open tender and price bidding, low-
quality rice was imported and used for manufacturing purposes between 1995 and 1998.  
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Imported rice was separated from the domestic table rice market by selling it through public 
auctions to rice manufacturers.  To minimize producer losses, the  government chose the import 
product quality with the minimal cross-price elasticity.  
A welfare analysis on Korean rice quota administration shows that the current system of 
minimizing the import price, by steering imports to the low-quality market, saves  producers 
approximately 1.1 percent of total rice revenue in surplus losses (which was about U.S. $9.6 
billion in the years 1995 to 1997).  It also lowers quota revenue by about 0.9 percent of total rice 
revenue (about $86 million) and reduces consumer surplus gains by 1.3 percent of total rice 
revenue (about $125 million).  Further, the loss of producer surplus that would occur if imports 
were shifted from industrial to table rice would be larger than the gain in quota rents.  Thus, it 
would not be possible to compensate farmers for such a shift using quota rent alone  (Sumner 
and Choi, 2000).  
Korea agreed to a relatively large quantity of citrus imports. Unlike rice, these fruits are 
allowed directly into the domestic market.  Quota rent is allocated directly to the domestic citrus 
industry.  The STE typically opens the tender during the off-season. The local citrus industry 
may consider the maximization of profits from sales of domestic citrus together with rents from 
the off-season sales of imported citrus, by choosing the seasonal (or monthly) import quantity.  
Since the annual quotas are pre-determined, seasonal allocation would be the choice variable.  In 
the longer-run, the expansion of in-quota quantity also could be considered to maximize the joint 
profit.  
 
9.6.  Summary and Conclusion 
  
Import policies in both Japan and Korea seem designed to minimize the impacts of 
imports on domestic markets in which domestic farms also compete, subject, of course, to the 
URAA and the WTO rules.  TRQs are allocated partly through the STEs, but private firms 
import many agricultural products.  
In Korea, TRQ administration follows four paths: 1) import on the basis of first come, 
first served; 2) auctioning import licenses to the highest bidder among private firms; 3 ) license 
on demand; or 4) administration by STEs that were previously responsible for price stabilization 128 
and other intervention measures.  Despite elaborate policies still in place for that limit import 
access, the TRQ contributed significantly to market access and resulted in increased imports into 
Korea.  Japan administers its TRQ through both license on demand and state trading.  
Generally, STEs in Korea and Japan operate as importers of items with large 
international-domestic price gaps and for which  the domestic crop is economically important for 
farmers.  For example, rice, beef, oranges, and other horticultural crops in Korea, and rice, dairy 
products, and leaf tobacco in Japan, are major agricultural commodities imported through STEs.  
The operations of STEs, including purchasing, selling, pricing, and revenue handling have been 
reasonably transparent.  
Our analysis presents that state-traded products show the higher fill rate.  It may seem 
ironic, therefore, that the United States and other exporters have targeted STEs for particular 
scrutiny in the next round of WTO negotiations.  If fill rates are a useful measure of 
administrative barriers to openness, it is other TRQ methods that should be cause for concern.  In 
fact, fill rate is only one part of the story; how the quota is filled is also important.  Our analysis 
and others (de Gorter and Boughner, 2000) show that variation in product type, season, and 
import supplier may all be crucial to understanding fill rates and the degree to which 
liberalization has occurred.  
Welfare implications of specific TRQ allocation methods require individual case studies.  
For example, since the government or STE tends to choose commodity characteristics that 
minimize the effects on prices received by domestic farmers, it is necessary to measure cross-
price elasticities to quantitatively assess how distorting this practice is on international trade.  In 
addition, international political pressure may affect STE behavior more than it would affect 
private importers.  Rice provides an instructive example of the interplay between domestic and 
international politics. 
Both Korea and Japan strictly implemented the URAA commitments on rice.  However, 
several issues arose from how these countries managed quotas.  The STEs of both countries kept 
most imported rice away from domestic consumers.  The Food Agency of Japan allocated rice 
across national suppliers with results roughly mimicking commercial trade.  Japan also used 
markups to keep imported rice away from domestic consumers.  In Korea, rice has been 129 
imported through tenders where the lowest bidder wins.  This results in low-quality rice imports 
from suppliers who were unlikely to have been successful in commercial trade.  
The fill rate of beef TRQ quota after the financial crisis in Korea raises another situation 
that warrants critical consideration.  In 1998, Korea’s quota fill rate was about 47 percent for 
both STE importer and the private traders through the SBS system.  Is this a coincidence of 
commercial outcomes, or a result of internal coordination?  This outcome is difficult to judge and 
may only be resolved through the WTO dispute settlement process.  In general, the concern is 
that private firms may face subtle but effective domestic persuasion to curb imports or behave in 
ways consistent with government policy.  With China joining the WTO, this issue is likely to 
grow in importance.  
In summary, while the TRQs have contributed to increase imports of major agricultural 
products in both Korea and Japan, problems with transparency and commercial considerations in 
administering the TRQs remain.  Access for some commodities seem to be less open than would 
be the case if quota amounts were made available on a commercial basis.  As a result, consumer 
benefits are reduced, and allocation across import suppliers has been affected.  The next round of 
WTO negotiations will face these issues if quantitative market access is to improve in the interim 
while tariffs are reduced.  Subsequent meetings will also face STE issues regarding possible 
manipulations within approved market methods and the ways to encourage market results 
through market mechanisms rather than political considerations.   
10.       Tariff Rate Quota Administration in Canada 
 
10.1.  Introduction 
The purpose of t his paper to review the operation of TRQs in Canada to determine 
whether the TRQ system has worked efficiently and as intended, and to see if any lessons can be 
drawn to help in guiding the next round of WTO negotiations.  The administration of tariff rate 
quotas since 1995 has been undertaken by the Export and Import Controls Bureau (EICB) of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), which also was previously 
responsible for the administration of all import quotas.  In keeping with this continuity in 
jurisdiction, the shift in administration from the previous import quota regime to the current TRQ 
system has been smooth and largely seamless.   
    The firms that receive import allocations (or “quota-shares”) are mostly private, 
with t he post-1995 exception that a state enterprise, the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC), is 
the sole entity that is now granted import permits for butter by the EICB.  Import allocations are 
decided upon annually.  The property right to this quota, year after year, is weak in strictly legal 
terms, but there has been a great deal of continuity in allocations over the years.  There has also 
been considerable variation in the number of holders of import permits or allocations across 
dairy products.  In 1991, for example, there were 237 quota holders for cheese, 33 for ice cream, 
28 for yogurt, 1 for buttermilk, and 1 for evaporated and condensed milk (Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal, 1992). 
  TRQs have been handled in much the same way as were the previous import quotas.  The 
number of quota holders by product has not changed appreciably, although now there is a TRQ 
for butter (held by the CDC) whereas previously there was no specific import quota.  Many 
regulations for obtaining and using the quotas are the same as in the pre-1995 period.  There are 
now twenty-one TRQs in Canada, thirteen of which are discussed under ten categories below.  
(For the details of all 21 TRQs, see Barichello.)  
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A.  Current Procedures 
The procedures that are now followed can be summarized across commodities in terms of 
which firms are likely to be given priority in TRQ allocations and what restrictions must be 
followed.  In the numerous dairy product categories, turkeys and substantially for shell eggs, new 
entrants are discriminated against in Canada, although in some cases like chicken there has been 
a gradual shift away from historical allocations to more open access.  For TRQ allocations, some 
commodities emphasize historical importers and firms with established operations and 
distribution lines.  Sometimes allocations are proportional to production or sales, and sometimes 
an allocation depends upon specific component needs in the production process.  In other cases, 
TRQs are allocated on a first-come, first-served basis.  Almost always there is an adjustment for 
any previous quota left unfilled.  “Use it or lose it” is the rule almost universally applied, with an 
allowance for sufficient prior notification to the administering agency.  There are some size 
restrictions per company for the holding allowed, and some Canadian residency conditions. 
  No financial element is involved in the quota allocation process between quota recipients 
and the administering agency.  In other words, there is no auctioning and no charge for a quota 
allocation. Therefore, it is a policy decision that all quota rents accrue to the recipient of the 
quota.  Some commodity rules do not allow rentals or inter-firm quota transfers, but in most 
cases, quotas can be rented and sold, a change from the situation in 1991. 
B.  Performance of TRQ Regime in terms of fill rates for TRQ 
Another aspect of Canada’s TRQ regime is the extent to which TRQ levels have been 
filled by actual imports.  In general, the percentage is close to one hundred across all categories.  
Therefore, the situation in Canada is generally unlike that in many other country jurisdictions 
where there have been problems of “under-filling” TRQs.  This appears in part to be the natural 
outcome of vesting the TRQs in private hands, outside the farm production side of the dairy 
industry where there is a commercial incentive to import the products in question.  Another 
observation is that there are available import permits, supplementary to the TRQs (and outside 
TRQ access), for those processing firms wishing to import dairy raw materials or products, 
manufacture or further process other dairy products, and export them internationally.  Imports for 
re-export are outside the TRQ system and are not counted as part of Canada’s fill.   132
  We have data for 1995 to 1998 for all twenty-one products or product categories (beef, 
poultry/eggs, dairy products, a close dairy substitute (margarine), and wheat/barley) that fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Export and Import Controls Bureau on the TRQ levels and actual 
quantities imported.  Ten major categories are reviewed below.  Ignoring the open wheat/barley 
category, for 1997 there are only four cases where TRQs are not virtually 100 percent filled: 
yogurt (88 percent filled), heavy cream (63 percent), dry whey (83 percent), and margarine (1.6 
percent).  In 1998, there are two such cases: heavy cream (83 percent), and margarine (6 
percent).  There are no data for liquid milk, for which Canada’s TRQ is 64,500 tons, due to the 
unique means of dealing with this TRQ which allows individual cross-border shoppers to import 
the product subject to the conditions which applied in the base period. 
10.2  Commodity-Specific Detail for Canada’s TRQs 
 
10.2.1  Margarine 
 
Canada had a TRQ of 6348.8 tons of margarine in 1998, rising to 7558 tons in the year 
2000.  In 1998, actual imports under the TRQ were 404.43 tons, indicating a fill rate of only 6.4 
percent.  This might indicate that protective measures are being practiced in the implementation 
of this TRQ to restrict margarine imports, but there are no indications that this is so.  The TRQ is 
administered on a first-come, first-served basis.  Since the establishment of the tariff quota, all 
import requests have been granted.  There are no restrictions on access to these permits, other 
than a 500-ton limit per applicant and that has been raised from 200 tons per applicant.  Further 
increases in that level have not yet been requested.  The only imports are specialty spreads.   
  It is most likely that domestic margarine production in Canada is highly competitive with 
imports such that general margarine imports are not profitable.  This is not surprising, given that 
Canada is an exporter of canola, a major ingredient in margarine production, and that canola is 
available relatively inexpensively.  And all oilseeds can be imported without duty.  Furthermore, 
this low fill rate for the margarine TRQ has persisted over the TRQ period. 
 
 
   133
10.2.2  Shell Eggs 
 
Canada’s import quota under the FTA and NAFTA for table eggs and egg products was 
agreed to at 2.988 percent of the previous year’s domestic production, split among shell eggs 
(1.65 percent), egg products such as frozen, liquid, and further processed eggs (0.71 percent), 
and powdered eggs (0.63 percent).  For 1999, this is equivalent to 13.318 million dozen.  The 
WTO commitment established a TRQ level of 19.66 million dozen for 1999, which were about 5 
percent of the base year.  The higher access level between these two quotas is applied, and since 
1996, this has been the WTO commitment. 
  For both s hell eggs and egg products, the quota is allocated to historical (pre-1974) 
importers of shell eggs and egg products who keep their initial allocation minus any adjustments 
for underuse.  The remainder of the quota for these two categories of imports is allocated to 
registered egg stations (shell eggs) and processors, wholesalers, and distributors (for egg 
products) on the basis of their market share.  The quota for powdered eggs is allocated on a 
modified first-come, first-served basis to registered processed-egg stations and further processors 
that use powdered eggs in their manufacturing processes.  A new allocation for nest-run eggs for 
breaking purposes (i.e., ungraded shell eggs) was introduced in 1996 for the increase in import 
access that occurred under Canada’s larger WTO access commitment.  This is allocated each 
year to registered processed egg stations on a market share basis. 
  This latter allocation has been contentious because all the increased market access agreed 
to under the WTO goes to egg i mports for breaking purposes, with none of the access going to 
the higher-priced shell-egg market.  This is an example of an end-use quota restriction that has 
denied WTO import access to higher-valued portions of the egg market by preserving that 
market for domestic producers, but one that Canada has vigorously defended. 
  A supplementary quota scheme exists for the usual two reasons: to prevent shortages of 
shell eggs or egg products, and to allow imports of eggs to be re-exported in some form.  
Obtaining  this quota for “shortages” involves making an application to the EICB.  It consults 
with the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, the national agency overseeing the activities of the 
provincial producer marketing boards, to determine if a shortage exists or if domestic product is 
available.   134
  The fill rate of Canada’s egg TRQ has been close to or above 100 percent since 1995.  In 
the last two years, 1997 and 1998, the fill rates were 120 percent and 132 percent, respectively, 
on an egg-equivalent basis, although these numbers include supplementary permits. 
10.2.3  Chicken 
The quota level for chicken also differs between the FTA/NAFTA and the WTO.  Under 
NAFTA, the agreed quota level was 7.5 percent of the previous year’s domestic production.  The 
WTO commitment has been 39,844 tons (eviscerated product basis) for both 1997 and 1998.  
Due to continuing growth in the domestic market, the access level under NAFTA has been 
higher and consistently applied since 1995.    
  The method of allocating this quota was revised in 1996, and it has now become quite 
complex.  Three groups receive quota.  First, any firms, regardless of their end use, who 
imported chicken prior to 1979 receive their initial allocation, adjusted for underuse.  Second, 
processors of chicken products that are not on the Import Control List, and who hence must 
compete with imports that have open access to the Canadian market, receive enough quota 
(“FTA quota”) to cover their “needs” but they must satisfy an “activity” test.  Firms in the food 
services sector receive a share (5.6 percent, or 2.7 million kgs.) of the TRQ remaining, 
depending upon the firm’s market share.  Finally, the remainder of the TRQ is split 70:30 
between chicken processors (on the basis of market share) and chicken distributors (on the basis 
of equal shares).  Any firm with a historical share can opt (irreversibly) for a market share or 
equal share, depending upon whether they are a processor or food services firm, or a distributor, 
respectively. There are minimum “threshold levels” for firms to qualify for quota in these 
various categories, with some provision for minimum quota allotments for small operations.  
Firms with historical quota shares are subject to use-it-or-lose-it provisions. 
  Supplemental quota is available under four categories: for shortages in the domestic 
market; imports destined for re-export; firms who wish to test-market new products or processes; 
and to allow further processors to compete with imports.  Requests for quota for shortages are 
made to the EICB, which c onsults with the Chicken Farmers of Canada who determine the 
availability of domestic supplies for that use.  For the other three categories, supplementary 
permits are issued on request.  There are no country reserves within the chicken quotas.   135
  The fill r ates for the chicken TRQ have been at 100 percent since 1995.  In 1997 and 
1998, the fill rates were calculated as 139 percent and 146 percent, respectively, but this was due 
to the fact that NAFTA quota levels are higher than the WTO quota levels used as the basis for 
the TRQ fill rate calculations.  However, it is also true that the market for chicken, particularly 
for further processed categories, has been growing quickly, and supplemental quota allocations 
(above the TRQ) have been common. 
10.2.4  Beef and Veal 
 
Although there is free trade between Canada and the U.S. under the FTA/NAFTA, 
Canada has a TRQ commitment under the WTO.  It has agreed to a TRQ for non-NAFTA 
countries (except Chile) in the amount of 76,409 tons for fresh, chilled, and frozen beef and veal.  
The TRQ does incorporate two country reserves, for New Zealand and Australia, with the New 
Zealand share of the total quota at 29,600 tons and the Australia share at 35,000 tons.  The 
remaining amount, 11,809 tons, is open to all other countries. 
  The beef TRQ is allocated to importers in two pools, one for processors and retailer-
processors, and one for distributors.  The former pool, of 57,307 tons, is allocated based on the 
amount of beef and veal from countries other than the U.S., Mexico, and Chile processed in these 
processors’ own facilities from November 1 to October 31 of the previous year.  The second 
pool, of 19,102 tons, is allocated to distributors based on sales of beef and veal from countries 
other than the U.S., Mexico, and Chile, from November 1 to October 31 of the previous year.  A 
system of supplementary quotas has been implemented to deal with market shortages. 
  The beef and veal TRQ has been filled or virtually so in all years since 1995.  In 1995, 
the fill rate was 113 percent; in 1996, the rate was 97.4 percent; in 1997, it was 117 percent; and 
in 1998, it was 111 percent. 
10.2.5  Fluid Milk 
 
In the case of fluid milk, Canada has a TRQ of 64,500 tons.  This is a global TRQ, 
accessible by any country supplier, but in practice, due to transportation costs, it is likely to be 
filled only from the U.S.  This TRQ is unique in that Canada does not allocate it to any importer, 
but leaves its importation to individual residents of Canada who shop in the U.S. and choose to   136
bring fluid milk home.  Prior to 2000, there was a limit of $20 per resident per trip for 
importation of fluid milk and cream for the personal use of the importer and his household.  But 
that dollar limit has been removed following a WTO Panel finding and Appellate Body finding 
concerning the administration of Canada’s fluid milk TRQ.  Because there is no formal counting 
of fluid milk imported by individual consumers, no published notifications are made and the fill 
rate cannot be verified. 
10.2.6  Powdered Buttermilk 
 
Canada’s WTO commitment in the case of powdered buttermilk is a TRQ of 980 tons 
that has stayed constant over the period from 1995 to date.  Unlike yogurt, however, it is not a 
global commitment; rather, the supplying country is New Zealand for the full TRQ allotment.  
Furthermore, the TRQ is allocated to one historical importer.  The reason for this country reserve 
is the same as for Australia and condensed milk, that when powdered buttermilk was placed on 
the Import Control List, New Zealand was the traditional and sole supplier, and this arrangement 
rolled over into the WTO commitments. 
  The administrative arrangements are standard.  The importer has completely filled this 
TRQ in each year since 1995.  The fill rates have been 1995, 116 percent; 1996, 133 percent; 
1997, 101 percent; and 1998, 120 percent.   
10.2.7  Butter 
 
As one of the most protected of Canada’s dairy products, butter had been on the Import 
Control List for forty years with the Canadian Dairy Commission as the sole importer.  In most 
years prior to 1995, there were no butter imports.  Butter was imported only to relieve temporary 
market shortages.  In 1995 as part of Canada’s UR commitments, a TRQ for butter was initiated, 
with a growth factor built in and with a country reserve for New Zealand.  The level of the TRQ 
for 1995 was 1,964 tons, increasing to 3,274 tons in 2000.  Of this, New Zealand’s reserve 
started at 1,200 tons (61 percent) of the 1,964 tons in 1995, increasing to 2,000 tons of Canada’s 
total 3,274 tons in the year 2000.  The TRQ accounts for less than 3 percent of Canada’s base-
period butter consumption.   137
  This TRQ has been fully allocated by the EICB to the Canadian Dairy Commission, the 
national agency that oversees dairy policy in Canada and which is a state trading e nterprise by 
virtue of its right as the sole importer of butter.  The further allocation of this quota is restricted 
to use only by processors and further processors.  As noted earlier, this allocation of the butter 
quota to the CDC has been contentious, w ith New Zealand complaining that it has received 
lower export prices for its butter than would otherwise be the case. 
  The TRQ has been filled in each year since 1995 with a fill rate of 100 percent in the 
1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 dairy marketing years. 
 
10.2.8  Cheese 
 
A cheese import quota was introduced in 1975 at 50 million pounds, which was reduced 
to 45 million pounds (20,412 tons) in 1978.  There was then an agreement between Canada and 
the European Union for a country reserve.  The current EU share (since 1996) is 66 percent, with 
the remainder open to imports from all other countries.  The TRQ established for cheese under 
the URA was fixed at this same level of 20,412 tons until 1999 and beyond.  In addition, the 
country reserve to the EU was incorporated into the administration of Canada’s cheese TRQ.  In 
the view of some industry experts, the EU reserve produces a result not that different from what 
the pattern of imports would be with open markets, and, therefore, would arguably be consistent 
with GATT 1994 Article 13. 
  A large number of private cheese importers have been actively involved in the cheese 
trade for many years and have retained their rights to annual allotments of this TRQ since 1995. 
These historical importers receive their traditional allotment regardless of where they are in the 
cheese trade, as long as they remain active in it and utilize at least 95 percent of their import 
allocation.  TRQs can be bought and sold among cheese-trade participants and newcomers.  In 
fact, there has been enough trade in these quotas that 72 percent of current cheese quota holders 
have entered the cheese trading system since 1985.  There is also a provision for supplemental 
quotas for market shortages and for re-export, but these allocations are rare. 
  As far as fill rates are concerned, cheese quotas have been filled in each of the four years 
since 1995, at 100 percent until 1997, and at 101 percent in 1998.    138
10.2.9  Ice Cream 
 
This product was named to the Import Control List in 1988, but then placed under a TRQ 
like all other agricultural products in 1995.  The TRQ level was initially 347 tons, rising by 1999 
to 456.6 tons.  It is open to all countries and has no restrictions on the types of importing firms. 
  The TRQ is allocated to historical importers, regardless of their sector of activity, in 
proportion to their historical imports.  Underutilization penalties apply if imports fall below 90 
percent of the importer’s allocation, and such quota is reallocated periodically to those who 
apply, new or traditional importers, without restriction.  
  The fill rate on this quota has been quite high and steadily rising to more than 100 
percent.  In 1995, it was 89 percent; in 1996, it was 99 percent; in 1997, it was 104 percent; and 
in 1998, it was 121 percent, even though there was a growth factor in the TRQ. 
 
10.2.10  Wheat, Barley and Their Products 
 
There are four TRQs under this category, and they are items not under supply 
management industries.  The items are wheat, barley, wheat products, and barley products.  The 
TRQ levels for 1998/99 were: wheat, 190,582 tons; barley, 335,160 tons; wheat products, 
123,557 tons on a grain-equivalent basis; and barley products, 16, 070 tons on a grain-equivalent 
basis.  In addition to these quota levels, under NAFTA provisions, Mexican wheat, barley, and 
their products can still enter at the in-quota tariff rates, even if the TRQ is full.  The same applies 
to the U.S. for wheat and wheat products, and now also for barley and barley products. 
  TRQs for these grains and products are available to importers from the U.S. and Mexico 
on a first-come, first-served basis.  Revenue Canada, Canada’s customs and income tax 
department, keeps track of the volumes, and once the TRQ level is reached, the over-TRQ tariff 
then applies.  I nitially, importers need General Import Permit No. 20, available without 
application, and they pay the in-quota tariff.  After the TRQ is filled, General Import Permit No. 
100 is necessary, covering unlimited imports, but all such imports pay the higher over-TRQ rates 
of duty.  A supplementary access regime covers the situation of market shortages.   139
  Fill rates are quite variable within these grain categories.  The fill rates for the wheat 
TRQ in the four marketing years from 1995/1996 to 1998/1999 were 18, 74, 27, and 33 percent, 
respectively.  For barley, over the same four years, fill rates were 5, 31, 12, and 18 percent.  For 
wheat products, the TRQ was always filled, with fill rates of 114, 100, 110, and 102 percent.  For 
barley products, the fill rates  were 75, 70, 59, and 60 percent.  Despite less than complete fill 
rates, there appears to be no administrative constraint that reduces market access.  Permits are 
free for the asking and no application is required.  Further, access to the TRQs is on a first come, 
first served basis.  The explanation would appear to be that imports of wheat, barley, and barley 
products are often not profitable, particularly for wheat and barley grain, given the 
competitiveness of Canadian grain production and processing. 
 
10.3  Lessons Learned from the Canadian TRQ System 
 
In terms of fill rates, the Canadian record is relatively good.  Most categories are filled or 
nearly so.  When categories have low fill rates, it appears most often to be due to the importation 
being unprofitable.  Further, the rules and procedures for these TRQs appear to be transparent 
and not too difficult to use.  In other words, for this criterion, the Canadian TRQ system appears 
to be working as desired.  Explaining why fill rates are so high is a tall order, but some 
observations can be made.  First, the quotas are usually allocated to private firms that are 
independent and do not profit from domestic production.  There would appear to be strong 
incentives for these firms to fill their TRQs as long as  the underlying economics of importation 
are attractive.  Further, the administration of the regime is quite open, straightforward, and 
predictable, not burdening importers with large costs. 
  In terms of quota allocation, the domestic economy and foreign exporters will gain from 
allocating quotas to those importers who can generate the highest profits from the quotas.  One 
would want to see a minimum of regulations restricting who can gain access to the quota, by 
enterprise characteristics or industry sector (e.g., further processors, or end-uses).  Also, one 
would want to allow new entrants to get into importation readily.  TRQ allocation in important 
parts of the Canadian system has done little to help accessibility by often relying on allocation to 
historical importers.  But some changes are now beginning to give more access to newcomers.   140
  The most effective means of meeting an objective of open access is to allow quotas to be 
bought and sold on a permanent basis and for there to be easy short-term rentals  (buying and 
selling the quotas for that import year).  The advantage of allowing this kind of transferability is 
that it makes the initial allocation largely irrelevant for achieving an efficient quota system.  On 
this score, Canada has improved its regime by allowing the quotas to trade in most categories.  It 
is important that this trade be allowed to continue and that implementing regulations protect sale 
and rental activity in all TRQ categories.  (This does not apply in those cases where quotas are 
not constraining, such as when they are allocated on a first-come, first-served basis.)  This is a 
most effective means of getting quotas into the hands of the most efficient importers.  Then the 
initial allocation can be done simply to transfer income to desired groups (e.g., further 
processors), and the initial allocations can become irrelevant for keeping the regime operating 
efficiently.  Allocating quotas by auctions becomes less an issue of efficiency for the regime and 
more a question of how to split up the quota rents. 
  Regarding the objective of keeping the administration of the quota system efficient, this 
calls for keeping costs to the importer of accessing quota as low as possible, keeping 
transparency high, and keeping uncertainty from rule changes, additions, or interpretations as 
low as possible.  Across the twenty-one TRQ categories, Canada’s regime appears reasonably 
successful in meeting this objective.  There are still many gains from further simplifying quota 
administration.  Some of the poultry allocations seem particularly good candidates for further 
simplification.  In fact, it would seem unnecessary to have  any rules governing quota 
administration other than that the quota or permit is needed to undertake importation, and that the 
quota must be used within the quota period.  Further gains in domestic efficiency can be arrived 
at by changes in system design.  One example already noted is to allow quota rental (within the 
year) and another is to permit quota to be held  permanently (the right  to be given the annual 
import permits each year, as for farm quotas).  This allows the flexibility of annual quota holding 
adjustment, in case of excess demand or your inability in one year to completely use your quota, 
and it provides the certainty of knowing you will be receiving your import quota each year. 
   It may be desirable on equity grounds to spread the quota rents more widely than is 
presently practiced.  This could be achieved with auctions, or for a charge to be levied on quota 
recipients each year.  Canada has not gone any distance down this path in quota administration.   141
  In terms of more international issues, there is the question of targeting TRQ supplier 
countries with the use of country reserves.  Canada does have five of these (one-fourth  of all 
TRQs), but does not appear to consider the existence of such reserves a policy objective.  These 
reserves do not seriously affect the operation of Canada’s regime, do not contribute to quota 
under-fill, and are valuable only to the recipient exporter.  Another issue is the role of State 
Trading Enterprises.  Canada has only one case, butter, in which the TRQ is allocated to the 
Canadian Dairy Commission.  One worry about such a role for STEs is that they may have 
weaker incentives to fill the quota.   But the evidence in Canada is that the STE monopoly 
importer is fully utilizing its butter TRQ. 
Implications for the negotiations 
From this review, the primary lesson for dealing with TRQ administration in the next 
round is to require that TRQ levels are  actually imported where there is a market demand for 
such imports.  Penalties should be imposed on governments (or their implementing agencies) for 
failure to allocate quotas to importers, allowing them to be guided by private economics as to 
how much to i mport.  If the importer is not an independent private firm (e.g., a STE), additional 
penalties may be necessary to induce them to import their TRQ import levels, assuming there is a 
private demand for those imports. 
It is not clear why any additional WTO rules should be adopted in this area, other than to 
ensure meeting privately profitable TRQ levels as discussed above.  From the Canadian 
experience above, it would not seem necessary to require quota allocation to private firms, to 
disallow allocations to  STEs, or to require the auctioning of quotas.  Most of these additional 
rules could contribute to filling TRQs and reducing the economic cost of quota administration 
and system operations.  But if we can deal directly with the filling of TRQs as suggested above, 
such other rules are either redundant or are primarily matters for domestic policy.  142
11.  The Case of Australia and New Zealand facing TRQs
72 
 
11.1  Introduction 
 
Australia and New Zealand, as leading members of the Cairns Group, are committed to 
achieving reductions in the distortions remaining, post-Uruguay Round, in international markets 
for agricultural and food products.  TRQs are but one element of the several distortions that 
remain.  Over the past fifteen years, each country has reduced its support to the agriculture 
sector.  In the period 1986-88, as measured by the percentage Producer Support Estimate 
(%PSE), support stood at 7 percent for Australia and 11 percent for New Zealand compared with 
34 percent for Canada, 46 percent for the EU, 65 percent for Japan, 26 percent for the U.S. and 
the average for the OECD countries of 41 percent (OECD 1999, Table III.5).  By 1998, the 
corresponding figures for Australia and New Zealand were 7 percent and 1 percent, respectively, 
and for the other countries listed were 16 percent for Canada, 45 percent for the EU, 63 percent 
for Japan, 22 percent for the U.S. and 37 percent for the OECD average.  Neither Australia nor 
New Zealand uses export subsidies as a way of increasing market share and boosting farm 
incomes, although state trading enterprises are an important feature of the international 
marketing for some products, e.g., wheat and sugar in Australia and dairy products in New 
Zealand. 
  On the import side, both countries introduced Tariff Rate Quotas on a very small number 
of products, having earlier removed tariffs altogether on imports of some agricultural products, 
e.g., the Australian tariff on sugar was removed in 1997.  Australia introduced TRQs for cheese 
and for tobacco; New Zealand introduced them on imports of fresh apples, fresh pears and hop 
cones (WTO 1998, Attachment pp. 1 and 16).  With the exception of the TRQ on cheese, the 
method of administration is by applied tariff rate.  For cheese, the method of administration is by 
historical imports with licenses tradable amongst holders.  Because the statutory marketing 
arrangements in Australia for tobacco are being restructured and the effective rate of assistance is 
due to fall from 60 percent in 1997-98 to 2 percent in 1999-2000 (Productivity Commission 
                                                 
72 Notes provided by Ron Sandrey and Rowena Hume of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade contributed substantially to this chapter and so are gratefully acknowledged.  However, they are not 
responsible for any remaining errors. 
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1999, p. 45), and because tobacco is relatively unimportant in terms of the value of imports, it 
will not be considered further. 
  Given the small number of TRQs in place, the main emphasis here will be on the TRQs 
which impede or which in some instances appear to enhance exports from these two countries.  
For Australia, the principal products in terms of the value of exports are beef, dairy, sugar, wheat 
and wool.  TRQs are only important for exports of beef, dairy and sugar.  However, for particular 
products, e.g., sheep meat, in certain markets, e.g., the EU, TRQs are important in providing 
access to the market that would not otherwise exist.  The country-specific allocation to Australia 
by the EU for sheep meat was 18.65 thousand tonnes (carcass weight) (ABARE, p. 40) which 
amounted to 13.6 percent of total exports of sheep meat during the period 1995 to 1997.  In the 
case of New Zealand, the focus will be restricted essentially to exports of dairy products. 
 




  The basic details about the Australian TRQ for cheese are as follows.  The minimum 
access commitment provided in the WTO schedule was 11.5 thousand tonnes for 1995 and 2000 
(ABARE 1999, p. 38).  The quantities to be imported have not been allocated to particular 
countries.  The in-quota tariff is a specific tariff of A$96 per tonne for both years;  the out-of-
quota tariff is A$1.22/kg or A$1220 per tonne. The indicative world price in 1995-96 was 
A$3,000/tonne thus giving  ad valorem equivalent rates for in-quota and out-of-quota of 3 percent 
and 41 percent, respectively. 
  Consumption of cheese in the period 1986-88 was 135.0 thousand tonnes and gross 
imports were 19.5 thousand tonnes, thus giving a gross imports-to-consumption ratio of 14.4 
percent (ABARE 1990, p. 57).   With imports currently (1997-98) at 31.2 thousand tonnes 
(ABARE 1998, p. 77) and base-period consumption at 131.2 thousand tonnes, the imports-to-
consumption ratio is 23.8 percent, i.e., well in excess of the required minimum access 
commitment.  With current (1996-97) consumption now at the considerably higher level of 197.8 
thousand tonnes (ABARE 1998, p. 72), the ratio of gross imports-to-consumption is still in 
excess of the commitment at 15.8 percent.   144
  The fill rates for the Australian cheese TRQ were 98 percent in 1995, 95 percent in 1996 
and 79 percent in 1997 (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 1).  Over these three years, the domestic 
production of cheese rose from 234 thousand tonnes to 285 thousand tonnes (ABARE 1998, p. 
80) which may partly explain the fall in the fill rate. 
Export Markets 
  The most important agricultural exports by value in recent years (the average of years 
1995-96 to 1997-98) have been wool (A$4.2 million), wheat (A$3.8 million), beef (A$2.3 
million), dairy products (A$1.6 million) and sugar (A$1.5 million) (ABARE 1998, pp. 221, 205, 
148, 75 and 197, respectively).  The two principal markets for wool are China and the EU.  The 
former is not a member of the WTO and the latter has no TRQ for wool.  The main markets for 
wheat over these last three years have been Indonesia (15 percent share), Iran (13 percent share), 
India and Japan (8 percent share), Egypt (7 percent share) and China and Pakistan (6 percent 
share).  Of these countries, Indonesia, India and Pakistan are recent Members of the WTO (1995) 
and have no TRQ for wheat, while Iran and China are not members of the WTO.  Egypt has no 
TRQ for wheat and Japan has a TRQ that is administered through a state trading enterprise, 
namely, the Japanese Food Agency, and the quotas are not country  specific.  The in-quota tariff 
is zero but there is a mark-up of 53 yen/kg in 1995, decreasing by 1.3 yen/kg to 2000 (ABARE, 
p. 37).  The out-of-quota tariff is 55 yen/kg.  On an indicative world price of 25,000 yen/tonne, 
the ad valorem rate is 220 percent.  The fill rates in 1995 and 1996 were each 100 percent (WTO 
1998, Attachment p. 13).  Hence, TRQs are not a significant feature, either as a help or as a 
hindrance, to Australian exports of wheat which are conducted by the now privately owned state 
trading enterprise AWB (International) (formerly the statutory marketing board, the Australian 
Wheat Board).  
  The two most important export markets for Australian beef by value are Japan (54 
percent share over the period 1995-1997) and the U.S. (19 percent share) (ABARE 1998, p. 148).  
The corresponding volume shares were 41 percent and 27 percent, respectively (ABARE 1998, 
p. 147).  As a result of the tariffication of the Japanese beef import quota in 1991, there is no 
TRQ in place (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 13).  However, the U.S. does have a TRQ which, 
according to the WTO (1998, Attachment p. 28), is administered on a first-come, first-served   145
basis.  The access provided for 1995 and 2000 was to be 656.6 thousand tonnes (ABARE 1999, 
p. 36).  The in-quota tariff in both years is US$0.044/kg or US$44/tonne, and the out-of-tariff 
rate is 31% for 1995 and 26.4% for 2000.  The indicative world price for beef in 1995-96 was 
US$1,800/tonne, implying an  ad valorem rate of 2.44 percent for the in-quota tariff.  The fill rate 
for 1995 was 66 percent while in 1996, it had fallen to 59 percent (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 
28).  Between 1994 and 1995, beef production in the U.S. rose from 11.2 million tonnes to 11.6 
million tonnes (i.e., by 3.6%) which may partly explain the fall in the fill rate as imports fell 
from 1.07 million tonnes (carcass weight) to 0.95 million tonnes (ABARE 1998, p. 144).  
According to ABARE (1999, p. 40), the U.S. allocates its beef TRQ to specific countries of 
which the Australian volumes were to be 378.2 million tonnes (assumed carcass weight) in 1995 
and 2000.  The actual volume in 1995 was 312.5 million tonnes (converted from a shipped 
weight basis of 210.7 thousand tonnes (ABARE 1998, p. 147) at 1.48), a fill rate of 83 percent.  
Australian exporters require accreditation with the USDA and an export license from the state 
trading enterprise Meat and Livestock Australia Ltd.  
  For exports of Australian dairy products, the most important constituents by value are 
cheese, skim milk powder, whole milk powder and butter.  For cheese, the dominant export 
destination is Japan with a volume share of 47 percent over the years 1995-96 to 1997-98 
(ABARE 1998, p. 75).  These imports are not subject to a TRQ (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 13).  
For skim milk powder, the four most important export markets are the Philippines (24 percent 
share by volume), Malaysia (16 percent), Japan (12 percent) and Thailand (11 percent).  With the 
exception of Japan, none of these countries has a TRQ in place (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 21-
22, 15 and 27, respectively).  Japan has two TRQs for skim milk powder, one for school lunches 
and the other for all other purposes, both administered by license on demand (WTO 1998, 
Attachment p. 13).  The in-quota tariff rate is 0 percent (or 35 percent  if sugar is added, a 
technical tariff) for 1995 and 2000 (ABARE 1999, p. 37);  the out-of-quota rate for both years is 
396 yen/kg which, at an indicative world price of 243,000 yen/tonne, is an  ad valorem rate of 
163 percent.  The fill rates for the first  category were 58 percent and 64 percent in 1995 and 
1996, respectively, but only 49 percent and 40 percent respectively for the second category.  As 
far as whole milk powder is concerned, Malaysia and Thailand are the important export markets 
with average volume shares of 14 percent and 9 percent, respectively, over the period 1995-96 to 
1997-98 (ABARE 1998, p. 75).  Neither country appears to have a TRQ in place for this product   146
(WTO 1998, Attachment p. 15 and 27, respectively).  Finally for dairy products, Thailand is the 
dominant export destination for butter and butterfat with a volume share of 12 percent (ABARE 
1998, p. 75).  There is no TRQ in place. 
  For Australian exports of bulk raw sugar, the main export destinations (by volume) over 
the period 1995-96 and 1996-97 were Canada (18 percent), Japan (17 percent), South Korea (16 
percent) and Malaysia (15 percent) (ABARE 1998, p. 197).  The share destined for the U.S. was 
4 percent and that for the EU was zero.  Given the prices available in the U.S. market, this is a 
more important market than the volume share would suggest.  In 1998, the average monthly 
world market price of raw sugar was US9.68 cents/lb compared with the U.S. domestic raw 
sugar price of US22.06 cents/lb (http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/1999/november/prices.pdf).  
The in-quota tariff for 1995 and 2000 is US1.460 cents/kg with a out-of-quota tariff of US39.85 
cents/kg in 1995 and US33.87 cents/kg in 2000 (ABARE 1999, p. 36).  The  ad valorem 
equivalent rates are 5 percent and 121 percent, respectively.  Also of note is the EU’s allocation 
of its TRQ on a selected country basis (largely because of the Sugar Protocol of the Lomé 
Agreement).  Australia has no share (ABARE 1999, p. 40), hence the zero exports. 
  Of the major destinations for Australian sugar by volume, Canada, Japan and South 
Korea have no TRQ in place.  Malaysia does have one that is administered through a license-on-
demand basis (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 15).  The fill rates were 0 percent and 13 percent in 
1995 and 1996, respectively.  In the case of the U.S. TRQ, the allocation is on a first-come, first-
served basis (WTO 1998, Attachment p. 28), although there are some country-specific 
assurances (ABARE 1999, p. 40).  Australia was given a minimum import share of 8.3 percent.  
For U.S. fiscal year 1999/2000, the import volume from Australia has been set at 87.4 thousand 
tonnes (http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/1999/november/trq.pdf).  This is slightly less than the 
actual volume of imports in fiscal year 1999 of 88.1 thousand tonnes but much less than imports 
of 260.5 thousand tonnes in fiscal year 1996. 
(http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/1999/november/imports.pdf). 
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11.3  New Zealand 
 
  In 1997/98, the top four markets for New Zealand cheese were Japan (22.6% by value), 
the European Union (Belgium and the U.K. 17.8%), the United States (9.1%) and Australia 
(8.6%) (New Zealand Dairy Board 1999, Table 5.5).  Access to all of these markets, with the 
exception of Japan, is controlled by TRQs.  For 1999, the U.S. cheese quota is 140.5 thousand 
tonnes, of which New Zealand has a country-specific quota of 21.7 thousand tonnes (MFAT 
1999).  Of this New Zealand quota, 7,300 tonnes is for Cheddar, 2,000 is for American cheese, 
1,000 tonnes is for low-fat cheese and 11,322 is for other types of cheese.  It has been estimated 
(Schluep 1999, Table B -1) that for all types of cheese imported by the U.S. in 1997, the quota 
rents were US$ 186.7 million of which New Zealand gained US$ 25.4 million.  However, this 
share of the total disguises the heterogeneous nature of the cheeses imported.  Of the nine types 
classified, New Zealand had substantial rental rates on only three.  These were “Other cheese 
NSPF” with a 50.5 percent share, “Cheddar” with a 80.5 percent share and “American other than 
cheddar” with a 69.0 percent share. 
  There are also TRQs facing New Zealand exports to the U.S. of butter, anhydrous milk 
fat (AMF), skimmed milk powder (SMP), and whole milk powder (WMP).  For butter, the TRQ 
generated in 1997 rents of US$ 3.8 million of which New Zealand had a 55 percent share.  For 
SMP and WMP, the rents amounted to US$ 1.7 million and US$ 1.3 million, respectively, which 
represented shares of 72 percent and 53 percent, respectively.  For AMF and casein, the U.S. is 
the most important export destination, accounting for 11.9 percent and 50.1 percent, respectively 
(NZDB 1999, Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively).  Casein is one of the very few dairy products that 
are not subject to a TRQ in the U.S. market, the others being whey protein concentrates and milk 
protein concentrates. 
  The administration of TRQs in the U.S. is complex.  For example, dairy product imports 
from New Zealand are subject to both country-specific TRQs but also MFN tariffs.  The TRQs 
for cheese, butter, AMF, SMP and WMP are administered through import licenses while other 
products subject to TRQs enter on a first-come, first-served basis.  The import licenses are 
allocated on either an historical holding basis or they are given to importers nominated by the 
exporting country.  Not the entire country-specific quota for New Zealand is under the control of   148
the New Zealand Dairy Board, i.e., other importers are also given licenses to import.  The 
licenses which are given to the New Zealand Dairy Board are held by its U.S. subsidiary, NZMP 
Cheese Ingredients, and, hence, the New Zealand Dairy Board collects the quota rents on only 
that proportion of licenses which it controls.  However, when New Zealand dairy  products enter 
the U.S. through other importers, then the price is a negotiated one between the Board, as the 
single-desk seller, and the importer, and the quota rents are shared between the two.  Exports to 
the U.S. under the MFN quota license arrangements for butter, AMF, SMP and WMP are 
trivially small, a maximum of 57 tonnes per year per license, and are allocated through an annual 
lottery. 
  Calculating the quota rents generated in the U.S. market for the New Zealand Dairy 
Board, by multiplying exports  by the difference between the U.S. wholesale price and the cif 
import price, will overstate these rents because some of the imports go through firms other than 
the New Zealand Dairy Board’s subsidiaries.  The estimates of New Zealand’s quota rents in the 
U.S. market in 1997 for all dairy products were US$ 49.5 million (Schluep 1999, Table B -1).  
This represents an upper bound because of the leakage in the control that the Dairy Board is able 
to exercise. 
  In some respects, the import arrangements for New Zealand dairy products destined for 
the EU market are more straightforward than those for the U.S.  Since Britain joined the then 
European Economic Community in 1973, New Zealand has had preferential access to the United 
Kingdom (and EU) markets for butter a nd cheese.  With the implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, these arrangements were continued through country-specific 
TRQs for New Zealand.  For butter, the quota of 76.7 thousand tonnes represents 4 percent of the 
EU butter market  and it attracts a specific tariff of 869 euros/tonne (an  ad valorem rate of 
approximately 50 percent).  The out-of-quota tariff is 2000 euros/tonne or an ad valorem rate of 
approximately 125 percent. 
  For cheese, there are two quotas: one of 4,000 tonnes f or cheese for processing and a 
second of 7,000 tonnes on Cheddar cheese.  The in-quota tariff is 170.6 euros/tonnes and the out-
of-quota tariff is 1765 euros/tonne.  These represent  ad valorem rates of approximately 10 
percent and 100 percent, respectively.   149
  The administrative arrangements for these TRQs are as follows.  The EU requires 
matching licenses, i.e., its import licenses have to be matched by the award of export licenses by 
the exporting country, in this case by New Zealand.  Imports of New Zealand butter and cheese 
by the EU require the importer to have an IMA1 certificate (Import Monitoring Arrangement) 
and an import license. The IMA1 certificate can only be obtained from the New Zealand Dairy 
Board.  The import license for butter has to be obtained from the UK Intervention Board for 
Agricultural Produce and for cheese from the corresponding authorities in the Member countries.  
Thus, the New Zealand Dairy Board has more control of the process in the EU market than it has 
in the U.S. market. 
  The  New Zealand Dairy Board is a monopolist with respect to the country-specific TRQ 
on butter and cheese destined for the EU market, i.e., it is a monopolist in the license market.  
But its control is even greater than that.  In the export market for dairy products, the New 
Zealand Dairy Board is also a single-desk seller.  As far as the EU market is concerned, the 
Board sells dairy products to its EU subsidiaries at the EU market price as well as selling to other 
EU importers at negotiated prices.  Given these arrangements, there is an incentive for New 
Zealand to fill its quota because EU prices are much higher than prices in the highly distorted 
world market.  In this case, unlike that in the U.S., the Dairy Board can capture most (all) of the 
rents because  of the control which it can exercise in both the license and the product markets.  
These rents have been estimated to be US$ 90.0 million for butter and US$ 16.1 million for 
cheese in 1997 (Schluep 1999, Table B -1).  The respective fill rates were 80 percent and 86 
percent. 
  Therefore, in the EU market, the quota rent captured by the New Zealand Dairy Board 
and, hence, New Zealand dairy farmers because of the link between the Board and internal milk 
and dairy prices, may be reasonably approximated by multiplying the import volume by the 
difference between the internal EU price and the world market cif price inclusive of the tariff. 
  There are two aspects of the quota rents acquired by the NZDB that need to be explored 
in more detail.  The first aspect is what does the Board do with the rents:  For example, does it 
pass these back to dairy processors and, hence, indirectly to milk producers, or does it use them 
to buy subsidiary companies in importing countries, or does it use them to advertise New   150
Zealand dairy products in some or all of its export markets?  The second aspect is, if the prices 
which New Zealand dairy producers receive for their product is increased by receipt of part of 
the quota rents, then what is the supply response and what are the additional export volumes then 
achieved?  In that sense, the quota rent acts in the same way as a production or an export 
subsidy.  Clearly, there are no simple answers to these questions and the research necessary to 
answer each goes well beyond the scope of this chapter.  However, it should be obvious from the 
institutional detail provided for New Zealand that a combination of TRQs in important export 
markets, together with a single-desk export seller of the product and administrator of licenses has 
a greater potential to distort markets than envisaged by those who, during the Uruguay Round, 
supported the introduction of TRQs as a means of improving market access.  TRQs under perfect 
and imperfect competition have quite different effects on markets.  In the case  of Australia, the 
role played by single desk exporters is less significant because wheat does not face substantial 
TRQs, although this is not true for sugar exports to the U.S. 
 
11.4  Conclusions 
 
  The existence of TRQs remains one of the important distortions in international markets 
for agricultural products.  For Australia and New Zealand, the issue of market access is an 
important one.  Neither country has made much use of TRQs, the former having two (cheese and 
tobacco) and the latter three (apples, pears and hop cones).  To the extent that each country has 
been granted country-specific import quotas by importing countries, it might be argued that 
guaranteed access would be better than the alternative of no TRQ.  However, it is apparent from 
the descriptions provided above that the arrangements facing each of these exporting countries in 
the major markets of the EU, Japan and the U.S., as well as in important Asian markets, carry 
administrative costs for the exporter because of the licensing arrangements  in many instances.  
These costs must go some way towards offsetting the additional revenues generated through 
quota rents. 
  Whether the net economic benefits to Australia and New Zealand of the market access 
provided by TRQs are positive is very difficult to determine.  In some cases, e.g., New Zealand 
shipments of dairy products and sheep meat to the EU, there were pre-existing arrangements 
which guaranteed access, while in other cases, the uncertainty created by quota allocated on a   151
first-come, first-served basis, e.g., sugar imports to the U.S., increases the costs of trade.  For 
certain, any estimate of quota rents calculated by multiplying the export volume by the 
difference between the internal and world price inclusive of tariff will overstate these n et benefits 
because of the administrative costs incurred by the exporter and because of the distortions 
created by the alternative methods of allocating the quota.  To offset these possible additional 
costs of exporting, for certain products there may be some additional gains that are captured by 
the single export desk activities of the Queensland Sugar Corporation and by the New Zealand 
Dairy Board.  The measurement of the size of such gains and the supply response induced 
through the passing back of part of the rents has not been attempted.   152
 
12.  The 1999 WTO Panel Report on The EU's Common Market Organization for 
Bananas  
12.1  Introduction 
The WTO Panel Report in 1999 found the EU’s Common Market Organization for Bananas 
(CMOB) in violation of WTO rules regarding country reserves and import licensing procedures.  The 
CMOB TRQ system originated with the Single European Act of 1993, which led to a common market 
policy in bananas. The objective of this chapter is to examine the administration problems plaguing the 
CMOB TRQ system and to assess the implications for the TRQ schemes in the URAA. 
The Original Policy 
Prior to the CMOB in 1993, no uniform EU policy on bananas existed, with policies 
ranging from free trade to very protectionist regimes.  Two major policy changes characterized 
the original CMOB: a  deficiency payment system for EU banana producers (to compensate 
farmers for the new policy) and a  TRQ scheme  with import licenses.   A quota for African, 
Caribbean and Pacific State (ACP) countries was distinguished from a Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) quota.  Traditional ACP exporters received a fixed quota of 857,700 tons of bananas with  
an in-quota-tariff of zero.  The MFN quota of 2 million tons was for bananas imported from 
either third countries or non-traditional imports from ACP countries
73.  
A distinctive feature of the banana TRQ was the distribution of import licenses.  Except 
for a small share for market newcomers (3.5% of imports), licenses were allocated to traders 
depending on the origin of the bananas.  So-called “Category A” operators had marketed dollar 
bananas and received 66.5% of the licenses. “Category B” operators had marketed EU/ACP 
bananas and received 30% of the import licenses.  The allocation of licenses within the two 
major categories A and B was further regulated according to functions of the firms in the 
distribution channel.  The licenses were tradable in most instances. 
 
                                                 
73  These are either exports by ACP countries that had not exported to the EU before the introduction of the CMOB 
or quantities exceeding the pre-1991 peak imports by traditional suppliers.   153
The Framework Agreement 
The CMOB was contentious from the beginning, with the GATT Panel in 1994 
concluding that the CMOB was inconsistent with various GATT rules [ THAGESEN/MATTHEWS 
(1997)]. Consequently, the EU signed the Framework Agreement on Bananas (BFA) in 1994 
with four of the five countries that had initiated this GATT Panel.  The BFA introduced country-
specific allocations for Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Nicaragua, taken from the global 
MFN quota. These four countries were allowed to issue export certificates for up to 70 percent of 
their national quotas, better: quota shares.  One stated goal of this arrangement was to alter the 
distribution of quota rents partly towards the exporting countries. The remaining share was 
mainly supplied by Latin American exporters not participating in the agreement, such as 
Ecuador, Panama, Honduras and Guatemala and a few ACP countries.  Among importers, there 
was still the same restrictive division of the licenses according to operator categories and activity 
functions. 
Recent Reforms 
After the introduction of the Framework Agreement, a dispute settlement procedure in  the 
WTO was initiated in September 1995.  The Panel concluded in March 1997 that the CMOB is 
inconsistent with several GATT and GATS rules.  The EU had, until the end of 1998, to reform 
the policy. This Panel ruled not only on the distribution of quota shares to particular exporting 
countries, but also on the details of the complicated licensing regime, in particular on operator 
categories and activity functions as well as on GATS issues.  Operator categories and activity 
functions were altogether abolished along with export licenses.  The Commission now 
distinguishes between traditional and new market participants only, based on banana imports in 
1994-96.  
In January 1999, a new banana Panel was set up in order to investigate whether Ecuador’s 
complaints that the modified European policy was still inconsistent with WTO rules were 
justified or not. In April 1999, the Panel decision was again unfavorable for the EU.  Although 
tariff preferences of ACP countries according to the Lomé provisions were accepted, s pecial 
treatment with respect to the allocation of country reserves was found not to be covered by the 
Lomé waiver, so that the requirements of Art. XIII applied.  The Panel recommended an either   154
an applied tariff regime or a combination of tariffs and quotas combined with an overhaul of the 
import-licensing scheme.  To this date, no political consensus with all parties involved has been 
found. In November 1999, the EU proposed to return to a tariff-only policy in a two-step plan 
[EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999)]: First, a TRQ system would remain in place but be replaced, no 
later than January 1, 2006, by a tariff-only system. The transitional TRQ regime would maintain 
the existing MFN quota of 2,553,000 tons with a tariff rate of 75 Euro per ton.  ACP countries 
could import tariff-free within this quota.  The European Commission favors a licensing system 
based on historical trade, if an agreement with the trading partners can be found. Otherwise, a 
first-come first-served rule is suggested. 
In addition, a new quota of 850,000 tons would be introduced, similar in size to the old 
tariff-free quota for traditional imports from ACP countries. This quota would now be open for 
all exporters, but a tariff preference of 275 Euro/ton would be given to ACP bananas. The idea 
for allocating this quota is to apply a striking-price tender system. 
12.2  Administration of TRQs under the CMOB 
The CMOB TRQ is a complicated system of country-specific and MFN quotas with 
differing tariffs, which have changed many times in the 1990s.  While TRQs are not an absolute 
limit to imports, the out-of-quota tariff is so high that out-of-quota imports are basically zero.  
The EU’s country-specific
1) TRQ for traditional imports from ACP countries
2) was created in the 
context of the Lomé Convention.  The ACP quota of 857,000 tons was the sum of the maximum 
exports of each country prior to 1991.  The intent was, according to EC Regulation 404/93, to 
“[maintain] traditional trade patterns as far as possible”.  First, the MFN quota was essentially a 
global quota open to all countries.   As the CMOB evolved, a growing share of this quota was 
allocated to specific exporting countries [ EUROPEAN  COMMISSION (1998)].  This quota grew 
from annual 2.0 million tons (mt) in 1993 to 2.1 mt in 1994 and is 2.2 mt from 1995 until today. 
While the EU considered these quotas as different regimes, the WTO Panel found in 1997 
that separate regimes are WTO-inconsistent. Imports from ACP countries were generally duty-
                                                 
1) Only in the most recent version of the CMOB of 1999 country-specific allocations were given up and 
replaced by a global quota.     155
free as long as they were in-quota.  The in-quota tariff for imports from third countries was 
originally 100 and later 75 ECU.  ACP countries were also granted a tariff preference of 100 
ECU on the much higher out-of-quota tariff (Table 12.1). 
 
Table 12.1: The CMOB 1993-present: An overview  
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a = Including non-traditional; b = green ECU; c = The tariffs for traditional ACP imports apply also to non-
traditional imports from ACP countries within the MFN quota; d = Will be reduced to 680 ECU/t as negotiated in 
the Uruguay-Round. 
Source: Own compilations based on different publications of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION; 
THAGESEN AND MATTHEWS (1997); WTO (1997b); WTO (1999). 
 
The EU retained the option to reduce or increase the overall MFN quota based on future demand 
estimates.  In practice, only the second possibility was used by introducing an “Autonomous 
Quota” and “Hurricane Licenses”. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2) Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Madagascar, Somalia, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname.   156
Hurricane Licenses 
Over-quota imports are additional imports at the in-quota tariff, the application of which is left to 
the discretion of the importing country [ BOUGHNER/DE  GORTER (1999)].  Hurricane Licenses 
made such over-quota imports with respect to the MFN quota share possible. They were 
introduced with the aim to compensate importers who marketed traditional ACP bananas for 
supply shortfalls due to “exceptional circumstances” like hurricanes [ EUROPEAN  COMMISSION 
(1994)].  Even though this option was used several times between 1994 and 1996, the total 
amount of 281,605 t is negligible.  More importantly, only category B operators could import 
additional quantities from profitable Latin American sources.  It is no surprise that this 
preferential treatment was criticized by the WTO. 
Country-specific allocations  
The Framework Agreement introduced country-specific shares of the MFN TRQ share. In 
addition to proportional shares granted to the Latin American signatories, 90,000 t were reserved 
for non-traditional imports from ACP countries. Since this allocation was found to be WTO-
inconsistent (see below), it was revised in the 1999 version of the CMOB (see Table 2).  
The Autonomous Quota 
The Autonomous Quota was introduced in 1995 in order to take account of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden joining the EU. Despite its name
1) and though its quantity of 353,000 t was not included 
in the WTO schedule, we do not consider these imports as “over-quota”. The reason is that it has 
effectively been a constant increase of the MFN quota, for which all the administrative 
provisions of the latter equally apply. 
  The actual country-specific shares varied significantly from year to year. The reason is 
that quantities that could not be supplied by a Latin American BFA signatory were reallocated to 
another one. This option of EC Regulation 478/95 was used repeatedly.  
 
 
                                                 
1) The term “Autonomous Quota” was not officially used until the introduction of the newest CMOB in 
1999 [BLE (1999)].   157
Table 12.2: Country Specific Allocation of the MFN Quota (t) 
Source  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Costa Rica  .  638,923  618,593  600,920  677,961  653,823 
Colombia  .  690,801  571,009  563,812  539,287  587,996 
Nicaragua   .  .  79,307  52,516  .  . 
Venezuela  .  19,113  37,010  51,361  51,361  . 
Panama  .  .  .  .  .  402,353 
Ecuador  .  .  .  .  .  668,120 




.  1,269,928  1,229,521  1,194,392  1,194,392  240,748 
Total Third 
Countries  .  2,618,765  2,535,440  2,463,000  2,463,000  . 
Total ACP
b  .  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  . 
Total  2,2,171,400 2,708,765  2,625,440  2,553,000  2,553,000  2,553,000 
a = Based on the quantities of 1994 (2,100,000 t). b = Dominican Republic and non-traditional 
Imports 
 from ACP countries. 
Source: Own compilation from EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 
 
12.3 Trade and Fill-Rates of the Quotas 
The introduction of TRQs does not necessarily lead to increased market access.  Fill-rates 
reflect the inefficiencies caused by administrative rules and differences in costs between 
countries. It is therefore necessary to analyze fill-rates in detail in order to draw conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the trade policy instrument. Three main trends become apparent from  
Table 12.3. 
  The introduction of country-specific quota shares, combined with the already existing 
operator categories and activity functions, led to a fragmentation of imports.  This may have 
made country-specific imports  less attractive.  Resulting quantities might have been too small to 
cover risks and fixed costs.  Country-specific allocations are at a disadvantage because of 
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Table12.3 :  Fill-Rates of the MFN Quota Excluding Country-specific Non-traditional 




1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Costa Rica  .  .  88.35  97.50  100.47  n.a.  n.a. 
Colombia  .  .  80.59  113.42  100.78  n.a.  n.a. 
Nicaragua   .  .  .  15.90  56.50  n.a.  n.a. 
Venezuela  .  .  69,83  48.06  58.78  n.a.  n.a. 
Panama  .  .  .  .  .  .  n.a. 
Ecuador  .  .  .  .  .  .  n.a. 
Subtotal  .  .  84.11  93.79  96.53  n.a.  n.a. 
„Other“ Third 
Countries 
.  .  91.51  95.54  102.87  n.a.  n.a. 
Total Third 
Countries  .  .  87.70  91.61  97.92  n.a.  n.a. 
Total ACP
a  .  .  78.31  98.52  83.10  n.a.  n.a. 
Total  n.a  95.66  87.39  91.85  97.40  n.a.  n.a. 
a = Due to the available data which do not allow to distinguish between different types of 
licenses, it was 
 impossible to allocate over-quota imports due to hurricane licenses. Therefore, these were left 
out. 
b = Dominican Republic und non-traditional imports from ACP countries; n.a. = not available.   
Source: Own computations with data from EUROSTAT (1998) and EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 
 
 
varying harvest seasons across countries, leading to lower fill-rates.  More importantly, the 
introduction of export certificates led to a reduction of quota rent for the importing firms.  
Therefore, banana imports under the global “other” quota share from other Latin American 
countries were relatively more profitable [ OSÓRIO-PETERS (1998); WTO (1999)]. This probably 
explains most of the difference in fill-rates between BFA signatories and non-signatories. 
Rising overall fill-rates occurred once market participants adjusted to the administrative 
burdens imposed by the CMOB.  Rules on licensing and t he arbitrary distribution of licenses to 
market participants, who had never imported bananas before, damaged existing business   159
relations.  These had to be rebuilt over time.  Some importers could only reach their pre-CMOB 
quantities by buying licenses from those favored by the licensing regime. 
 
12.4  The WTO Panel Report on the Implementation of TRQs in the Banana Case 
 
Article XIII GATT  
The most recent WTO Panel Report on the EU’s banana regime ruled that the MFN tariff 
quota of 2,553,000 t and the 857,700 t reserved for duty free traditional imports from ACP 
countries constitute separate regimes, and so are inconsistent with Article XIII.  The EU’s view 
was that the 857,700 t are not a tariff quota but an upper limit for the zero-tariff preference 
granted to traditional imports from ACP countries.  
The Panel also finds that the Lomé waiver
1) does not overcome inconsistencies with 
Article XIII of the GATT. It then decides that the general requirement of non-discrimination of 
Art. XIII:1 has been violated on the ground that individual suppliers from traditional ACP 
countries and non-substantial suppliers from non-traditional ACP or third countries are not 
equally restricted, since the first can also import under the MFN quota while the second cannot 
import under the ACP quota. Furthermore, Art. XIII:2 requires that the distribution of trade 
within the quota is as close as possible to the distribution in a hypothetical free trade situation. 
To this end, an importing country can either set up a global quota  or allocate country-specific 
shares. In this latter case, XIII: 2(d) provides that the importing country should seek an 
agreement with all substantial suppliers to fix their country-specific shares
2). If this is not 
practicable, the importing country can i mpose these unilaterally, based upon the respective 
proportions supplied during a previous representative period. In cases where there is no 
representative period, it is still possible either to have a global tariff quota or to find country-
specific allocations by agreement.  In the here relevant representative period, the ACP quota 
share was filled, on average, only up to about 80%, whereas the MFN quota share always had a 
                                                 
1) The purpose of the Lomé waiver is to enable the EU to follow its obligations resulting from the Lomé 
Convention  that grants former colonies of European countries in Africa, the Caribbean and some 
Pacific Islands (ACP countries) preferential trade relations with the EU. Regarding the general question 
to which extent WTO inconsistent measures are waived, see next paragraph. 
2) This is a main reason why the Framework Agreement had been criticized before: Country-specific allo-
cations were only introduced to some, but not all substantial suppliers.   160
fill rate of more than 95%. From this, it is deduced that the free trade distribution of imports 
would be different from this quota allocation imposed by the EU, which is therefore found to be 
inconsistent with the proportionality requirement Art. XIII: 2. 
Article I GATT: Extent of Lomé Waiver with respect to MFN Clause  
There is a legal distinction between traditional and non-traditional imports from ACP 
countries in Article I GATT regarding the Lomé Waiver with respect to the MFN clause. 
According to previous WTO interpretations, it is only to traditional banana imports that the 
provision of Art. 183 Lomé Convention applies. This in turn demands that no ACP State should 
be worse-off with respect to market access to its traditional markets and “advantages” on these 
markets. In contrast to this, Art. 168 provides that imports from ACP countries which are subject 
to the EU’s common agricultural policy, i.e. also non-traditional banana imports, are to be 
granted more favorable treatment than imports from third countries.  
The Panel mainly decides that the Lomé waiver does not cover quantities exported by a 
particular ACP country in excess of its individual pre-1991 best ever level. Therefore, the prefe-
rential tariff on such excess volumes is inconsistent with Art. I:1. Since the European Com-
munities abolished country-specific allocations within the 857,700 t quota share for traditional 
imports from ACP countries, such excess quantities of more competitive countries at the expense 
of less competitive ones are possible. 
Licensing Procedures and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Violations of the GATS were found, for the first time, in the 1997 Panel Report.  The EU 
essentially maintained that its licensing regime governed trade in goods and not trade in 
services
1) and that the provisions of GATT and GATS were mutually exclusive. The 
                                                 
1) Article I:2 of GATS defines its coverage as including four modes of supply of services: cross-border 
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural persons. [...] 
Article I:2 of GATS provides: 
"For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other 
Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the   161
complainants
2) argued that the banana regime’s licensing procedures were aimed at modifying 
competitive conditions in favor of EU and ACP wholesale firms.  
The Panel found that the licensing regime was inconsistent with the MFN as well as the 
national treatment clause of GATS, because it favors EU and ACP firms. Even though the EU 
claimed that the distribution of quota rent was discretionary and not within the scope of WTO 
rules, the Panel implicitly rebutted this view.  The fact, that firms in the complainants’ countries 
(mostly category A), had to purchase licenses from EU/ACP firms, which were mostly category 
B operators, in order to maintain their previous market share within the sector of Latin American 
Bananas, modified, according to the Panel, c ompetitive conditions in a GATS inconsistent way. 
Therefore, the EU licensing system for bananas was found to be inconsistent with its obligations 
with respect to wholesale trade services under GATS.   
   In the revised system, import licenses are allocated to traditional operators
1) on the basis 
of reference quantities, which in turn consist of “actually” imported quantities in 1994-96. To 
prove that one has “actually” imported bananas, one has to prove payment of customs duties. 
The crucial question is whether allocation of licenses based on this criterion prolongs the de 
facto discrimination found before.  This is the claim made by Ecuador in the latest dispute.  
Overall, the Panel argued that the previous regime was discriminatory and that today’s 
license holders are those favored by that regime, so that Noboa, an Ecuadorian service supplier 
that provides wholesale services, and other third country suppliers are at a competitive 
disadvantage. Consequently, there are carry-over effects of GATS inconsistent aspects of the 
previous regime. The European Commission itself had acknowledged in a Working Document 
that an allocation on the basis of the “license usage method” would “fossilize license allocation”. 
As a result, there is a presumption that the revised license allocation system is inconsistent with 
Art. II GATS (MFN clause) and Art. XVII GATS (national treatment clause). Given that 
Ecuador could show that its service suppliers had in cases to enter contracts that did not allow 
them proof of customs duties, it was up to the EU to bring sufficient evidence to rebut above 
                                                                                                                                                             
territory of any other Member".   
2) Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States 
1) In order to be eligible as a traditional operator, firms must have been established in the EU during the 
respective reference period and must have imported a minimum quantity of bananas.   162
presumption, which it did not. So the Panel concluded that there is de facto discrimination in 
violation of Art. II and Art. XVII of GATS. 
Therefore, the degrees of freedom that an importing country has in designing an 
administrative system of TRQ`s quota can also be limited if there has been found discrimination 
in the past. Rules that perpetuate the economic effects of the old system are not allowed, even 
though they may be legitimate under WTO rules. 
12.5  Economic Impacts of TRQ Administration and Licensing Procedures 
The impacts on trade distortions, quota rents and economic inefficiency depend on the 
size of the MFN and ACP quotas, and the fill rates.   Dollar-banana exporters may not be worse-
off compared with the pre-CMOB situation.  These exporters lost sales on the formerly 
liberalized markets like Germany but gained access on formerly more protectionist markets like 
France ( GUYOMARD/LAROCHE/LE  MOUËL, 1999).   Foreign trading firms lost sales volumes on 
former free-trade markets due to the quantitative restrictions but gained “windfall profits” in the 
form of quota rents. Losses to dollar-banana producers in exporting countries may coincide with 
welfare gains for multinational firms trading those bananas.   
The analysis above suggests that quota rents under the TRQ administration of the CMOB 
remained in the importing countries or went to multinational firms, which are vertically 
integrated and have subsidiaries in the EU. The latter aspect enabled non-European firms to 
participate in the import license allocation. These firms were mostly category A operators and 
primary importers. Firms in exporting countries that do not have subsidiaries in the EU had been 
excluded from the license allocation under the original TRQ administration. 
This pattern changed, as explained in section 12.1, with the introduction of the 
Framework Agreement.  The signatories could issue export licenses that were required for A and 
C importers in order to receive import licenses. So part of the quota rents was redistributed to 
some, but not all exporting countries. The move from the Framework Agreement to the 1998 
reform of the CMOB exacerbated the market position of these exporting countries, and led to a 
redistribution of quota rents back to importing countries and vertically integrated multinational 
firms, because now only import licenses are used as in the original scheme.  So the 1997 Panel   163
decision that rightly criticized discriminatory elements of the CMOB’s licensing system, has 
nevertheless led to a system change that reduced the welfare of exporting countries. 
 Apart from these effects on the distribution of income among countries and market 
participants, there are several aspects that concern the economic efficiency of the CMOB.  
Inefficiencies are caused, for instance by the overall allocation of TRQs towards banana imports 
from ACP countries as opposed to Latin American countries. We have seen earlier that the fill-
rates of the TRQs for traditional banana imports from ACP countries were always well below 
100%. The fill rates for the imports from the dollar-banana suppliers have been close to 100% 
but did not exceed 100% because the out-of-quota tariff for imports from third countries was 
prohibitive.  This pattern of differential fill-rates across differing TRQs holds true for the initial 
administration of TRQs as well as for the later modifications in the CMOB.  This indicates 
inefficient TRQ allocation. The overall size of the third-country quota is  too low compared with 
the size of the quota for traditional imports from ACP countries. 
Furthermore, adjustment costs have been high as a consequence of frequent policy 
changes within the first six years of the CMOB. Quota allocation, license allocation a nd 
administrative procedures have been changed several times.  Adjustment costs are visible in 
fluctuating fill-rates of the quotas. It was revealed earlier that the fill-rates decreased in general 
with the policy change from the original rules to the Framework Agreement.  Adjustment costs 
were borne by multinational trading firms, too, due to the preference for imports from ACP 
versus Latin American countries in the EU. Investments in African countries were realized, in 
particular in Côte d' Ivoire and Cameroon, in order to take advantage of the preference for ACP 
bananas.  
Adjustment costs were also caused by the dominating "historical" allocation rule in the 
import-licensing process for all market participants at the import stage. Some unprofitable out-
of-quota imports occurred as an “investment” in future quota rents, since they increased the 
importer’s reference quantities for future license allocations. 
Substantial transaction costs added to the inefficiencies. Under the original rules of the 
CMOB, the shares of activity groups in the license allocation did not coincide with trade patterns 
in a hypothetical free-trade situation.  This caused an intensive trade with licenses, which,   164
besides redistributing income, causes significant resources and so diminishes the overall size of 
the quota rent captured by importers. In general, firms had to invest time and money in 
understanding and applying a difficult licensing scheme, and spent resources which could have 
been used more effectively from the society's point of view in production, processing and trading 
activities.  
Furthermore, rent-seeking has risen enormously due to the introduction of TRQs in general 
and, partly, due to the specific rules of TRQ administration. Due to the lasting trade dispute 
around the rules of the CMOB, which has occurred since the beginning of the 1990s, all market 
participants in the EU banana economy engaged in the political market and in rent-seeking. 
PEDLER (1994) documented in detail the lobbying process prior to the introduction of the original 
CMOB and elaborated how the fruit companies influenced the outcome. A recent article in 
TIME magazine reports how Chiquita lobbied with a lot of perseverance and money in order to 
get the US Administration to complain at the WTO [TIME, Feb. 7, 2000]. This ultimately led to 
the Panel report of 1997. 
12.6  Implications of the WTO Panel Report 
  Many of the rulings from the Panel have significant implications for the export/import licensing 
procedures and the country export quota allocation schemes for all 1,370 agricultural TRQs registered in 
the WTO. The most important lessons from the WTO Panel Reports on Bananas seem to be the 
following two: 
(i)  The administration of quantitative restrictions has to be non-discriminatory. 
(ii)  TRQs are GATS-relevant and will often be inconsistent with GATS rules. 
Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative restrictions 
Under TRQs, the distribution of trade within the quota shall be as close as possible to the 
distribution in a hypothetical free trade situation. As explained earlier, an importing country may 
implement this rule by setting up a global quota or by allocating country-specific shares by 
agreement with all substantial suppliers.  Lessons can be drawn from the regulations in the 
CMOB, which were seen as inconsistent with GATT Article XIII:   165
•  Violations of this rule exist if a third country is restricted more than others. Ecuador claimed 
this successfully in its case against the CMOB. 
•  Benchmark years for quota allocation cannot be years which trade was already distorted by 
quantitative restrictions. Either there are such years of free trade or adjustments must be 
made. However, no one has yet answered the question how these adjustments are to made in 
practice.  
•  Preferential trade agreements do not provide a n automatic waiver for preferential treatment 
granted through country-specific allocations that are inconsistent with the requirements of 
Art. XIII. 
The GATS-Relevance of TRQs 
The most surprising result of the WTO Panel Report on Bananas is that the CMOB i s GATS-
relevant and so may have implications for all other TRQs in agriculture.  There is no clear–cut argument 
for why a TRQ should be GATS-relevant. A major question is whether "trade in services" is involved in 
banana trade.  Services can be defined either the demand–or supply–side.  If we use a demand-oriented 
definition of services, the usual distinction is between demand for goods and services. Goods are 
separated in nondurable or consumer goods and durable goods. Bananas as well as all foods would be 
classified as consumer goods and not services. Consumer expenditures for bananas in their full amount 
would be expenditures for consumer goods, although services may be involved in the value of the final 
good. Hence, trade regulations in the banana market would be GATT– and not GATS-relevant.  
From a supply-oriented point of view, transport services on the way from the exporting country 
to the importing country could be involved and supplied by transport firms, i.e. the service sector. It has 
to be taken into account, however, that sea transport of bananas is combined with ripening and has the 
character of a processing activity. Most often, own vessels of multinational firms carry out this transport 
and processing activity. Only at a later stage, after ripening, services are added in the importing country 
to the final product. At the border, bananas are typically in the ripening process. Based on this view, the 
European Commission has argued that licenses under the CMOB refer to green bananas at the border 
and thus to a good which is still "processed". This suggests that the CMOB would only be GATT-
relevant.   166
The Panel has taken a much broader view and argued that the licensing regime was inconsistent 
with GATS as it changes competitive conditions in favor of firms of EU or ACP origin. The term of Art. 
1 GATS “measures...affecting trade in services” is interpreted to include measures which do not directly 
govern trade in services but which indirectly have an impact on competitive conditions in a service 
sector which is linked to trade in goods. Consequently, the administration of TRQs and the resulting 
distribution of quota rents is not left to the importing country’s discretion if it is discriminating in a 
WTO inconsistent manner.  
It follows, from all this, that the value of an imported good contains the value of services which 
might or might not be imported, and if they are, the service provider might or might not be from the 
exporting country.  Consequently, the net distinction that rights to rents are either allocated to the 
exporting country or to the importing country cannot be maintained. 
There are two main conclusions from the WTO Panel on Bananas for other TRQs: 
•  The Panel's conclusions suggest that it is expected that a large part of quota rents will be captured by 
the wholesale and thus service sector. Therefore, a TRQ does not only protect local production but 
also connected service sectors. Their protection, however, should not occur in a discriminating way, 
since this kind of protection happens rather incidentally and is not the declared and legitimate 
purpose of TRQs. 
•  One cannot mix arguments about competition policy with the allocation of import licenses. 
It is the conclusion of the Panel Report that the allocation of licenses for imports from dollar-banana 
exporters and for nontraditional imports from ACP countries favored EU firms as opposed to foreign 
firms. Various authors had argued [ MCQUEEN  (1999);  BORRELL  (1994)] that production costs are much 
higher in ACP than in Latin American countries.  Therefore, with a uniform market price for the 
varieties, quota rents would have been much higher for trade in dollar bananas. With a historical rather 
than a discretionary allocation of import licenses in the original CMOB, foreign firms would have 
received a much higher license share according to the Panel's view.  Companies, which were categorized 
as A operators, namely, according to the Complainants, Chiquita Brands (US), Dole Foods (US), Noboa 
(Ecuador), Del Monte (Mexico), Uniban (Colombia) and Banacol (Colombia), would benefit by far most 
from the quota rent. According to the Panel, the EU wanted to let European companies share in those   167
benefits.  Those companies, whose origin countries were those that formerly had protected market
1), 
closely monitored and tried to influence the originating Common Market legislation.  However, the 
Panel Report of 1997 made clear that such kind of antitrust policy with the means of an import licensing 
system is not legitimate by WTO standards.  At least not, if a country has made GATS commitments for 
the wholesale sector as the EU had done.  As the Panel has made clear as well, the MFN clause of 
GATS always applies, but the National Treatment clause applies only if the respective sector is included 
in the country's s chedule.  Consequently, a country can protect its importers, but it would have to 
bargain over such protection on a specific market at multilateral negotiations. 
12.7  Summary 
The TRQ system under the Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) is a special and 
very interesting case among the many agricultural TRQs introduced in recent years.  Several Panel 
Reports repeatedly found inconsistencies of the TRQ administration with various GATT and GATS 
rules.  Even though some of these findings surely apply o nly to the very particular administrative design 
of the CMOB, others, in contrast, are of a much more fundamental nature: Many other TRQ’s do also 
not meet the criteria set up by the Panel. 
The administration of TRQs has changed several times. A complicated system of quota 
and license allocation was introduced in the original CMOB of 1993.  Preferential access is given 
to imports from ACP countries, with reference to the Lomé waiver.  The allocation of quotas and 
licenses did not follow consistently historical patterns, because important discretionary elements 
interfered as well.  The unstable policy framework led to fluctuating fill-rates.  Fill-rates have 
been higher for dollar-banana imports that reached almost 100% in several years.  Fill-rates for 
traditional imports from ACP countries are generally much lower and typically reach about 80%. 
This suggests an inefficient quota allocation with strong economic impacts on resource allocation 
and income distribution.  Quota rents are high and untargeted, with  multinational firms, 
European importing firms and exporting countries lobbying for the rents. 
                                                 
1) "Operatos classified in Category  B for most of their past trade volume: e.g., Geest (UK), Fuffes (Ire-
land), Pomona (France), Compagnie Fruitière (France),  CBN/Durand (France), Gipam (France), Cop-
laca (Spain), Bargoso  SA (Spain). (Information submitted by the Complainants)". [ WTO (1997), 
p.380)].   168
The Panel has clarified that two issues are crucial in the evaluation of TRQs: (i) The 
administration of TRQs has to be non-discriminatory. (ii) TRQs are GATS-relevant and may not 
discriminate against foreign firms of connected service sectors.  The Panel Report indicated that 
the WTO thinks primarily in terms of market-shares, which may or may not be correlated with 
welfare effects.  It is most likely that many  agricultural TRQs do not fulfil these two criteria 
emphasized by the Panel.  Discriminatory components in TRQs are as likely as the fact that 
competitive conditions in associated service sectors will be altered at the expense of at least 
some foreign firms.  
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13.  Assessment 
TRQs have become an important instrument affecting international agricultural trade, as 
signatories to the URAA endeavor to meet their obligations to increase international access to 
their markets.  The overall purpose of this Consortium paper is to increase understanding of how 
TRQs work, both in principle and in practice, specific attention being paid to issues such as 
methods of quota administration, quota fill, and appropriate means of achieving trade 
liberalization in the presence of TRQs. 
Several policy implications for future negotiations can be identified from the discussion 
of TRQs outlined in this Commissioned Paper.  The results of previous chapters show that the 
TRQ system is working reasonably well in terms of fulfilling market access commitments, quota 
fill rates and transparency.  However, in some cases economic inefficiencies and discriminatory 
practices remain in the administration methods adopted by individual countries in allocating the 
rights to import and export agricultural products.  Some additional conditions and restrictions on 
import licenses are often made, at times resulting in costly and cumbersome import procedures.   
In addition to the indirect effect of increasing imports through improved administration of 
TRQs on imports, liberalizing market access directly by reducing tariffs and expanding quotas 
can do a good deal more.  Placing emphasis on liberalizing TRQs as well as changing their 
methods of administration will ensure that the negotiations are focused o n the process of 
improving market access as opposed to merely mediating disputes over who has the rights to the 
quota rents. 
As is now generally accepted, implementation of the URAA did not actually result in a 
significant degree of trade liberalization.  Countries were meant to steadily increase the quotas 
and decrease out-of-quota tariffs, thereby facilitating a smooth transition to free trade over time.  
TRQs, originally designed to ensure a minimum degree of market access, have actually resulted 
in a large number of quantitative import restrictions being institutionalized under the rubric of 
the GATT, along with the associated quota rents.  These quota rents have been consolidated 
formally in the URAA through the use of TRQs, which have continued rent-seeking behavior. 
This occurred even though the URAA was to convert quantitative restrictions, and other non-  170
tariff barriers to trade into transparent tariffs, which could then be successively reduced through 
trade negotiations.   
Essentially, the implementation of TRQs following the URAA has institutionalized rents 
for certain exporters, which in turn has ensured that they will resist any attempts to reallocate 
those rents.  It would be unfortunate if the WTO negotiations were to get embroiled in refereeing 
disputes over who should get these rents rather than focusing on liberalizing the very instruments 
that are creating the rents in the first place.  In summary, the policy principle the negotiators 
should follow is to significantly reduce out-of-quota tariffs and increase (or eliminate) quotas at 
the same time.  The objective of the negotiations should then be on liberalizing trade directly, so 
that real progress is made toward free trade in agricultural and food products.  Simultaneous 
efforts should be made to introduce more efficient methods of quota allocation in order to 
minimize the possibility of future disputes over rent allocation.    
The distribution of rents, and the attendant rent-seeking behavior that goes with it, is what 
drives the politics of  TRQ administration.  GATT Article XIII does allow, in principle, for the 
reallocation of quota rights if a specific exporter suffers a loss of comparative advantage such 
that a lower cost supplier should be allocated the quota rights.  However, this ignores the fact 
that once agents are vested with the rights to rents, they will seek to keep those rights, and 
historically, no reallocation under Article XIII has ever taken place.  As a consequence of this, 
negotiating quota allocation in the WTO will simply  have the structure of a zero-sum game, and 
is unlikely to generate any real progress toward trade liberalization.  In fact, it has the potential to 
tie up the negotiations altogether.  Legislating the auctioning of quota rights and allowing trade 
in licenses would minimize future disputes over allocation as they are based on a market solution 
to the rights allocation problem.     
The success of TRQS in increasing market access is mixed, and varies substantially 
between countries.  In the EU, for example about half of the TRQs were instituted to maintain 
preferential trade arrangements where existing negotiated arrangements existed. In both the EU 
and the US, as in most other cases, TRQs were applied to politically sensitive commodities and 
permitted continuation of trade policy regimes similar to existing regimes.  For example, TRQs 
in the US permit continuation of sugar import quotas given to historical importers. The greatest   171
degree of liberalization was probably found for the developing countries, who in m any cases 
reduced tariff and experienced significant increases in imports.  But in many of those cases 
applied tariffs are well below bound tariffs, so that this liberalization is not guaranteed under 
GATT to remain in force.  This is in sharp contrast to the US and EU, where applied tariffs are 
generally at bound levels, but those levels do not often represent significant reductions from 
domestic reforms that preceded the GATT agreement (the 1991 US farm bill and the 1992 
McSharry reforms).  It is interesting to note that in the developing countries where there has been 
liberalization, TRQS are not instituted as in rich countries.  Applied tariff often implement the 
regime so quantitative restrictions do not arise.  Their notifications are indented to indicate that 
they are complying with their minimum access commitments. 
Given only minimal market access has been ensured by the implementation of TRQs 
following the URAA, what is the appropriate objective for the trade negotiators to adopt?  As is 
laid out very clearly in Chapter 2, it is critical for trade negotiators to identify which of the three 
instruments within a TRQ is actually effective in order to maximize the initial impact of trade 
liberalization. It is also particularly important for negotiators to identify how soon an instrument 
becomes redundant after liberalization, as the binding instrument may change quickly with 
liberalization.  While reducing the very high out-of-quota-tariffs may seem an attractive political 
option to negotiators, due to the fact that there is a significant amount of “water” in many of 
these tariffs, the net result will be little or no increase in the degree of trade liberalization if either 
the quota or in-quota-tariff is actually the effective instrument.  But as long as a two-tiered tariff 
regime remains, so does the possibility of quotas and so rent seeking.  Therefore, it may be better 
to reduce the out-of quota tariff significantly and eliminate quotas all together.  For example, 
reducing the out-of-quota tariff will expand imports in those cases where the tariff equivalent of 
the quota is very close to it, and even then, decreasing tariffs  and increasing quotas will 
maximize the gains from liberalization.  If however, the tariff equivalent of the quota is 
significantly b elow the out-of-quota tariff, increasing the size of the quota will have an 
immediate effect.   
The choice among liberalization alternatives depends to some extent on how resigned one 
is to continued managed trade, and the need for compromise to make any p rogress at all in   172
negotiations.  Particularly OECD countries have used this instrument to maintain management of 
trade where that was felt to be politically necessary or desirable. 
The efficacy of increasing quotas is based on the premise that the chosen method of quota 
allocation does not itself generate distortions.  But if a quota is allocated to high cost producers 
on the basis of historical shares, increasing that quota may actually result in a decline in quota 
fill, as the relevant market price will n ot be high enough to provide high cost suppliers with an 
incentive to meet the quota.  This result simply reinforces the notion that negotiators should 
consider liberalizing the quota and out-of-quota tariff significantly and at the same time, in 
conjunction with changes in the methods of allocating the rights to import and export. 
The latter point raises the issue of whether negotiations in the WTO should largely focus 
on the issue of how TRQs are administered, and how to minimize trade disputes over the 
allocation of quota rents.  On the face of it, reviewing, and seeking change in the administration 
of TRQs is a worthy objective for the negotiators.  As pointed out in Chapter 3, the WTO is only 
concerned with how the administration of TRQs influences the  volume and distribution of trade.  
But inefficient allocation of the right to import and export can in itself have an impact on trade 
flows.  Therefore, reforming administration of TRQs in such a way as to promote the use of 
more efficient allocation methods, such as auctioning and tradable licenses, may generate short-
term welfare gains through increased fill rates of TRQs and substitution of low cost for high cost 
exporters. At a minimum, reduction of the use of historical shares as an implementation 
mechanism would reduce the inefficiencies and favoritism now inherent in this instrument. In 
addition, this would minimize both the economic distortions caused by TRQs and the resulting 
discrimination with arbitrary allocation methods.   
It was argued above that the overall principle of the trade negotiations should be the 
liberalization of international trade.  Within this overall principle, negotiations within the WTO 
should focus, at a minimum, on achieving the following in terms of developing disciplines on 
market access: 
•  Develop rules on the administration of quota licenses such as auctioning, tradability between 
firms, and the supervision of first-come-first-serve situations to minimize unnecessary costs   173
•  Eliminate country specific export quotas or allow them to be tradable. 
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